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Abstract.
The aim of this study is to illuminate in a novel and original manner the political
and ethical character of Nietzche's project of revaluation and to demonstrate its
continued import and significance for thinking on culture and society today. In
order to achieve this, I have placed Nietzsche's work in relation to the fiction,
poetry, and prose of D.H. Lawrence, who, it is argued, provides the most
imaginative and vital development of the above. In turn, Lawrence's thinking is
exposed to more recent theoretical developments, thereby giving a good indication
of the wider philosophical and political traditions within which the Nietzschean
narrative of revaluation is produced, circulated, and maintained - and those
against which it moves.
It is argued that this narrative, although now widely studied and debated, remains
an illicit and marginalized form of philosophical discourse; one that is often
derided and condemned by those whose own narratives form the dominant and
legitimized language games within modern liberal society. Nietzsche's philosophy
thus provides a vital counter-discourse which allows things to be said and voices
to be heard that few other forms of philosophical discourse dare to allow. It is
crucial, therefore, that such a text be explored, developed, and enabled to
perform a role in as wide a social arena as possible.
In attempting to do this over the course of the five chapters that make up the
work, several of the major themes and concerns of Nietzschean and post-
Nietzschean philosophy, such as power and the reconfiguration of the subject, are
examined at length and the thesis provides an exciting contribution both to
Nietzsche studies and to the critical work on Lawrence, demonstrating the validity
of Foucault's contention that the relation between philosophy, literature, and
politics is permanent and fundamental.
It is concluded that Nietzsche's and Lawrence's political thinking is of most
interest and use to us today when it becomes molecularized and minoritarianized;
a politics of desire that frees itself from molar ambition and ascetic militancy,
and, perhaps, opens the way not to fascism as is often feared, but, on the
contrary, to a radically new notion of democracy: the democracy of touch.
A Note on the Abbreviations Used in the Text.
Where I have cited from Lawrence's novels at the heart of this thesis, the
references are given immediately in the text and not in the Notes and References
section, as is the case for all other writings. I have employed the following
standard abbreviations for these novels:
AR - Aaron's Rod, ed. Mara Kalnins, (Penguin Books, 1995).*
EC - The Escaped Cock, in The Complete Short Novels, ed. Keith Sagar and
Melissa Partridge, (Penguin Books, 1990).
FLC - The First Lady Chatterley, (Penguin Books, 1986).
JTLJ - John Thomas and Lady Jane, (Penguin Books, 1986).
K - Kangaroo, ed. Bruce Steele, (Penguin Books, 1997). *
LCL - Lady Chatterley's Lover, ed. Michael Squires, (Penguin Books, 1994). *
PS - The Plumed Serpent, ed. L.D. Clark & and Virginia Crosswhite-Hyde,
(Penguin Books, 1995). *
R - The Rainbow, ed. Mark Kinkead-Weekes, (Penguin Books, 1995).*
WL - Women in Love, ed. David Farmer et aI, (Penguin Books, 1995). *
NB: Titles marked with an asterisk are based on the text established In The
Cambridge Edition of the Works of D.H. Lawrence.
Outside the Gate: An Introduction.
Part I: Formal Remarks.
The aim of this thesis is to illuminate the political and ethical character of
Nietzsche's project of revaluation, by situating it within the context provided by
the fiction, poetry, and prose of D.H. Lawrence, who, it is argued, provides the
most imaginative and vital development of the above. In addition, Lawrence's
thought is exposed to other strains of post-Nietzschean thought and theory where
and when it becomes convenient and/or constructive to do so, giving an indication
of the philosophical and political traditions within which the Nietzschean narrative
is produced, maintained, and circulated - and those against which it moves. Most
notably, the work of Deleuze is utilized here (including his studies in collaboration
with Guattari), as is the thought of Heidegger. This is not to imply that the above
all share the same political perspectives, social concerns, or philosophical
approaches; quite clearly they do not and this work is not an attempt to produce
a metanarrative that would suggest otherwise by illegitimately synthesizing the
above in some manner. That said, it is my contention that there is a 'family
resemblance' which is not merely coincidental among the above, and that there are
obvious points of contact and signs of mutual infection worthy of investigation.
It is claimed that there are five main consequences of the death of God and that
these form the five themes of Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean philosophy: 1.
the destruction of the world (nihilism); 2. the dissolution of the subject; 3. the
dis-organ-ization of the organism and the building of the body without organs; 4.
the molecularization and minoritarianization of culture and politics; 5. the
'stuttering' of language. Coincidently, the thesis has been divided into five main
chapters in which the above are crucial notions, although they do not determine
the structure of the work. This, the structure, has been determined rather by
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Lawrence's novels, following a chronological sequence that begins with The
Rainbow and ends with The Escaped Cock, tracing out Lawrence's attempt to
articulate and further the revaluation of values. The chapters are divided into
parts in order to facilitate an easier reading, and each is provided with
preliminary material and closing remarks in order to supplement the more general
Introduction and Conclusion offered to the thesis as a whole. They are united by
the above themes of power, subjectivity, and the need to form new relations and
new ways of feeling, as well as by the central argument that both Nietzsche's and
Lawrence's work is of important social and political significance. I shall say more
concerning this latter point shortly. First, I wish to offer a brief reading and
summary of the five chapters in this thesis, so that the thinking behind them is
made explicit.
Chapter I sets out the central problematic of the work: modern European
nihilism, and offers an initial response to this in terms of what we are calling here
a politics of style; a politics which, as we show, bifurcates into a grand politics of
evil and cruelty (examined in chapters II and III) and a molecular politics of desire
(developed in chapters IV and V). Debate in this opening chapter takes place
within a fictional environment (the Ruins) provided by Lawrence's two great
novels of modernity and nihilism: The Rainbowand Women in Love. It touches
on Questions to do with economics, technology, culture and the subject. I argue
that whilst industrial capitalism is fundamentally nihilistic (reducing as it does life
to market value and the logic of the machine and destroying as it does the
conditions needed for cultural greatness as Nietzsche understands it), it may
nevertheless release flows and forces which enable the emergence of new forms of
self and society. Simply put, there may be positive aspects to the so-called crisis
of nihilism, and the decadence that is both causal and symptomatic of it may yet
prove to be vital for the advancement (and, indeed, enhancement) of man. Besides
which, as Nietzsche argues, 'no one is free to be a crab'; i.e., there can be no
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side-stepping or going back, modernity cannot be reversed and modern European
nihilism has to be confronted, explored, and experienced. The only way to move
beyond the Ruins may be via an active acceleration of the processes now
unfolding, thereby bringing nihilism to the point of its own consummation
whereupon it reveals itself not simply as an End (of Man and History), but as
that which provides the very womb of the future. For if nihilism devalues values
on the one hand, so too does it provide the opportunity for a revaluation on the
other, by enabling man to form a new and uncanny perspective on himself and
the world. Thus, as I conclude here, at the very least nihilism is an ambiguous
state of affairs in need of calm and careful consideration, free from the
apocalyptic rhetoric that all too often surrounds it. If it remains in a very real
sense the impasse that dominates our horizons and determines the limits of our
thought, so too is it the promise of a newly open horizon and of a thinking that
exists beyond the old conventions of moral-rationalism.
As mentioned, chapter I also examines a politics of style developed as a positive
and appropriate response to nihilism; art being promoted as the counter-nihilistic
force par excellence. For art, it is suggested, provides the possibility of another
revealing for man (i.e., another way of being in the world) and allows him to
regain connection with the physical (i.e., to come back into touch with the real).
This construction of a new revealing, or what Deleuze calls a 'change of element',
enables man to move from negation of the world to its total affirmation. It is my
contention that a different revealing based upon art and an understanding of the
tragic is a genuine possibility and not merely a form of utopian speculation; for
when art allies itself with politics and ethics, then the revolt into style becomes
very much a revolt into the real. Art helps us correspond to the nearness of
things and the very thingness of things, awakening in us an intuitive awareness
and a sensitivity to physical intensities. It is for this reason that art has long
troubled a long line of moral idealists and political ascetics - from Plato to Stalin.
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A radical politics of style would be characterized above all by plurality,
heterogeneity, contradiction, and difference; a radical ethics of style would
promote not only care and creation of the self (in the ancient Greek manner
revived by Nietzsche and Foucault), but also a concern for others and otherness.
At this point, the question of style bubbles over into and points towards the
more profound notion of desire; the major theme of chapters IV and V, as
indicated.
However, prior to this, in chapters II and Ill, we necessarily explore a different
but related theme: Power and, in relation to this theme, a politics of evil and
cruelty. This is examined in the context provided by Lawrence's so-called 'power-
trilogy' of novels: Asron's Rod, Kangaroo and The Plumed Serpent; works which
whilst experimental and speculative on the one hand (books for thinking - nothing
else), seemingly fall into the programmatic and prescriptive on the other,
concerning as they do the revolutionary seizure of history and the mechanisms of
state power, and the imposition of a violent authoritarianism at a molar party-
political level that is all too characteristic of modern political theory and practice
on both the extreme-left and the far-right of the ideological spectrum.
In an attempt to move beyond the Ruins and overcome the impasse of nihilism,
Nietzsche and Lawrence consider a transcendent and transgressive politics based
on a theoretical and fictional terrorism and a radical aristocratism, the latter
combining elements that are peculiarly pre- and post-modern, as well as modern
and counter-modern at one and the same time. Such a politics is certainly
suggested by their cultural and aesthetic thinking, as well as their understanding
of power, and although many critics (such as Mark Warren, for example) have
argued that Nietzsche's aristocratism has no intrinsic relation to his philosophy
(and thus can be legitimately divorced from such and thence abandoned), we argue
here that there is a closer and more intricate link than such critics allow; even
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whilst conceding that, ultimately, the above politics proves strategically to be of
limited use in forming a workable contemporary model.
Try as Nietzsche and Lawrence do to suggest the radical nature of their
aristocratism, they frequently slip into a lazy and fundamentally conservative
authoritarianism that reproduces not only the errors of classical political
philosophy, but also several of the base stupidities of modem political theory.
Somewhat disappointingly, it seems that neither Nietzsche or Lawrence could ever
quite find the resources needed to endure the experience of nihilism, and thus
each falls back into the quest for some dramatic means of transcending the Ruins
and completing the history of Western metaphysics. This tendency in both writers
to oscillate frantically from an advocacy of ever-further deterritorialization to
desperate attempts to reterritorialize in the void; from a desire to accelerate the
processes of decodification to a desire to recodify all the more completely, is, as
will be illustrated, a marked feature of their writings. They too, at times, suffer
from the condition of modernity which they set out to diagnose; i.e., their
thinking is never quite as untimely or resentment-free as they would have us
believe. Nietzsche and Lawrence are, one suggests, simply mistaken when each
allows his preoccupations with the possibility of a new beginning to force him
into assuming the role of an overly anxious mid-wife who prematurely attempts
to induce the birth of such via inappropriate (and potentially disastrous) means.
Only by abandoning the politics of transgression and hopes for a revolutionary
transcendence will man save himself from the threat of fascism (an ever-present
danger at both a macro- and micro-level, which is discussed in this work) and
free himself at long last from the twin spirits of revenge and gravity; a crucial
aspect of Nietzsche's revaluation.
Chapters II and III are also both concerned with tracing that which lies outside of
the political and, indeed, the human (i.e., outside of morality and reason). We
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witness how the attempt is made by Lawrence in Kangaroo and The Plumed
Serpent to bring a notion of the Outside into his thinking on politics and
subjectivity; to reconfigure the latter in terms of the daimonic and the divine and
to transform political thinking via the substantiation of mystery and the re-
introduction of the gods back into history.
This making of the political into an 'occult' project and the stressing of the
'theosophical' character of the revaluation, is a vitally important aspect of
Nietzsche's and Lawrence's work, and it shapes the structure and concerns of this
thesis from the end of chapter II through chapter III and into chapter V.
Ultimately, it is argued here, Nietzsche and Lawrence are religious writers in the
widest sense of this word, more concerned with Geist and the dark gods who
perhaps alone can 'save' us, than with the mechanisms of the Reich or any party-
political programme. Thus although each repeatedly attempts to express his vision
and philosophical insights in socio-political terms, neither wishes to imply that
the social and/or the political provides the final horizon of meaning. As shown in
chapters III and V, Lawrence attempts to make a daring combination of politics
and a reactivated paganism in order to further the project of revaluation.
According to Habermas, it is precisely the nee-pagan aspects of the above (i.e.,
the confronting of Occidental reason and Christian morality with its Other) that
reveals the "political-moral insensitivity and ... aesthetic tastelessness" 1 in
Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean thought. Admittedly, there is an element of this
in The Plumed Serpent of which criticism is perhaps justified. However, such an
entirely negative assessment is challenged here, as I argue that Nietzsche's turning
to Dionysus and Lawrence's resurrection of the man who died (Jesus) as Osiris
(see chapter V), is a profoundly important (and profoundly beautiful) move. If
Habermas feels uncomfortable with the 'spicing up' of political philosophy with
talk of the dark gods, as poets, Nietzsche and Lawrence are surely entitled to "all
kinds of emotions and sensations which an ordinary man would have repudiated"
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(K., p.14) and, essentially, I am in broad agreement and sympathy with
Heidegger's claim that it is to the poets that man must turn for guidance in this
time of nihilism.
Chapter II is also an important examination of the critique of Love (i.e., moral-
idealism), as developed by Nietzsche and Lawrence. It is shown how love infects
all aspects of modern existence; including modern polities, as socialism,
liberalism, and - crucially - as fascism also. All of these '-ism' narratives are
rejected decisively by Nietzsche and Lawrence on the grounds that they are
merely a making 'natural' of Christianity and behind each remains lurking the
ascetic ideal. The critical and clinical analysis of love thus forms an important
part of the genealogical project of revaluation; it is an analysis which brings
Nietzsche and Lawrence into opposition not only with Christianity, but also the
modern state and the reactive forces of civilization (forces they contrast to those
productive of culture).
In chapter III, whieh is essentially a continuation of and a conclusion to chapter
II, we analyse Lawrence's attempt to not only make politics grand, but also
sacred; and also his final attempt in The Plumed Serpent to develop a notion of
transgression, i.e., a deliberate violation of human limits and norms, promoted in
the hope that man may be able to kick his way back into paradise. Clearly this
idea develops the Nietzschean notion of new innocence via an active immoralism,
and I argue that the politics of cruelty rests additionally upon three other key
beliefs found in Nietzsche: Firstly, a belief in an anti-humanist philosophy of
power; secondly, a belief that society and culture require acts of violence and a
hierarchical power arrangement; thirdly, a belief in the need to affirm a 'general
economy of the whole'. These notions are all examined in detail in the course of
chapter III. The chapter concludes in agreement with Lawrence's own view;
namely, that the leadership principle has ultimately to be recognized as obsolete
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and that the militant political ideal is redundant, no matter how one tries to dress
it up. In contrast to many of his contemporaries, Lawrence realizes that the
revolutionary politics of grandeur is as invalid and ineffective as it is nostalgic
and romantic.
However, this is not to deny that in his own work post-Serpent Lawrence
continues to seek out a politics that is beyond the limited option of liberal
democracy, as well as a new ethic and model of self based upon an active
understanding of power in its naked materiality, stripped from the negative and
reactive representations of slave morality. Thus Nietzsche's thinking remains
central, even if Lawrence identifies a need to reinterpret it and to challenge it at
those points wherein the former's personal political preferences and prejudices do
not allow sufficient freedom to think the future opened up by the collapse of old
values. In other words, even if there is a need to move away from inflated
political posturing towards a micropolitics of desire and the body, this does not
mean a retreat into the private sphere of the bourgeois individual, or isolate
subject; desire is not a 'personal' affair, but always a collective-impersonal one.
Thus if Lawrence examines and promotes a different kind of politics in his later
work, there is no absolute break from the politics of the power trilogy; more a
strategic withdrawal and the forming of different tactics and approaches. Certainly
the goal - of revaluation - remains the same, and certainly there is no retreat to
the old ideals of liberal humanism. In fact, I suggest that such a retreat were it to
be made, would not only be inappropriate, but potentially the most fatal loss of
philosophical nerve imaginable. For it is not the denial of such values, but their
positing in the first place, that leads to nihilism and political terror. This
argument, as addressed by Heidegger in his Letter on Humanism, closes chapter
III. It is in this essay that we can locate a clue to a new ethic; something that
opponents and critics of (post) Nietzschean thought often suggest is impossible to
locate within an 'irrationalist ontology' and/or a politics and philosophy of power.
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Here, we develop this clue as an ethic of letting be and letting go and relate it to
the notion of justice developed by Lawrence in The Plumed Serpent and to his
thought in the Lady Chatterley's Lover trilogy and final major work of fiction,
The Escaped Cock.
Just as chapters II and III essentially form one part of the thesis between them,
so too do chapters IV and V. Leaving behind the power trilogy of novels, we
place Nietzsche's project within the context of the above mentioned late works,
radically reconfiguring and eroticizing his philosophy in the process.
Moving away from the politics of evil and cruelty, we suggest there are good
theoretical and strategic reasons why molar political ambitions can be replaced
with micropolitics at the level of desire and the forces of the body; a politics of
touch. There is no need to move through geo-political space or cultural time
searching for a 'solution' to the 'problem' of nihilism; the nomad thinker has
merely to travel in intensity and learn how to listen to his 'blood'. This is not an
abandonment of social and political concerns, merely the transference of them
onto a different field of intensity. Nor is this a break from Nietzsche's
philosophy; on the contrary, by returning to the body we are of course following
Nietzsche, who was one of the first to fully appreciate that the revaluation would
not be achieved without the 'resurrection' of the body and the rejuvenation of the
body's most active forces. Today, the task is not to seize the power of the state,
but to affirm the potency of the flesh and revive the passionate instincts. Today,
the task is not to organize into political parties, but to dis-organ-ize the
organism (or what Lawrence terms the 'corpse-body') and begin the building of
the body without organs; we illustrate how this can be achieved and make clear
its significance within both chapters IV and V.
Put simply, desire is a politics because desire is productive of and invests itself
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within social reality. The body is a politics because it exists within history and
history, of course, does not take place outside of bodies.
Essentially, in chapter IV, following theoretical remarks on the politics of desire
and the philosophy of becoming upon which it rests (the latter being a
quintessentially Nietzschean and anti-Christian ontology of difference), we argue
that Lady Chatterley's Lover, can most usefully be read as a schizoanalysis
concerned with breakdowns, breakthroughs, and becomings. Concerned, that is to
say, with the flows of desire within industrial capitalism and the strange, inhuman
becomings of the human being subject to such flows and the above socio-
economic conditions.
It is argued that there is no longer a clear public/private dichotomy or distinction
and that Richard Rorty's wishing to push Nietzsche's thinking into the 'private'
realm is therefore untenable. Further, because the above dichotomy has broken
down within late modernity, the work of the novelist becomes of increased
relevance to political and social theory; for the novelist understands perhaps
better than anyone the feelings, forces, and flows that constitute the subject as a
subject. Certainly Lawrence has an uncanny insight into such and I argue in
agreement with Deleuze and Guattari that his 'pollyanalytics' is of far greater use
today than, for example, Freud's psycho-analysis, based as the latter is upon a
reactive conception of power, sexuality, and the unconscious.
If in the earlier part of the work it was the hero as political activist (and the poet)
who was posited as the most valuable type, in chapters IV and V this status is
given to the lover and man of active desire. The lover, it is suggested, is he who
knows best how to revalue values and to make the world anew, having submitted
to his own passion and found a level of fulfilment and joy. Thus we examine the
possibility that man may be able to attain the 'peace that comes of fucking', even
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if he cannot kick his way into paradise. To achieve this, is the ultimate aim of a
politics of desire. But the latter, it should be noted, is not simply a form of sex
radicalism and does not call for sexual 'liberation', nor claim that sex alone is the
clue to everything (i.e., the great be-all and end-all). On the contrary, Lawrence
is explicit in his argument that the sex urge has to be subordinated to a still
greater urge, which he thinks of as a creative or religious impulse (and what he
calls the 'power-mode' in his earlier work); this is the collective drive and the
world-forming force in man.
In several ways, chapter IV looks back to chapter I. For example, it returns to
the idea that nihilism afflicts us as a physiological collapse of the healthy
instincts, robbing the body not only of its strength, but also its value and
meaning (making it sexless, sterile, rationalized). It also carries forward from the
opening chapter the question of style, but this time in its more radical and
profound form as a politics of desire, transforming Nietzsche's thinking on
culture and society in the process. Understanding that the latter needs to become
more rhizomatic, more molecular and minoritarian (to become-woman), Lawrence
arrives at a social and cultural model that he calls a 'democracy of touch'. This,
his major contribution to political theory, is investigated at length and in detail in
chapter IV. where we relate the idea not only to the wider body of Lawrence's
thought. but to the work of Whitman. Heidegger, and Nietzsche. It is shown how
a democracy of touch is founded upon a new economy of bodies and their forces
and forms a vision of individual and communal regeneration; a democracy to come
- not a reactionary return to some pre-modern ideal. Prior to the establishment
of a democracy of touch, however, must come an opening up of a new field of
consciousness; what Lawrence terms 'phallic consciousness', or, elsewhere, 'cunt
awareness', the latter perhaps better indicating the non-logocentric nature of this
new way of thinking which is productive of a sensual and intuitive body of
knowledge that Nietzsche terms die trohliche Wissenschaft. Like Nietzsche.
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Lawrence sets out to arrive at a point of reckoning with the great saviours and
teachers of Western metaphysics. If this means addressing 'the case of Socrates'
and Plato on the one hand, so too does it mean confronting Christ; and thus we
close the thesis with a chapter that explores the revaluation in terms that
Nietzsche wished it to be understood: Dionysus versus the Crucified!
Chapter V is a final consideration of Nietzsche's project in which many of the
earlier themes of the thesis (power, love, the human etc.) all return for a critical
reexamination. The discussion takes place primarily around Lawrence's The
Escaped Cock and his final prose work, Apocalypse. As for Nietzsche's own
enigmatic formula above, this we interpret as shorthand for the great conflict of
ideals at the centre of his philosophy and which characterizes Western history.
The chapter opens with a series of remarks on Nietzsche's and Lawrence's
understanding of Christianity and their (non-dialectical) opposition established
with the Crucified. In rejecting the latter and by saying yes to Dionysus (or the
man who died as the risen Osiris), affirmation is given to the resurrection of the
flesh, life as difference and becoming, and a plurality of norms. But, importantly,
Dionysus also symbolizes for Nietzsche an urge to living unity; i.e., a principle
which allows man to come back into touch with other men and women beyond
egoism and the idealism which isolates him at present. In other words, Dionsyian
magic (desire) is that which forms and seals the bonds between man and world;
that which ultimately dissolves the little word 'and'.
Lawrence's figure of the man who died, like Nietzsche's Zarathustra, is prepared
to retract his earlier teaching, having realized that immortality (i.e., creative
fulfilment or blossoming) is achieved only via a coming into touch; for touch is
the great atonement that puts us into vivid contact and allows us to affirm our
lives as lived upon the earth and within time. I argue that Lawrence's
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reinterpretation of Christ's resurrection is crucial to the project of revaluation; as
is his and Nietzsche's new understanding of death, time, and our mortal relation
to both. If the importance of resurrection into new life is stressed, so too do we
emphasize the necessity of firstly finding the courage to embrace the void of
oblivion and to die out completely from this life as one dominated by reactive
forces and egoism; the personal life of what Lawrence terms the 'Lesser Day'.
Each of us must prepare his or her own 'ship of death', or, as Heidegger writes,
Dasein must be able to face up to its own mortality.
This does not mean, however, accepting the banal conventionality of a general
biological extinction (,heat death'), and this reactive understanding of death is
challenged and replaced with the positive notion of a 'fire death' (i.e., death as a
true becoming, a flight, or passage). Courage is the key: the courage to live, to
die, and to resurrect into new life. Men fail the test of the eternal return
(examined in detail here) if they do not desire to resurrect back into life lived on
earth and in time with all its limitations and problematic aspects (such as
suffering and pain); if they long instead either for absolute oblivion, or an eternal
afterlife of personal immortality.
Trapped within old ideals and corpse-bodies, the question is how and when man
will leave the tomb of incomplete nihilism and rise into the new flesh. The danger
is he worit. But Nietzsche and Lawrence do all they can to encourage us to rise up
as 'risen lords' and to move towards a transhuman becoming. They demonstrate
how rising thus into an active and affirmative life means the forming of many
connections and a wide variety of relationships; sexual, social, and political. The
man who died rises as a whole man, keen to become a lover, a husband, a father,
a comrade, a friend. He is far removed from the Cross-burdened Christ figure he
was; i.e., one who wanted to be loved, but knew not how to love himself except
in the most ideal abstract-universal manner, afraid to physically touch or be
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touched. The man who died also rises as a physician of culture, for he knows that
there is a need for a collective healing of mankind (not its 'salvation') and that his
own resurrection cannot be accomplished in isolation.
Chapter V closes by suggesting that whilst it remains debatable whether Nietzsche
or Lawrence achieved their declared goal of a revaluation of all values, at its best
their work constitutes an important and significant starting point that has, in
some decisive sense, changed everything.
Part II: Remarks on the Political and Social Concerns of the Thesis.
" .. the time is coming when politics will have a different meaning." - Nietzsche.?
As will already be clear, this thesis is intended as a contribution to political
philosophy as much as it is to literary criticism, concerned as it is with the social
aspects and significance of Nietzsche's project of revaluation and Lawrence's
development and fictional illustration of it. I believe that one cannot fully
appreciate either writer's work without recognizing that each is concerned to
effect a fundamental change in our way of thinking about ethics, politics, and
society. It is not because they follow the standard methods of sociological
investigation, or ask the usual questions of political analysis that they deserve to
be taken seriously as thinkers in the above areas, but, on the contrary, because
they offer highly novel approaches, suggest new questions, and form different
perspectives on old problems, thereby transforming our notion of what it is to
think the political and address the social. Thus whilst I have argued earlier that
Nietzsche and Lawrence are far more than simply political writers, and whilst it is
certainly not my intention to reduce their work to the level of 'ideology' or
propaganda, nevertheless I would echo Foucault's assertion that the relationship
between philosophy, literature, and politics is "permanent and fundamental". 3
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If Nietzsche and Lawrence are betrayed by those readers who would use thought
to ground a political practice in Truth, or seek out a systematic doctrine in their
texts, so, on the other hand, are they sold short by those commentators who
would deny there is any substantive content to their work relevant to
contemporary intellectual debate concerning the public realm and collective
activity (pretending that all is simply a playful and self-contained exercise In
metaphor and symbol for private self-enlightenment). But, let us be clear, In
stressing the relevance of Nietzsche and Lawrence to the above debate, I do not
want to deny their unique status, nor in someway domesticate their thinking by
abandoning the more contentious and controversial elements of their work. It is
absolutely not my aim to bring them into line with a newly revised liberal
humanism, for example. Hopefully, I manage to avoid this tendency to
recuperative assimilation and succeed in discussing the radically mobile and
un(der)determined new style of politics found in Nietzsche and Lawrence in and
on their own terms, whilst still showing how their work has important
significance for and relationship to the more conventional and dominant forms of
socio-political narrative and practice.
Of course, it is true to say that in recent years Nietzsche's place in the history of
political thought and Lawrence's relevance as a social commentator (for example
on questions concerning the natural environment and man's relation to it), have
become more widely recognized and more carefully studied. And yet one still
frequently encounters the claim that neither should, in fact, be construed as
public thinkers and that their primary import is an apolitical one concerned with
"the fate of the existential individual who is far removed from the social world. "4
In both cases, it is argued here, this is a profoundly mistaken view; one that not
only misconceives the nature of Nietzsche's and Lawrence's respective projects,
but also shows a pronounced ignorance concerning their notion of the individual.
Whilst such a reading will be challenged throughout the course of this thesis, it is
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important to briefly say something of it here.
There is, it is suggested by commentators hostile to the idea of Nietzsche and
Lawrence as political thinkers, an 'irresponsibility' in their work that causes
concern. Rorty and Habermas, for example, share the view that Nietzsche's
influence upon social and political thought has been of a highly undesirable nature.
But if liberal critics have a duty to express concern with the 'illiberal', 'irrational',
and 'irresponsible' elements they detect in Nietzsche's thought and those related
to him, surely Rorty is simply being crass when he suggests that whenever the
above put forward a view about modern society, culture, or politics they become
"at best vapid and at worst sadistic". 5 For Rorty, Nietzsche et aJ are magnificent
when they stick to celebrating their personal canons and invaluable in helping us
with "our attempt to form a private self-image"; but "pretty much useless:" (if
not acutely dangerous) when they attempt to address us as public philosophers
and promote views relevant to collective action. Rorty is prepared simply to
dismiss views he finds objectionable as 'idiosyncratic' and to assert that projects
of self-creation have "nothing in particular to do with questions of social
policy. "7
If Rorty is right to criticize Nietzsche for attempting at times to suggest
grandiose and ideal schemes to do with total revolution and for setting out on a
quest for the sublime, he fails entirely to see why it is that Nietzsche cannot
simply talk of overcoming the self as if the latter existed in isolated abstraction
(i.e., asocially and ahistorically). For Nietzsche, self-perfection and socio-cultural
concerns are not separable; they belong to one and the same project. In fact, as
Keith Ansell-Pearson rightly points out and as is stressed in this thesis:
"For Nietzsche the degeneration of political and cultural life in modern Europe
could partly be explained by the absence of a vibrant and vigorous public life ....
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Nietzsche ... would argue that Rorty's emphasis on self-creation as a private act
represents a retreat from the social world, and is symptomatic of the
degeneration of creative action that characterizes the modern period. "8
Symptomatic of a variety of solipsism that other liberal critics, such as Leslie
Paul Thiele, also collapse into. The latter's notion of a 'politics of the soul' is not
only entirely alien to the Deleuzean micro-politics I attempt to develop here, but
is quite falsely ascribed to Nietzsche. The philosopher, writes Thiele, is "fated to
remain apart from social politics ... he is a solitary. "9 In as far as this is the
case, Nietzsche violently opposes such a 'fate' and describes such isolation as the
'sickness of the desert'. Lawrence too would condemn such twaddle as a form of
depravity resulting from an atrophy of the senses. Both men never doubted that
if the revaluation was to be accomplished it would require community, the
proliferation of relations, and the development of a nourishing creative flow of
desire and sense of physical kinship. They would have had nothing but scorn for
Rorty's anaemic ideal of 'solidarity' between private individuals, each cultivating
an inward sense of separateness and all the time afraid to touch one another.
Arguably, the real 'irresponsibility' is not Nietzsche's or Lawrence's in opening up
a space in which to think and form a new style of politics, but, on the contrary,
belongs to those who refuse the challenge of occupying such a space. For by so
doing they allow those forces of virulent reaction and base stupidity which they
rightly fear - and which Nietzsche and Lawrence also abhor - to have exclusive
access to this new terrain. Fascists have no more qualms about occupying
theoretical thinking space than they do geographical Lebensraum. Thus although I
do not agree with the way that liberal commentators such as Mark Warren and
William Connolly occupy Nietzsche's texts and put them to work, at least they are
to be commended for not funking the challenge of so doing. Unlike many critics,
they do not mistakenly believe that Nietzsche's political visions can be ignored,
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casually dismissed as poetic affection, or condemned as intrinsically too dangerous
to be discussed and developed. They know that it is a question of finding the
exterior forces that best put Nietzsche's writings to work in a manner that is
faithful to the joyous and affirmative spirit that invests them.
Part III: On Dissolving the Genre Distinction Between Philosophy and Literature.
"It seems to me it was the greatest pity in the world, when philosophy and fiction
got split ... the novel went sloppy, and philosophy went abstract dry. The two
should come together again" - D.H. Lawrence.l"
One consequence of the death of God and the subsequent collapse of values, is
that genre distinctions and the dualistic hierarchies that support them become
unprotected and thus vulnerable to challenge. The opportunity for philosophy and
literature to reunite is thereby enlarged. Despite the best efforts made by the
moral guardians of thought (i.e., those who would preserve the purity of genres),
we witness today an increased level of intertextual promiscuity and intellectual
miscegenation. Clearly Lawrence approves of this and actively promotes the union
of fiction and theory, arguing that the world of thought needs to become
inseparable from that of feeling.
Nietzsche in his writings is equally explicit about his desire to dissolve genre
distinctions, setting out from early on to demonstrate how philosophy and
literature can have "a more profound and congenial relation to each other"ll and
to life. In order to help achieve this, he develops a new style of writing and
presents himself as the first of a new breed of philosopher; the philosopher-as-
artist. Such a philosopher produces a text that is radically and openly figurative,
drawing upon all manner of considerations, including those previously regarded as
unacceptable or irrelevant to 'serious' investigation. J.P. Stern rightly claims that
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Nietzsche's devising of a highly personal literary-philosophical mode of language
and thought and his application of such to "an almost infinite variety of
contemporary issues'<? is one of his greatest achievements.
In reviving a pre-Socratic model of philosophy as literature which dissolves the
opposition between metaphor and concept, Nietzsche risks inaugurating a style of
philosophy that can no longer be clearly distinguished from poetry. This is not a
risk that Nietzsche finds troublesome, or regrettable. Far more regrettable for
Nietzsche is the continued and fanatic separation betwen the 'real' and the
'imaginary' (or the 'true' and the 'false'); a separation that has divided and
damaged human consciousness. In learning to think and speak once more in
metaphor, we perhaps move some way toward healing this fatal division of man,
allowing the greater intelligence of the body and the fullness of life the right to
expression.
Certainly, for Lawrence, thought has to be what he calls "an adventure of the
whole man" 13 - mental consciousness which thinks purely in concepts (or what
Nietzsche terms mummified metaphors) is not enough: and that is why he goes on
to say; "we cannot believe in Kant, or Spinoza. Kant thought with his head and
his spirit, but he never thought with his blood. The blood also thinks inside a
man, darkly and ponderously. It thinks in desires and revulsions and makes
strange conclusions. "14 Of course, the effort to derive from 'blood-knowledge' a
new reality principle which is capable of providing "standards for existential
attitudes, for practice, and for historical possibilities appears as childish
fantasy"15 to those critics such as Habermas, who regard Nietzsche's project as
hopelessly infected with 'irrationalism' and 'aestheticism'. And yet Nietzsche and
Lawrence both maintain it is vital that modern man learns how to listen to and
write in blood; i.e., to think instinctively and intuitively outside the boundaries of
moral-rationalism and to conduct thought-experiments, rather than construct
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theoretical systems which betray a lack of integrity on behalf of the thinker. For
Nietzsche and Lawrence, and those related to them, art too not only produces
knowledge about the world, but retains a determinate relation to philosophy
(realized as a passionate blood -experience) - this is what Plato missed and those
such as Habermas continue to miss.
In a sense, then, I am arguing that literature is of far more use than theory in
allowing one to "think through and move across established categories and levels
of experience'T? and in transporting us outside the gate to those extreme places
"where the highest and deepest truths rise up." 17 Of more use also in providing a
sense of genuine solidarity, as Deleuze and Guattari stress in their study of
Kafka; "not at all for ideological reasons but because the literary machine alone is
determined to fill the conditions of a collective enunciation that is lacking
elsewhere" .18 The novelist expresses another possible becoming via a creative
storytelling or act of 'fabulation', that challenges the dominant myths and fictions
of his time. Thus it is not merely because the novel forms a superior medium to
theory for exploring notions of relativity and contingency that it interests us
here, but because it also offers a form of resistance. Implicit in this claim is a
belief in "the potency and relevance of the imagination ... as a way to step out of
the political and intellectual stasis of these postmodern times." 19 And, further, a
belief that the novel, at its best, can help us live more fully by setting free alien
forces within us and registering more fully than any other medium "the complex
and shifting world of relationships which for [Lawrence], as for Nietzsche, is the
essence of reality." 20
Critics such as Habermas, however, reject the above arguments and continue to
claim that in levelling genre distinctions between philosophy, literature, and
political theory and thereby interrogating the primacy of logic over rhetoric,
Nietzsche and those who have come after him and radically extended his project
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(such as Derrida) fail to recognize important differences between the above, with
the result that each discipline is lessened in a significant manner.
Habermas thus writes for example: "The false assimilation of one enterprise to the
other robs both of their substance. "21 He fears that if philosophy and literature
are denied independent status and separate identity then the former becomes
unable to operate successfully as a medium for problem solving; "robbed not
merely of its seriousness, but of its productivity.r = The latter too is reduced, he
claims, when enlisted into the battle against metaphysics. Quite simply, I do not
agree with Habermas, nor share his concerns. Rather, I think that Derrida has
shown how the former's prejudices which allow him to assume that rhetoric is
simply an adornment to logic, stop him from reading and interrogating texts (not
least of all his own) carefully enough. Nietzsche and Lawrence teach us to worry
about the surface play of language and the question of style; this results in a
radically different way of reading, writing, and thinking: superficial, but in a
Greek sense (i.e., out of profundity). In casting the fear of incest aside, it
becomes clear how extremely rewarding it is to explore the intertextual quality of
writings and proliferate points of contact and mutual involvement between
philosophy and literature, allowing thinkers from various backgrounds to come
together. To 'rob' philosophy of its 'seriousness' and productivity, is to perhaps
allow it to become gay and creative.
Similarly, to give to poetry and fiction a seriousness of purpose is not to betray
the 'integrity' of art, nor to slide helplessly along a confused and dangerous path
towards fascism, but simply to acknowledge that the above can be used as a
medium of thought, intellectual exchange, and problem solving. To postulate the
unity of thought and poetry, of theory and fiction, is to understand that the
latter term does not stand for "an aimless imagining of whimsicalities ... a flight
of mere notions and fancies into the realm of the unreal." 23
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I am, then, prepared in this thesis to place Lawrence and his work on an equal
footing with Nietzsche and his writings. And prepared methodologically to
experiment with and to test the claim that;
"the most truly philosophical reading
of a philosophical text ... is one that treats the work as literature, as a fictive
rhetorical construct whose elements and order are determined by various textual
exigencies ... Conversely, the most powerful ... readings of literature may be
those that treat them as philosophical gestures". 24
Finally, before closing this Introduction, I would like to indicate why Lawrence
was specifically chosen as a literary machine to which Nietzsche could be
connected; and why Deleuze is also assigned a particularly important place within
this work.
By placing the Nietzschean project of revaluation within the fictional enviroment
provided by Lawrence, I hope to ensure a metamorphosis of the former, sending
it in a direction that is perhaps contrary to its own inner tendency (in as much as
the latter can legitimately be said to exist and identified). But perhaps this could
have been achieved just as well, some may argue, by placing Nietzsche's work
within the space of literature provided by any of a number of other authors who
have been 'influenced' by his work. Perhaps: but I think not. Rather, I would
argue that Lawrence is the best author for our purposes here and that his
relationship to Nietzsche is uniquely special. For not only is Lawrence the most
self-consciously 'philosophicalish' of novelists, believing as he makes clear that
"art is utterly dependent on philosophy'S>. but so too, as has been widely
recognized within the critical literature, is he the most profoundly Nietzschean.
Each belongs to that "order of genius which beats out the boundaries of human
experience and widens the frontiers of life". 26 In fact, as Colin Milton shows, the
intellectual kinship between Nietzsche and Lawrence is so "intimate and
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pervasive'<? that "an awareness of Nietzsche's thought is essential for a full
understanding of Lawrence's vision" constituting as it does a "subtle and powerful
interpretive framework for reading the novels". 28 This is illustrated here, but, in
addition, so too is it argued that the reverse is equally true; i.e., a knowledge of
Lawrence's work is essential for a full understanding of Nietzsche's project of
revaluation. This I believe to be an original claim.
What I am not attempting to do, however, is offer merely another study in
influence a la Milton, For one thing, the latter has already quite adequately
produced such and I accept his conclusion that Nietzsche profoundly affects
Lawrence. Nor am I simply seeking out a series of appropriate parallels between
the two authors and other bodies of work. For whilst such undoubtedly exist, it
is arguably more productive to develop 'inappropriate' parallels and offer
inappropriate readings; to use a variety of authors not to supplement or bolster
one another, but to stand one another on their heads from time to time and to
pervert one another (Deleuze famously writes of buggering authors). This may
mean having to mutate Lawrence's thought at certain junctures - just as he
mutates Nietzsche. But whilst I am not overly concerned with remaining 'faithful'
to an author or his texts (nor, indeed, the tradition of criticism surrounding him
and his works), I sincerely hope to avoid falling carelessly into the trap of simply
working out personal concerns on Lawrence et al "without being able to relate
[my 1 strictures to what it is that makes [them] positively interesting or
important'S? in their own right. What, ultimately, I seek to do within this thesis
is to give back to the authors central here via an intelligent and imaginative
reading; "a little of the joy, the energy, the life of love and politics that reach 1
knew how to give and invent. "30 And surely Foucault is right to claim that the
only way one can do this, and the only valid 'tribute' to thought such as
Nietzsche's. "is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. "31
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But why move from Lawrence to Deleuze? Because just as philosophical
references abound within the former. so within the latter - the most Nietzschean
of recent philosophers with the possible exception of Foucault - literary
references are found everywhere. Deleuze defends his reliance upon literary
figures from criticism by simply saying that very often novelists and poets know
more about schizophrenia. politics. and desire than do psychoanalysts.
philosophers. or sociologists. If the overt Nietzscheanism of his writings has
frequently been remarked upon. the equally present Lawrenceanism has. so far.
been widely overlooked. Part of the originality of this work is in showing how
Lawrence's work as well as Nietzsche's enters into a vital relation with Deleuze's;
and to show how one misses the mark in Lawrence if one simply ties his work to
the tradition of English fiction. by ignoring the political. ethical. and philosophical
dimensions that permeate his texts and give them such an important status in the
history of both European and Anglo-American thought.
Lawrence suggests that very often the tale requires saving from an author's
interference by the critic who knows how to put the tale to work in new and
startling ways; this is particularly so when the author is prone to moralizing or
engaging in the kind of metaphysical speculations that betray fatigue and
ressentiment. allowing blockages to form upon the lines of flight he himself has
intitiated. Deleuze, as the most intelligent reader of Nietzsche and Lawrence both.
arguably provides such a service as critic in relation to them. He is also. of
course. very much a political thinker and as such recognizes the importance of
Nietzsche's and Lawrence's nomadic thought in contributing to the invention and
invocation of a people yet to come. Thus Deleuze is the perfect figure to complete
our unholy trinity and form an effective philosophico-Iiterary assemblage.
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Chapter I: Among the Ruins: Nihilism, Culture
and the Politics of Style.
Part I: Opening Remarks on the Death of God and the Emergence of Modern
European Nihilism in Relation to Lawrence's The Rainbowand Women in Love.
Nihilism is of crucial importance to Nietzsche's thought and central to his
comprehension of modernity. If Nietzsche is one of the first to accept what
Camus calls the "burden of nihilism"! as his own, it remains for us today the
great and unavoidable problematic dominating our social, cultural, and political
horizons, determining the very limits of our experience. In short, "it stands like
an extreme that cannot be gotten beyond". 2 And yet, if we want to live, surely it
has to be gotten beyond; if accepted meanwhile as a painful transitional stage
through which we must pass. The question 'how?' is the one to which the fate of
modern humanity is tied. What nihilism is, both in its original and modern sense,
why and how it emerges, are relatively straightforward questions to address. But
how it can be survived and eventually overcome - and at what cost - remains an
intractable problem. For it may well be the case that in order to move beyond
nihilism, both as a contemporary phenomenon related to what Nietzsche calls the
'death of God' and as an originary process which has been uncoiling throughout
European history since the 'fall' into Western metaphysics, man has not only got
to overcome his own past but also that which is usually identified as the 'human'
element of his make-up (i.e., his reason and his morality).
Thus the advent or return of nihilism as an explicit phenomenon is a fate toward
which our civilization has relentlessly been moving and it is an event which, as
Nietzsche tells us, will determine our future for a long time to come. However, it
is not a singular event that possesses its own meaning; rather, there are as many
meanings as there are forces capable of offering an interpretation. Thus the
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phrase 'God is dead' can be heard both as a "great cry of loneliness">, marking
the point at which man conceives of himself as a being "surrounded by nullity'<
and living in a world suddenly devoid of value and sense; and as a great shout of
defiant independence in which man can find his own pride and joy and which
marks the point at which he accepts the task of himself becoming the creator of
all things: "For with God's death, the absolute centered perspective ... is
shattered, forcing the decentered human perspective to emerge as the foundation
of meaning and value. "5 And, perhaps, beyond this, a transhuman perspective.
But, as yet, man still doesn't know whether to laugh, cry, or rage; nihilism
continues to afflict him as a disabling and disorienting condition which affects his
ability to understand how to act in the new world in which he finds himself. This
is illustrated by Lawrence in The Rainbow (K) and its sequel Women in Love
( WL).
Set during the seventy year period leading up to the First World War, The
Rainbowand Women in Love are Lawrence's two great books of modernity and
apocalypse. Their potent mix of myth, social and cultural history, and post-
Nietzschean philosophy make them essential reading for anyone concerned with
developing an understanding of the 'crisis' of modern European nihilism. They are
almost desperate attempts to think that which enframes us; i.e., to gain critical
distance upon both the past and present, as well as attempts to speculate on the
possibility of a postmodern and, indeed, transhuman future." Arguably, nihilism
itself both obliges and enables us to do so. For, as Mark Warren writes:
"Nihilism not only forces consciousness but also distances one from the
conditions of one's existence that are no longer adequate. "7 In other words,
nihilism makes the world seem alien and uncanny and makes us strangers to
ourselves. Lawrence clearly demonstrates this in the above novels, showing how
the familiar world of the Brangwen family in the early part of The Rainbow has
become a lost possibility for the protagonists of Women in Love; the death of
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God ensuring that the comforting horizons of Christian-moral culture have
vanished. Without any such horizons, without limits guaranteeing stability even of
the self as a rational subject, access is suddenly granted to the Dionysian
dimension as a "smaller system of morality, the one grasped and formulated by
human consciousness'< is once more subsumed within "the vast, uncomprehended
and incomprehensible morality of nature or life itself, surpassing human
consciousness. "9
If there is a mythopoeic quality to The Rainbow, there is a dream-like or
nightmarish quality to the later work, as in a French surrealist text. Indeed, in a
manner suggestive at times of Georges Bataille, Lawrence seems to celebrate and
promote an elemental violence found in both the erotic and sacred realms of
experience as he conceives of them; realms only fully opened up in a time of
nihilism, as we suggest above, or in those explosive moments of transgression
"when those categories fall apart that guarantee in everyday life the confident
interaction of the subject with himself and the world. "10 This insistence in Women
in Love on those things and forces that modernity both releases and yet remains
deeply troubled by - irrationality, cruelty, strange fears and desires (all of which
flood the social field as Lawrence illustrates) - makes the novel a sometimes
difficult and disturbing one to read. Plunging deep into negativity, Lawrence
attempts to explode the established dualities of enlightened thinking, stressing like
Nietzsche before him the significance of madness in the unfolding history of
morality and its surpassing. II The behaviour of Ursula and Birkin, Gudrun and
Gerald, may no longer shock us, but it can still be disconcerting to be shown
'''civilized' human beings as by no means fully under their own control, but
impelled by forces within them well below the level of their conscious will or
choice." 12
Not only, then, is the world of The Rainbow coming ever-further apart at an
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ever-increased velocity, but so too are the characters coming apart as Lawrence
challenges the belief in a stable ego and of the human being as a fixed and pre-
determined entity; forever finding new ways to reveal man as a thing of forces,
flows and becomings. This obliges him as a writer to find the language which can
best "render and expose violence, disintegration and deadly excess" .13 That he
achieves this with consummate skill cannot be disputed. But as Mark Kinkead-
Weekes points out in his perceptive Introduction to the novel: "This poses ... a
crucial question for the critic: is this a destructively violent and excessive work,
or is it a diagnosis of violence and excess, enabling its author and its readers to
come through the experience with better understanding of themselvesv'<+ It is a
question which can also be asked of Nietzsche's philosophy: is it a diagnosis of
nihilism, or simply a symptom of such? Probably it is both (as Nietzsche
recognized). And probably Lawrence's Women in Love is also a work written at
the very point at which modes of disintegration encounter the possibilities of new
life. Above all, it is vital to stress that if there is decadence and deathliness in all
of the characters, yet the crucial discovery is made that there is an active nihilism
to be accelerated and perfected, and that "there is a kind of violence that can heal,
as well as a violence that destroys." 15
Thus despite the end-of-the-world tone of the novel, we find in Women in Love,
as in The Rainbow, something affirmative; a revolutionary joy or indescribable
delight which, as Deleuze says; "always springs forth from the great books, even
when they present things that are ugly, desperate, or terrifying." 16 If there is
corruption and sickness here, so too is there a promise of tomorrow's health.
And thus despite Birkin's insistence that we are all flowers of corruption living
among the ruins, Ursula will "have none of his acceptance of deathliness (however
necessary before new creation can come about). She isn't a flower of dissolution,
but feels herself a rose, warm and flamy with life. "17
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Finally, having for the most part offered comments on Women in Love, let us
here say something specifically about the earlier novel, The Rainbow; a work
which has a strong affinity to a German philosophic tradition that runs via
Nietzsche to Spengler and Heidegger, concerned with "the breakdown of
communal ties in favour of the competitive, self-seeking ethos of capitalism" 18
and the triumph of 'civilization' over culture.'? Lawrence opens the novel in
'about 1840'; a date chosen to mark the arrival of the modern industrial era. The
old world of farm, village, and church is about to be displaced and replaced by
the world of canals, railways, mines, factories, schools and new housing estates.
If, initially, the Brangwen family farm (Beldover) remains "just on the safeside of
civilization, outside the gate" (R, p.14), nevertheless its womenfolk in particular
look toward this new world and wish for their children to belong to its future.
Lawrence is ambiguous about this new order. If, on the one hand, he regrets and
at times condemns the turning away from a life lived on the soil, on the other
hand his text shows an acute understanding of how the inert pressure of the past,
when uninformed by the vigour of the present, can stifle and suffocate life. This
is the danger of a stagnant 'antiquarianism'; the mindset of those who would
preserve and revere the past, described by Nietzsche in his second untimely
meditation. Keywords for such persons are tradition, contentment, rootedness,
stability. Like Nietzsche, Lawrence knows that "when the historical sense no
longer conserves life but mummifies it"20, then culture needs its seeds of
discontent (its decadents ), such as Ursula, who possess the "strength to break
up and dissolve a part of the past"21, liberating the new and evolving forces and
forms. Ursula, who, as Anne Fernihough points out,22 is as much a Nietzschean
'free spirit' as Birkin, deliberately and radically breaks from the word of her
fathers and is transported from their world by the unfettered flows of modernity
and modernization that push on toward an absolute threshold. Looking back more
with shame and anger than love and loyalty, she knows, that for her, as for her
sister, Gudrun, the old way of life has become something to escape and
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overcome. The sisters are born of the forces of decodification and
deterritorialization among the ruins of the old socius; they are In every sense
'modern' women, and, as such, decadents. But, Lawrence knows, it is only via
such independent and individual young women (as well as men like Birkin who
belong to the "weak and quasi-feminine type of the dissatisfied<'), that life is
advanced and made more profound. Culture, as Nietzsche realised, flourishes in
times of corruption; the latter being "merely a nasty word for the autumn of a
people. "24
Thus, ultimately, Lawrence supports the struggles made by his characters to
become who they are and he welcomes the conditions in which this is made
possible. And yet he also wishes to retain some form of socio-cultural unity; for,
like Nietzsche, he believes that the individual will flourish only from out of the
latter. Thus, in a manner similar to The Birth of Tragedy: "The Rainbow sets
itself an impossible task, seeking out a social structure in which the full
expression of the individual might be possible without causing the social fabric to
fall apart. "25 Arguably, this could be said to be Lawrence's central dilemma; and
the political problem at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy.
To reiterate and conclude, modern experience no longer corresponds to any old
interpretive framework; "'seeing there's no God'" (WL, p.58), as Birkin says,
and that all the old ideals and guidelines are consequently as "'dead as nails'"
(Ibid.) The religion which had meant so much to Ursula and her contemporaries
as children, becomes as they pass into adulthood "a tale, a myth, an illusion,
which, however much one might assert it to be true in historical fact, one knew
was not true - at least for this present day of ours" (R, p.263). And thus it is
that the world of commerce and industry - 'the weekday world' - triumphs over
'the Sunday world'; because, quite simply, the latter has lost reality to modern
men and women and can no longer provide them with "plausible subjective
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identities in relation to everyday life. "26 The question is whether the weekday
world can provide the conditions for the emergence of new and genuine cultural
forms and active selves; or whether the world of capitalism and technology
merely deepens and furthers the experience and expression of nihilism. Let us
now examine this world of money and machinery.
Part II: Aspects of Nihilism as a Molar and Molecular Phenomenon.
II.i. Cash From Chaos: Nihilism and the Question of Capitalism.
It is arguable that modern nihilism has not in fact resulted in the definite collapse
of all values into zero, but, rather, the resolution of all values into one; in much
the same way as original nihilism resulted in the replacement of many gods with
just the One God. And this one value is commercial or exchange value:
"When Marx says other values are 'resolved' into exchange value, his point is
that bourgeois society does not efface old structures of value but subsumes them.
Old modes ... do not die; instead they get incorporated into the market, take on
price tags, gain new life as commodities. "1
The consequence of this is not only that everything is equalized and made the
same (one of the essential aspects of nihilism), but everything becomes
permissible - providing it is economically possible and profitable. All modes of
conduct are encouraged, all modes of consciousness allowed, if they pay, and
people now look to the market place "for answers to questions not merely
economic but metaphysical - questions of what is worthwhile, what is honourable,
even what is real." 2
Like Marx, both Nietzsche and Lawrence recognized the increasing dominion over
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every aspect of modern life that money had acquired and both, whilst little
interested in developing a detailed analysis of the workings of the market place>,
repeatedly voiced their concern with and opposition to this trend; equating the
economic idealism and increasing mechanization of labour in the name of
productivity with the unfolding logic of modern European nihilism.
Nietzsche's hostility to capitalism is evident from his very early writings. In The
Greek State, for example, he claims that the "self-seeking, stateless money
aristocracy" (i.e., the bourgeoisie) should be regarded as a "dangerous
characteristic of the contemporary political scene", because they have undermined
the "internally sturdy and sensitive'< bonds between rulers and ruled that existed
in noble, despotic society and which were based on an ethical component;
replacing these with a purely abstract-economic relation between employer and
employee that is productive of class conflict and social discord. In other words,
like Marx, Nietzsche condemns the bourgeoisie on the grounds that they have
left remaining "no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest,
than callous 'cash payment'''. 5 Counter this, Nietzsche advocates a strong model
of communal life, of the kind that Lawrence describes the disintegration of (and
yet anticipates and hopes for the rebirth of) in The Rainbow.
For Nietzsche, then, the effect of the above all-dominant money economy is that
society and culture are compromised and, ultimately, made impossible. In their
place is imposed a systematic anarchy and aggressive philistinism which allows a
man "only as much culture as it is in the interest of general money-making and
world commerce as he should possess". 6 Because today the "greed of the money-
makers"? infects every sphere of human activity ("in the minutest and subtlest
detail'") and dictates the standards and objectives of 'culture', Nietzsche feels
obliged to conclude that capitalism is "the most vulgar form of existence that has
yet existed. "9 Ursula Brangwen, as a young student in The Rainbow, soon comes
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to the same conclusion; realising the permanent substratum of money under
everything causes a "harsh and ugly disillusion" (R, p.403) to come over her
which, crucially, brings her to the political decision that she would rather " have
an aristocracy of birth than money" (R, pA27). Like Nietzsche, she rejects liberal
democracy as political degeneracy; for, like Nietzsche, she sees the latter merely
as the political expression of capital and deeply resents how the bourgeois-class
have not only ruined society and culture, but "learnt to misuse [the polity 1 ... as
an instrument of the stock exchange, and ... as an apparatus for their own
enrichment. "10 As for the 'freedom' and 'equality' opened up by liberal capitalism,
Ursula rejects this as simply the freedom to buy and sell one another and the
"equality of dirt" (R, p.427).
The vital point is that whilst liberal democracy may produce and guarantee the
'rights' of the 'private citizen', it fails, lacking a genuine conception of culture and
society, to produce the sovereign individual whom Nietzsche values and Ursula
wishes to become. The non-emergence of such sovereign men and women who are
masters of themselves, can largely be explained according to Nietzsche's and
Lawrence's analysis, by the fact that the economic and political apparatus have
today fallen "into strange hands" 11 and that we lack a dynamic and vigorous
public life. These two facts combine to signal the fall of man into an entirely
herd-like state and the dissolution of culture: all greatness and all potential for
greatness is lacking. "Human rights" - as Deleuze and Guattari say - "will not
make us bless capitalism." For human rights say nothing about the" ..meanness
and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies ... The ignominy of the
possibilities of life that we are offered" .12 Not only does the universal scramble
for money ('competition') threaten to result in an anarchic free-far-all destructive
of social order, but, naturally lacking in a 'societal instinct' or respect for
otherness, the capitalist may even have a fatally weakened instinct of preservation
and a suicidal lust for death a la Gerald erich, who, as Lawrence shows would
33
ultimately prefer to "lie down and die on a sure nothing't l ", rather than struggle
into a new way of being beyond the ruins.
We are among the ruins: and yet there remains standing one final barrier which
serves to protect the capitalist class from the very flows they have themselves
released and which also negate those lines of flight which promise a different and
greater experience of life:
"Our last wall is the golden wall of money. This is the
fatal wall. It cuts us off from life, from vitality, from the alive sun and the alive
earth, as nothing can. Nothing, not even the most fanatical dogmas of iron-bound
religion can isolate us from the vital inrush of life and inspiration, as money
can. "14
How do we break down or surmount this 'golden wall'? The very idea seems to
us today utopian and faintly absurd: "So what is the solution? Which is the
revolutionary path? To withdraw from the world market?"15 - ask Deleuze and
Guattari, rhetorically. And whilst Lawrence does advocate side-stepping and
retreat in his work on occasion.I" Nietzsche makes it clear that "no one is free to
be a crab" 17 and that any withdrawal into private fantasy is to be decisively
rejected. So what then is to be done? Perhaps, Deleuze and Guattari go on to
suggest, adopting Nietzsche's solution to the problem of nihilism in general, there
is nothing to be done today other than to offer an affirmation of market forces
and accelerate the process of capitalism:
"To go still further, that IS, In the
movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization. For perhaps the
flows are not yet deterritorialized enough, not decoded enough from the
viewpoint of a theory and practice of a highly schizophrenic character. "18
What Deleuze and Guattari recognise is that money does not constitute a 'golden
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wall' in the way in which Lawrence appears to conceive of it; and is thus not
something that can be broken down, or stormed like a barricade. Rather, money
- i.e., that which has been substituted by capitalism for the very notion of a
social code or ethic - has "created an axiomatic of abstract qualities that keeps
moving further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius" 19 and
ever-toward its own self-destruction and self-overcoming. This constitutes the
most characteristic and important tendency of capitalism: "It continually draws
near to its [exterior and absolute 1 limit, which is a genuinely schizophrenic
limit. "20
This theoretical understanding of capitalism in terms of flows and limits found in
Deleuze and Guattari, is anticipated by Nietzsche, who even describes how
capitalism both deterritorializes and decodifies, before then quickly attempting to
reterritorialize and recodify: "Presupposing it knows itself sufficiently strong to
be able not only to unchain energies, but at the right time also to yoke them .. "21
By advocating an acceleration of this process, Deleuze and Guattari hope that this
presupposition will prove itself to be fatally mistaken (an overestimation of its
own power to recapture); they hope that one day energies will be released (of an
active and schizophrenic character) that will prove impossible to rope back in and
then exploit; that lines of escape will go all the way to the Outside and there meet
up, reforming on an aesthetic plane apart from and in opposition to the wage-
system; subversive of and fatal to the internal axiomatic of capital that can no
longer contain them. It is ironic that perhaps: "Like all great historical systems
capitalism will perish more as a result of its successes than failures. "22 And that
capitalism itself, the economic system of modern European nihilism, provides the
enviromental zero-point in which new models of culture and self-formations, new
relations, become possible.
To reiterate and conclude, we must, then, accelerate the process of capital in the
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hope that we may yet be able to attain to a life established upon a different
arrangement of forces. But let us not fool ourselves into believing that such an
acceleration will have no casualties; the death of God is simply a beginning ("as
Nietzsche puts it: in this matter, the truth is we haven't seen anything yet").23
Bearing this in mind, it is perhaps legitimate to ask in closing who would dare to
begin this process of acceleration? Who would have the courage and strength for
such an act? Perhaps the 'perfect nihilist' whom Nietzsche himself sought to
become (i.e., the active nihilist who affirms the negation of nothingness). Deleuze
and Guattari call him the 'schizo' and conceive of him as the one who seeks out
the external limit of capitalism beyond the golden walls; "he is its inherent
tendency brought to fulfilment, its surplus product, its proletariat, and its
exterminating angel. He scrambles all the codes and is the transmitter of the
decoded flows of desire. "24 He is as Birkin is to Gerald's arch-industrialist
persona. This is the real reason that Gerald fears and feels threatened by Birkin;
refusing the friendship offered by the latter, and yet continually drawn to him,
seeking him out. Gerald dies because having pushed himself beyond his internal
limit, he mistakenly believes that death is the only option; having failed to see the
possibility of the new life, the greater health, the other love that was offered him.
Il.ii. 0 Wonderful Machine: Nihilism and the Question Concerning Technology.
According to Blanchot, Nietzsche is quick to grasp "that from now on all the
world's seriousness will be confined to science ... and to the prodigious power of
technology. "25 Whilst he does not deplore this fact, happy, for example, to accept
and affirm the experimental practices of science, Nietzsche by no means feels able
to embrace the above development without reservation, because, for Nietzsche,
modern science is very much the descendant and heir of Christian-moral culture;
i.e., a machine-embodied unfolding and advancement of the ascetic ideal and
further expression of the will to truth.26 Thus science and technology remains
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fundamentally nihilistic; full of thinly-veiled metaphysical prejudices and
productive of reactive knowledge-forms which may yet prove fatal not only to the
Christian-moral culture from out of which it has grown, but to the possibility of
culture per se, as it 'puts on ice' all the illusions which are necessary, according
to Nietzsche, to culture, and, indeed, to life itself.
In addition to this antipathy between illusion and the pure knowledge drive,
Nietzsche claims science is incapable of serving as the foundation of culture
because it knows nothing of "taste, love, pleasure, displeasure, exaltation, or
exhaustion" 27, and so cannot evaluate, cannot command, and cannot create; all
vital requirements which characterize the genuine cultural force. At best, when
coupled to the huge resources and forces of capitalism, science is capable of
building a tremendous industrial-technological civilization, such as our own, but
this is not a cultural formation, because, whilst it organizes the chaos of existence
and whilst it possesses a system, it lacks style.28 Whilst the latter involves the
constraint of a single taste, it does not impose universal laws and other ideal-
abstractions that seek to make all things and all forces familiar, similar, and
predictable. These laws may very effectively allow for the manipulation of the
world and the subordination of life to a tyrannical knowledge form (logic), but
this is not the same as mastery and the artist of culture is more than a mere
systematizer. Failing to make the distinction. the technocratic man of reason and
will confuses bullying with a display of strength (force with powerr.t? This is
illustrated for us in Women In Love by the figure of Gerald Crich: a man driven
to impose his will and authority over himself and his workers, just as he does
over his red Arab mare.I"
Gerald's world, the world of industrial civilization, has been described earlier by
Lawrence in The Rainbow:
"The streets were like visions of pure ugliness ... that
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began nowhere and ended nowhere. Everything was amorphous, yet everything
repeated itself endlessly .... The place had the strange desolution of a ruin .... The
rigidity of the blank streets, the homogeneous amorphous sterility of the whole
suggested death rather than life. ... The place was a moment of chaos
perpetuated, persisting, chaos fixed and rigid" (R, pp.320-21).
If such a mechanical world essentially lacks style, so too does it entirely lack
meaning according to Nietzsche. At best, it retains a strictly functional residue of
the latter that allows it to continue to operate. How to give back to such a world
meaning, value, and a little loveliness is the great concern of Nietzsche and
Lawrence. They both know, however, that so long as the metaphysical-scientific
perspective retains its authority, there can be no revaluation. For such a
totalitarian perspective has not only brought on and "made unavoidable, the
alienated, unhoused, recurrently barbaric estate of modern technological and mass
consumption man" 31, but it ensures the destruction of all other perspectives and
modes of being. And yet, perhaps, there is hope to be found, as within the
economic system of capitalism, where we least expect to encounter it. This is the
great lesson of encouragement given us by Heidegger in his essay entitled The
Question Concerning Technology. At the heart of this work are the following lines
quoted from Holderlin: "But where danger is, grows / the saving power also. "32
Commenting on these lines, George Steiner writes:
" to realise that false technicity
has edged the human race to the brink of ecological suicide, is to realise also that
salvation is possible ... It is in the very extremity of the modern crisis, in the
very time of nihilistic mechanism, that hope lies ready. "33
But let us be careful not to misunderstand here; hope does not lie in the fruits of
science and technology themselves and it is therefore not a question of
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accelerating the production and proliferation of ever-more sophisticated machines
in the erroneous assumption that only a machine can save us. If, on the one hand,
technophobes who rebel naively against technology and "curse it as the work of
the devil"34 can justly be challenged, then, on the other hand, the technophiles
and neo-futurists who argue for an ever-greater technological manipulation of life
deserve also to be met with resistance. For here we agree with Lawrence, who
writes: "The more we intervene machinery between us and the naked forces, the
more we numb and atrophy our own senses. "35 If we are to find our way forward
into what Heidegger calls a new 'revealing', then we will have to come back into
living touch with and creatively manifest these 'naked forces'. If we are to deepen
our questioning of nihilism and technology then we will need to keep our senses
alert. And it is only via such a questioning - one that manages to touch on the
essence of technology - that we can find hope. For the closer we come to the
latter (i.e., to the danger) "the more brightly do the ways into the saving power
begin to shine". 36
That an enhanced understanding of the essence of technology is crucial, Heidegger
makes clear in the following passage:
"What is dangerous is not technology ... the
essence of technology, as a destining of revealing, is the danger .... The threat to
man does not come in the first instance from potentially lethal machines and
apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already afflicted man in his
essence. The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be
denied him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience a more
primal truth." 37
In other words, the essence of technology - something that exists long prior to
the actual machine age of modern capitalism - is a way of revealing so
monolithically powerful and inherently expansionist, that it may overwhelm man
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and prevent him from discovering any other possible becoming. Heidegger calls
this revealing Ge-stell; commonly translated into English as 'enframing'. Rather
than allowing man and other beings and things to come forth in their own right
and thence letting them be as such, the revealing that rules with technology is a
'provocation', or 'challenging' (Herausfordern ); "which puts to nature the
unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as
such. "38 Thus, for example, a tract of land "is challenged in the hauling out of
coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district". 39 But, more
than this, it also reduces man and beings "to a sort of 'standing reserve' or
stockpile in service to, and on call for, technological purposes. "40
Heidegger's own example of mining IS convenient for a study related to
Lawrence's The Rainbow and Women in Love; for Lawrence also illustrates his
thinking on the question concerning technology in these novels via reference to
the coal industry. In the latter text, for example, we see Gerald the industrial
magnate acknowledge his destiny: "He had a fight to fight with Matter, with the
earth and the coal it enclosed ... to turn upon the inanimate matter of the
underground and reduce it to his will" (WL, p.227). Whilst in The Rainbow we
encounter Tom Brangwen, another coal boss, who is of the view that men belong
entirely to their jobs as a human resource; that outside of the great social-
industrial machine of work man has become "'a meaningless lump - a standing
machine'" (R, p.324). Ursula, forever seeking to question technology and find
another possible revealing, nevertheless understands the horrible fascination of
"human bodies and lives" (ibid.) subjected to the machine and is aware that there
is a "perverse satisfaction" (ibid.) to be gained from such subjection.U Even, we
are told, via service of the machine, man achieves his consummation and
immortality (see TR, pp.324-S and WL, pp.230-31); Lawrence arguing not that
technology makes us less human, but, on the contrary, super-human. Gerald
erich, for example, is transformed into a god of the machine, thereby fulfilling
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the great promise of science; i.e., that man too can attain infinite power (or, at
least, infinite knowledge, which for modern man is one and the same). The
question is: what will man do with this unlimited power-knowledge? Will he
transform himself; or destroy himself? If on the levels of utility and abstraction
we have made ourselves into lords of production, then so too have we arrived at
the point of supreme danger: "Present day man is of the lowest rank, but his
power is that of a being already beyond man: how can this contradiction not
harbour the greatest danger?"42 Rightly, Nietzsche predicts that modern
European nihilism will be a time of great wars and violent upheaval on an
unprecedented scale.
However, oblivious or indifferent to such dangers, men like Gerald push on m
their quest to see life "wholly dominated by mind and will. "43 A will that IS
negative in direction and composed of predominantly reactive forces, and which
seeks the ego's triumph over all that lies external to it. By bringing everything
into the realm of knowledge, Gerald is able to master and manipulate the world,
determining its truth via reference to his own learning. Thus, in this manner, the
self "becomes the hub of reality and relates to the world outside in an
exploratory, necessarily exploitative way. "44 But no matter how much Gerald
'knows', still he feels strangely empty; "as if the very middle of him were a
vacuum" (WL, p.233). As this feeling becomes increasingly acute, his
voraciousness grows: "And to stop up this hollowness, he drags all things into
himself. "45 Such rampant egoism and intellectual conceit and greed is condemned
repeatedly in the texts of both Nietzsche and Lawrence, and yet it remains almost
definitional of modern man, who, it seems, will not rest content until he has
"killed the mysteries and devoured the secrets. "46
Clearly, if a change is to be made to a new way of living and the world 'saved',
then man must find some way to overcome his vanity and "paranoid and phobic
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anthropocentrisrn'v+? To do so will not be easy and will involve the repudiation
not only of our own metaphysical inheritance, but also the finding of a way into a
new revealing. Yet, to return to Heidegger, we have already seen that hope lies
ready at the moment of supreme danger where and when we might least expect to
encounter it; the hope of a radically different revealing to the one that holds sway
today. Heidegger names this with the Greek term poiesis and means by this a
revealing that brings forth without provocation, having an entirely different
relation to matter; a revealing which may enable us, perhaps, to confront the
essential unfolding of technology and survive our engagement with modern
European nihilism. And yet, to reiterate, it is this essential unfolding which
harbours in itself the possible rise of the saving power. Thus instead of simply
"gaping at the technologicalv+f and standing half in awe, half in dread, before the
power of machine civilization, we must attempt to catch sight of that which is
ambiguous and other contained in the essence of technology. Of course, to simply
glimpse this does not mean that we are thereby saved, but "we are thereby
summoned to hope in the growing light of the saving power. "49 And we are
reminded that, as Heidegger points out, there was once a time and place (i.e.,
ancient Greece of the tragic age) when poiesis was also called techne and the fine
arts were not distinguished from technology. At this time and in this place, the
"outset of the destining of the West ... the arts soared to the supreme height of
the revealing granted unto them. "50 They allowed man to enter into a direct
physical relationship with the real (i.e., with things as things and not as objects
of knowledge and representation); and they allowed man to 'dwell poetically' on
the earth. Can they do so again? Heidegger is uncertain: "Whether art may be
granted this highest possibility ... in the midst of the extreme danger, no one can
tell. "51 But he remains hopeful. For as long as there are those, like Nietzsche and
Lawrence, who can still be astounded by and before this other possibility and who
can continue to reflect upon the vital questions concerning man, nihilism, and
culture in a manner that is full of radical astonishment and due reverence, there
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remains a chance of inciting a new becoming and/or of opening a different
revealing. And so there remains a vital task for philosophy: For whilst the latter
cannot itself provide the new, merely prepare the conditions under which the new
might emerge; and whilst such 'prepatory thinking' is neither able to predict or
guarantee the future, still it allows for "the possibility that the world civilization
that is just now beginning might one day overcome its technological-scientific-
industrial character as the sole criterion of man's world sojourn. "52
II.iii. A Dry Soul is Best: Decadence, Sexuality and the Subject.
Having critically examined modern European nihilism as a phenomenon at the level
of culture, capital, and the question concerning technology, we are primarily
interested here with how it unfolds at the micro-level of the subject; i.e., we are
clinically interested in the forces (active and reactive) and the flows (sexual and
excremental) that constitute, condition, and, indeed, breakdown the human being,
determining as they battle for supremacy within the will to power the value of the
souP3 For nihilism is not simply about the death of God and the subsequent
collapse of all values, but the collapse also within the body and 'psyche' of our
healthiest and most primary instincts. It is in this sense that Nietzsche says
nihilism represents a pathological transitional stage and is the expression of
physiological decadence; and it is for this reason that he frequently uses biological
and psychological language to describe the process. 54
Lawrence illustrates this "anarchical dissolution of the instincts"55 in his fiction
and, like Nietzsche, argues that one of the side-effects of such is an increase in
mental activity, so that decadent individuals are a "wincing mass of self-
consciousness" 56 as well as corruption. In particular, according to Lawrence,
decadents are prone to getting their 'sex in the head'; i.e. , transferring
unconscious physical feeling and creative intensity into mental sensation and
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knowledge. 57 Thus it is not the case that, following the death of God and the
devaluation of the highest values, man plunges self-sacrificially into his previously
abjected values (animality, sensuality, materialism etc.); rather, he seeks to
idealize these latter values and therein maintain himself, securing the old 'white'
psyche: '''Even your animalism, It, - Birkin tells Hermione - '''you want it in your
head. You don't want to be an animal, you want to observe your own animal
functions to get a mental thrill out of them'" (WL, p.4I).
Similarly, Hermione's 'passion' and 'spontaneity' are condemned by Birkin as
deliberate and false "'and more decadent than the most hide-bound
intellectualism'" (Ibid.) For Birkin, it is vital we overcome our conceit of
consciousness and be stripped of ourselves if ever we are to enter into a non-
decadent becoming and learn how to "'live in another world, from another
centre'" (WL, p.4S). But, as we have previously indicated, this is not something
that decadents are prepared to do; they fight to maintain their corrupt selves,
secretly enjoying the sensation of being "threshed rotten inside"58 and of reducing
"the complex tissue back through rottenness to its elements. "59 Circumscribed
within outer nullity and their own egoism, they surrender to the flux of
corruption; rewarded with sensational gratification in the flesh via cheap
sensuality (see WL chapter IX for Gudrun's experiencing of the latter), or
sensational gratification in the mind via the liberation of the "static data of
consciousness'P'' or what Hermione calls "'the joy and beauty of knowledge in
itself'" (WL, p.8S).
For Lawrence, corruption is ".. only divine when it is pure, when all is given up
to it. If it be experienced as a controlled activity within an intact whole, this is
vile .... The static will must be subject to the process of reduction also. "61
He continues: "Insofar as we fight to remain ideally intact ... we are obscene ....
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To destroy life for the preserving of a static, rigid form ... this is the lugubrious
activity. "62 But it is an activity which has become the dominant mode today; a
'pornographic' mode according to Lawrence's definition of this term, based upon
the "grey disease of sex hatred" and the "yellow disease of dirt lust". 63 Not only
is this a desire to prevent the free flow of active forces, but it is also the lust to
watch our own '''naked animal actions in mirrors'" (WL, p.42); i.e., to trade
away the physical intensity of lived experience for mental representation.
Eventually, decadent individuals find themselves not only unable to differentiate
between the real and the simulacrum, but unable to distinguish between sex and
shit, or life and death. Lawrence comments:
"The sex functions and the
excrementory functions in the human being work so close together, yet they are,
so to speak, utterly different in direction. Sex is a creative flow, the
excrementory flow is toward dissolution, decreation, if we may use such a word.
In the really healthy human being the distinction between the two is instant, our
profoundest instincts are perhaps instincts of opposition between the two flows.
But in the degraded human being the deep instincts have gone dead, and then the
two flows become identical. This is the secret of really vulgar and pornographical
people; the sex flow and the excrement flow is the same thing to them. "64
However, interestingly, in Women in Love (and later in The Plumed Serpent and
Lady Chatterley's Lover: see chapters III and IV respectively), Lawrence makes
vital and strategic use of an act of anal sex to demonstrate something crucial to
the project of revaluation as he conceives of it; namely, the overcoming of shame
and bad conscience with regard to the body and its flows. Lawrence's attraction
for this illicit sex act as a method of liberating the greater health and defeating
the feelings of guilt which have become entwined with both sexual and
excrementory functions, and his attempts to "distinguish between buggery which
was wholly dissolute and buggery that was initiatory, the symbolic death before
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rebirth'v> is clear even in The Rainbow, as revealed by the relationship between
Will and Anna (see pp. 218-20). Exploring the full range of sexual pleasures
enables them to discover the beauty and delight of their own bodies and to lose
their fear and shame of themselves.
Like her mother before her, Ursula also finds liberation and a fundamental
gratification via the defeat of shame, following her 'night of sensual passion' with
Birkin (see WL, pp.412-13). But more than simply feeling free and happy once
she has accepted the physical reality of herself (her inhuman and 'bestial' nature),
she is also enabled to move toward a new becoming and new self. In other words,
the anal sex between her and Birkin marks the death of her old established belief
in herself as an ideal being; she realises that she is not merely a rational-moral
machine, nor just a "creature of light and virtue" (WL, p.413), but also alive in
'corruption' with a different reality that she needs both to know and accept.
Lawrence develops this idea in another 'Birkinesque' essay, The Reality of Peace,
which he concludes:
"If we are ashamed, instead of covering the shame with a
veil, let us accept the thing which makes us ashamed, understand it and be at one
with it ... let us go down into ourselves ... and rise again, not fouled, but
fulfilled and free. "66
Crucially, this descent into ourselves and a coming to terms with our full bodily
reality, is not the same thing as getting our physical selves into our heads and
developing a hysterical and decadent obsession with our sexual and excrementory
flows. There are ways of knowing which make sane and innocent; others which
make mad and corrupt. Thus: "The forbidden acts of Gerald and Gudrun; or
Birkin and Hermione ... are merely corruption within the rind; the same acts
committed by Birkin and Ursula ... are the acts of healthy human beings. "67 Anal
sex is radically redemptive for the latter; reductive and deadly for the former.
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Typically, and like Nietzsche, Lawrence relates his thinking on the individual's
struggle to become full of good conscience toward their non-ideal selves, or,
alternatively, their fall into corrupt egoism, to his thinking on culture and modern
European nihilism. For eventually, according to Lawrence, the lugubrious activity
becomes a collective process of reduction and social insanity; "till our whole
civilization is like a great rind full of corruption ... a mere shell threatened with
collapse upon itself. "68 Thus whilst our world prides itself on the sparkle, the
speed, and the sophistication of its machines and economic system: "Beneath the
technical efficiency of modern culture, Birkin feels a decadent, regressive
emotional drift. "69
Thus beneath the ruins runs the 'dark river of corruption'; a river in which swim
'sewer rats' like Loerke "'gnawing at the roots of life'" (WL, p.428) and along
whose banks grow beautiful but deadly fleurs du mal like Gudrun "'white
phosphorescent flowers of sensuous perfection'" (ibid., p.172); marsh-lilies who
lust for decomposition motivated by a nostalgia for mud."? If the scent of such
flowers of corruption smells "sick and unwholesome" (R, p.325) in the nostrils of
Ursula and Birkin, having "the same brackish nauseating effect of a marsh, where
life and decaying are one" (ibid.), nevertheless it is seductive to men like Gerald
erich. For whilst the latter is himself in the process of becoming-ice (i.e., of
following the 'Arctic' or 'Nordic' process of abstraction), still he has a taste for
the sensual perversity offered by those who have opted for the succulent
moistness and turgidity of mud and the 'African' process of break-down."! In
fact, we would do well to remember Ursula's own adolescent attraction for Miss
Inger and Birkin's reluctance to sever ties with Hermione and Halliday's
'bohemian' set. Birkin, perhaps more so than Ursula, cannot help having an
ambivalent attitude toward decadence and corruption, and although he claims to
profoundly understand, after Heraclitus, that 'a dry soul is best', he is also aware
like the Greek thinker that 'souls take pleasure in becoming moist' (even whilst 'it
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is death to souls to become water'). 72 Further, Birkin comes close at times to
accepting that the river of corruption is our true historical reality; just as
Nietzsche is prepared to accept nihilism as such. Perhaps there is therefore
nothing to be done, he muses, but to follow the course of this river to its end.""
Certainly this dark river of nihilism is nothing new; we have been drifting along
in it for the last 2,500 years or so. That which we mistakenly believed to be the
"'silver river of life, rolling on and quickening all the world to a brightness, on
and on to heaven, flowing into a bright eternal sea'" (WL, p.172) was always
really the black river of death and nothingness. As for the 'eternal sea' (i.e. God),
this has now been exposed as a vast dead swamp of stagnancy, rather than a
source of life everlasting_?4 Ought we then accept obscenity and pornography and
affirm the process of reduction? Perhaps those such as Loerke who are, as Birkin
notes, much further on in the above process, should be admired for their courage
and thanked for undertaking the difficult and dangerous task of revealing to man
his own essential condition. Is not Loerke the artist and exterminating angel
whom Nietzsche awaited? No. For Loerke makes the fatal error of turning the
process into a goal, thereby collapsing the possibility of a line of flight which
could take us beyond the ruins into a black hole. As Birkin says, Loerke belongs
to the river of corruption '''just where it falls over into the bottomless pit" ( WL,
p.428), and not where it promises to form a fresh tributary. Loerke is not a
perfect nihilist because although he '" hates the ideal utterly, yet it still dominates
him'" (ibid.) Rather, Loerke is closer to being a form of 'last man'; i.e., an
ultimate creature who, as Gudrun recognizes, is "the rock-bottom of all life"
(ibid., p.427). So we must not make a 'dangerous misunderstanding' in the case
of Herr Loerke.I> He is not in the least interested in the creation of new hopes,
new habitats, or new forms of self; but only in the artistic interpretation of the
old world in its death throes and in the preservation of the old self in its egoism,
in order that he may sustain the experience of organic disintegration from which
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he derives his greatest thrill. His notion of the overcoming of man is not thought
of in terms of creative self-transfiguration and enhancement; rather, he opts to
effectively abort the human race. Whilst the former is a furtherance of life and its
evolution, the latter is simply life's termination and an indication that one has not
only lost faith in one's ability to give birth to the future, but lost faith in the
future itself. Thus it is that apart from delighting in "mocking imaginations of
destruction" (WL, p.453) in which a death sentence is passed on life, Loerke and
Gudrun never talk of a time beyond the ruins. Birkin may also have his fantasies
of world destruction and human extinction, but so too does he always imagine a
new future of some description for life, in which the "timeless creative mystery
would bring forth some other being, finer, more wonderful .. to carryon the
embodiment of creation." (Ibid., p.479)
II.iv. Closing Remarks: No One is Free to be a Crab.
"Overall insight - Actually, every major growth is accompanied by a tremendous
crumbling and passing away . . . every fruitful and powerful movement of
humanity has also created at the same time a nihilistic movement. It could be the
sign of a crucial and most essential growth, of the transition to new conditions of
existence, that the most extreme form of pessimism, genuine nihilism, would
come into the world. This I have comprehended." - Nietzsche.?"
It is the above insight which we have attempted to illustrate here. But whatever
the 'truth' of nihilism, one thing is certain: there can be no turning back; the
death of God, the rise of industrial and consumer capitalism, the triumph of
science and technology, the dissolution of old and stable models of subjectivity
etc. are not reversible events. As Nietzsche puts it; "no one is free to be a crab.
There is nothing for it: one has to go forward, which is to say step by step into
further decadence". 77 This being the case, the question of how to move beyond
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the rums IS no longer strictly pertinent to our present situation. Rather, we
should be asking how best to survive among the ruins and how, perhaps, we may
accelerate the processes of modernity to our own advantage. And yet although
Nietzsche and Lawrence acknowledge this and claim that they are prepared when
movement forward to a new epoch seems blocked (and movement back an
impossibility) to sink deeper into the abyss, affirming corruption and chaos and
the need for these things, still both writers refuse to abandon the hope that to do
so is merely a necessary preliminary to a new period of growth and creation. As
Lawrence writes in The Crown:
"If we have our fill of destruction, then we shall
turn again to creation. We shall need to live again, and live hard, for once our
great civilized form is broken, and we are at last born into the open day, we shall
have a whole new universe to grow up into, and to find relations with. "78
Essentially, then, modern European nihilism is and must remain an ambiguous
state of affairs; one that signals the end of old hopes and old values, and yet also
the distant (but distinct) promise of rejuvenation and revaluation. Provided, that
IS, we do not funk the great challenge of nihilism, either by looking in a moment
of panic and pure folly to some extreme 'solution' (as Socrates looked to
rationality), which merely postpones the moment of reckoning, or by opting to
become passive nihilists and last men; i.e., those who are content to stay at the
level of the ruins and perpetual fragmentation, adopting a complacent quietude in
place of an anxious and agitated state of tension, still not knowing which way to
turn, but no longer really caring, or, worse, mistakenly assuming they have, as it
were, arrived at their destination; modernity being taken for the very zenith of
history and culture.
Clearly what is needed is a little courage and a little intelligence; above all, the
courage and intelligence to laugh at ourselves and our conceit of seriousness, and
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to become insouciant in a positive manner about nihilism."? This is not to deny
that there is danger and uncertainty ahead, but simply to argue that "goodwill and
fearlessness'<? is what is most needed in a period of transition.
If we are to live at all, then we have to agree to 'live dangerously'; accelerating
the process of nihilism and transforming an 'incomplete' condition into a
'perfected' one. Undoubtedly there is something disconcerting about such a
strategy, but for Nietzsche "the only hope for avoiding the catastrophe, for
turning its reactive collapse into an active revaluation is to will it. "81 Only if we
succeed in perfecting nihilism will we be able to proclaim, like Jesus,
'consummatum est'. Only we will not mean that, for us, life is finished, but,
rather, that our long journey into the void of moral-idealism has ended and we
are ready to be born anew in the living flesh; shedding our old humanity like the
tadpole that dares to abandon his tail and become-frog. For if we are not free to
be crabs, neither are we free to remain the ideal creatures we have become and
thus, crucially, the revaluation is "not simply a question of humans recuperating
from the illness of nihilism. "82 Dare we let go of who and what we are and
become-other? Have we the one thing that, as Ursula Brangwen recognizes, really
matters at last: courage. "'Courage for what?' asked her uncle. 'Courage for
everything'" (R, p.270), she replied.
Part III: Aesthetics and Ideology.
III. i. Further Remarks on the Question of Culture.
It will have become clear that essentially Nietzsche is concerned with the question
of culture and believes modern European nihilism as characterized by a "hugely
contemptible money-economy" and the triumph of science and technology
"pursued without restraint" 1, signals the coming of a new dark age. In fact,
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Nietzsche says that when the philosopher examines this today "he almost thinks
that what he is seeing are the symptoms of a total extermination and uprooting of
culture.V Almost - but perhaps not quite. For even after the misplaced hopes of
his first publication", Nietzsche continued to be preoccupied with exploring and
delineating the possibility that modern European nihilism may also coincide with
the rebirth of culture and tragic wisdom; if and when the former can be brought
to perfection and finally left behind.
For Nietzsche, culture is the supreme way of ordering the Dionysian realm of
chaos into a world in which man's highest form of agency (sovereignty) becomes
a possibility. Culture does not simply allow a man to 'be', but, more, it is the
means by which man becomes and self -overcomes. Culture does not merely
guarantee to preserve and/or make safe. If these goals defined the species activity
of culture then, as Nietzsche remarks ironically in the Genealogy, modern man
could be said to have achieved a remarkable degree of culture; whereas he has
merely developed a highly advanced level of civilization (two terms between which
Nietzsche maintains an important distinction as we noted earlier: see fin II. iii. 28).
If the issue of culture contra civilization appears today to have become an urgent
one, there can be no doubt that the struggle between the forces of culture and
civilization has become so uneven, it is probably more accurate to say:
"History now appears as the act by which reactive forces take possession of
culture and divert its course in their favour. The triumph of reactive forces is not
an accident in history but the principle and meaning of 'universal history'. "4
This 'degeneration' or becoming-reactive of culture and the triumph of civilization
occupies a central place in Nietzsche's work. It is, as Deleuze reminds us, the
source of his greatest disappointment and something he often thinks of as a
becoming-German of that which begins Greek; i.e., whereas culture in ancient
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Greece was something fundamentally concerned with Geist (the active and
affirmative life of a people). it ends confused with Reich (the coordinating power
of the state) in the modern world of late 19th century Europe. So successfully
has the former been encased within the ideal molar formations of the latter, that
the "social organizations, associations, communities of a reactive character.
parasites which cover it and absorb it"S have become mistaken for cultural
formations in themselves.
If there is to be a new flowering of culture then at least two things need to be
done: Firstly, we need to recognise that culture and the state are not one and the
same; that they are, in fact, antagonists. As Nietzsche writes; "the 'cultural state'
is merely a modern idea. The one lives off the other, the one thrives at the
expense of the other. "6 The state - that 'coldest of all cold monsters' as
Zarathustra describes it7 - sucks the very blood out of the people over whose
body it has grown like a face. Secondly, having recognized the above and having
withdrawn our love and allegiance for the 'new idol'. then we need to find a way
to release Geist (as defined above), from the hard shell of civilization and its
state-formations. In Nietzsche and Lawrence, and continued in the work of
Deleuze and Guattari, the ultimate task of the philosopher and the artist remains
the same: "It is always a question of freeing life wherever it is imprisoned'f and
overcoded by molar ideals. This may be a slightly forlorn hope, more suited to a
young woman overcoming a period of trauma, such as Ursula Brangwen at the
end of The Rainbow, but for those who refuse to accept that civilization goes all
the way down, there will always remain the possibility that "the sordid people
who crept hard-scaled and separate on the face of the world's corruption were
living still" (R, pp.458-9) and that they would one day find the strength, the
soundness of instinct, and the courage to "cast off their horny covering of
disintegration" so that "new, clean, naked bodies would issue to a new
germination, to a new growth" (ibid, p.459).9
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But how? How to throw off old selves and dead forms? It is here that Nietzsche
once more looks to the phenomenon of modern European nihilism and declares
'accelerate the process!' Like Lawrence, Nietzsche welcomes the deluge and the
flood, because only after such will the rainbow stand in the sky as a symbol of a
new beginning and as a bridge toward a transhuman future. As Deleuze writes:
"Confronted with the ways in which our societies become progressively decodified
and unregulated, in which codes break down at every point, Nietzsche ... makes
no attempt at recodification. "10
In other words, Nietzsche forgets or throws aside his umbrella, just as Lawrence
rages against the great social umbrella that man in his terror of elemental chaos
"erects between himself and the everlasting whirl"ll of life. But let us be careful
here. For whilst Nietzsche makes no attempt to recodify along old lines and
Lawrence no attempt to repair the holes ripped in the great social umbrella by
poets and other enemies of civilized convention, this is not to say that they do
not hope to bring together newly liberated forces onto a plane of consistency.
Thus if they are, on the one hand, rightly thought of as great iconoclasts and
opponents of the idee fixe, rejecting most, if not all, of the legal, contractual, and
institutional bonds relating to and founded upon the interior forces of the modern
state, they are also, on the other hand, keen to reorder, revalue, and "regain
mastery over that which has been totally released." 12 Nietzsche and Lawrence are
not anarchists and, in fact, the question of culture "is badly considered if it is
posed in terms of anarchy versus organized molar politics" 13
However, this is not to say they are crypto-systematizers after all. Let us be
clear on this point, as it is of fundamental importance for an understanding of
Nietzsche's thinking on culture and his politics of style: Central to the notion of a
'healthy' culture, for Nietzsche, is the idea of "harmonious manifoldness or unity
54
in diversity"; culture is not an artificial homogeneity "imposed by external
contraints ... but an organic unity cultivated on the very soil of discord and
difference. "14 In other words, as we indicate above, culture is the giving of what
Nietzsche was fond of calling 'style'. For Nietzsche, this is both a 'natural'
activity and an aesthetic process; art being understood by him as an organic
function of the will to power. He writes: "Culture is, above all, unity of style in
all the expressions of a life of a people." 15 Adding that 'barbarism', the opposite
of culture, is "lack of style or a chaotic jumble of all styles."!" Crucially, a little
later on in the same essay he will clarify this distinction by stressing that
systematic and "oppressive philistinism does not constitute a culture, even an
inferior culture, merely because it possesses a system: it must always be the
antithesis of a culture, namely a permanently established barbarity." 1 7
For Nietzsche, the systematizer is a fraud; a mere play-actor pretending to be a
"whole and uniform nature" 18, but knowing nothing of the genuine discipline
required for style. Gerald Crich is one such actor. Behind his 'composition mask'
lies an iron will, but not integrity. He knows how to organize into a system, but
he is not a man of culture. Rather, he is a pure German who imposes the former
over the latter and translates the "mystic word harmony into the practical word
organization" (WL, p.227); not only a sign for Lawrence of barbarism, but also
indicative of the profoundest nihilism. Of course, from the mechanical
systematization of life imposed by those such a Gerald, "there is vast material
productivity to be gained. "19 But it is only from culture that we shall "produce
the real blossoms of life and being. "20 That is, those sovereign men and women
of active power and affirmative will, newly risen in the flesh, different one from
the other and who acknowledge their differences as degrees of power across a
'pathos of distance', whilst at the same time accepting their place within an 'order
of rank'.
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One is obliged at this juncture to concede what has become obvious; culture, for
Nietzsche and those related to him, is inherently an aristocratic notion and
arrangement and his theory of culture has definite social and political implications:
"Nietzsche himself clearly thought so and did not hesitate to draw them". 21 And
this is precisely where many of the 'dangers' and/or 'problems' of Nietzsche's
work begin for those commentators who convince themselves (mistakenly I
believe) that the above implications are, or are destined to become, 'fascist'. Mark
Warren, for example, claims that when Nietzsche'S notion of culture based upon
the aristocratic model of ancient Greece is transplanted into the socio-political
context of modern Europe it "goes beyond nostalgia for a vital hierarchical
community and moves toward a cultural-aesthetic fascism. "22 Such a claim is met
and challenged in the course of our discussion in chapters II and III, wherein
Nietzsche'S 'politics of evil' and grandeur based upon his cultural aesthetic are
examined at length. However, briefly, I would like to offer a preliminary response
to this claim here and now. Firstly, one cannot and should not attempt to deny
the 'cruel sounding truth' that for Nietzsche notions of mastery and hierarchy are
at the very heart of culture and that he has no qualms about the need for
exploitation and oppression. Simply stated;
"for Nietzsche, a choice must be made
in the end between the needs and claims of noble culture whose goal is art, and
those of a democratic one whose goal is justice and compassion, for the two
cannot be reconciled". 23
But nothing in the above necessarily implies fascism; exploitation and oppression
belong just as crucially to liberal capitalism, resting as it does upon a universal
system of wage-slavery and debt. The ideals posited by a spurious form of
democracy that Lawrence brands as 'robot' or slave-", should not, as we quoted
Deleuze and Guattari saying earlier, make us bless the present system without
reservation. Nor should we be bullied into accepting the crass and simplistic
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alternative of either liberalism or fascism. There is always a line of flight that
escapes from in between such points of blackmail and Nietzsche's thought is
founded upon and furthers such lines. If it carries us away from the vulgarity of
liberal democracy, so does it carry us away from the stupidity of fascism. Thus it
is, for example, that Rupert Birkin, no friend to liberalism, also dismisses the
growing Italian nationalism that so seduces Hermione as no more than another
expression of modern industrialism "'and a shallow jealousy that I detest so
much'" ( WL, p.299).
Nietzsche is saved from fascism because, like Sirkin, he detests the petty
nationalism, the ressentiment-ridden racism, and the state-idolatry of fascism.
Nietzsche's philosophy of culture, art, and style does not only suggest the kind of
politics that we examine in chapters II and III and which can, for one reason or
another, be made to resemble and thereby be confused with faseism; also it
suggests a new and radical politics (of desire) which we shall develop in chapters
IV and V. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, from out of even the tightest knot of
roots a rhizome can sometimes shoot; i.e., Nietzsche's arborescent and
authoritarian model of culture engenders its own escapes and self-overcoming.
Finally, and above all, it is important to realize that, for all his talk of things
Greek, Nietzsche is not advocating an attempted return to, or reterritorialization
upon, an ancient model of culture; nor, as Warren seems to suggest, the
transplantation of a classical model into the modern world. Nietzsche is fully
aware that what cannot be built anymore is a culture in the oldest sense of the
word (even whilst he would remind us of this sense); for modern man is
fundamentally no longer suitable material for such.25 Nietzsche simply hopes to
reactivate something of the Greek Geist (i.e., the creative spirit or potential) that
lies dormant within the present as a different order of sensibility. He knows he
cannot designate a new culture in advance and knows too, after The Birth of
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Tragedy, that it cannot be imposed by force. But Nietzsche hopes that the
philosopher can, perhaps, remove some of the restraints upon the formation of
such and release the necessary forces via experimentation. Such experimentation
(essentially of an artistic character), is primarily directed to the bonds that exist
between people. Thus the goal of a politics of style is to proliferate and intensify
relations; relations of a kind which are presently either dissolved or carefully
regulated by capitalism "through its capacity to fragment, privatize, and segment
the socio-economic field"26 and which has today overgrown and overcoded the
political and cultural arenas.
Fragmented and isolated as modern man has become, he must endeavour to come
back into touch with others and with the world; regaining what Lawrence calls his
"living wholeness and his living unison'S? But this will involve submission,
according to Nietzsche and Lawrence, to those men in whom life is more vivid
and more powerful and presently our entire democratic sensibility rises up in
protest at such a suggestion. Nietzsche insists, however, that "only he who has
attached his heart to some great man is by that act consecrated to culture' 28 and
that only via such an act will man find his own sense of power-fulfilment (i.e ..
his value and joy).
When he is at a low ebb, Birkin wonders why he should bother striving for a
"coherent, satisfied life" and asks himself: "Why bother about human
relationships? ... Why form any serious connections at all?" (WL, p.302). But
when feeling stronger once more, then he knows he must form connections
between himself and others if he is to live seriously as a fulfilled and, indeed, as a
free man; for freedom lies in having duties and obligations toward others (these
are what the noble man understands by 'rights') and in having a place within a
communal order. Birkin realizes that his individuality is a social and cultural effect
that has to be striven for and that his 'singularity' means nothing outside of a
58
social and cultural context. Of course, it is possible to "deny connections, break
them, and become a fragment. "29 But then, according to Lawrence, one is
wretched.
And so: "What we want is to destroy our false inorganic connections, especially
those related to money, and re-establish the living organic connections'<" (i.e.,
form a culture that is based in physis and not upon capital). How to achieve this
is the main concern of this thesis as of Nietzsche's project of revaluation.
III.ii. Art as the Counter-Nihilistic Force par excellence.
We have seen in II.ii how the question concerning technology becomes a question
'answerable', perhaps, in terms of a different revealing (poiesis ). And we have
seen in III.i. how the question of culture understood essentially as a question of
style, also leads us back to art; back, that is, to a process which via creative
experimentation disengages forces that may carry us toward a new becoming and
contribute to the formation of a 'people yet to corne'. Art, then, is central to our
concerns to do with nihilism, culture, and the self; the aesthetic critique of
modernity playing an important role in the philosophical critique. In fact, for
Nietzsche, art is the first and last great hope; quite simply, if we are ever to
move beyond the impasse of the present and give birth to new forms of relation
then "unheard of artistic powers will be needed to break the unlimited knowledge
drive'l.:'! Whether such powers will prove forthcoming in an age of nihilism is
debatable. But that such powers will have to be 'artistic' is a point on which
Nietzsche insists. For art alone is;
"the great means of making life possible, the
great seduction to life, the great stimulant of life. Art is the only superior
counter-force to all will to denial of life, as that which is ... anti-nihilist par
excellence. "32
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The above is not simply Nietzsche giving "hyperbolic expression to his private
preference for art over science. "33 Rather, he is, as Daniel Breazeale correctly
claims; "drawing the logical conclusion from his analyses of culture and
knowledger P and, indeed, from his understanding of life and art in terms of will
to power. It is important if one wishes to form a clear understanding of
Nietzsche's 'aesthetics' (and his politics of style) to appreciate the latter point.
For ultimately, Nietzsche does not "inquire into art in order to describe it as a
cultural phenomenon ... Rather, by means of art and a characterization of the
essence of art, he wants to show what the will to power is. "35
This is why Nietzsche very rarely talks about specific art works; he is essentially
interested in art as a process and a practice in which the will to power most
clearly reveals itself. And thus it is that Nietzsche is also keen to understand art
in terms of the artist and the artist's 'health'. For as an organic function of the
will to power, art can only be understood in terms of the forces (not the
'intentions') present within the artist. For Nietzsche, the genuine artist, whilst
very often of frail health in many obvious respects, nevertheless is full of active
and excessive energy. Via his art, he not only copes with the tragic character of
existence, but affirms it and demands more chaos, more suffering, more danger.
For these things are not only the source of his work, and, indeed, his life, but
via art they are transfigured; "the horror and absurdity of existence" becoming
something which is "compatible with life"36 and not destructive or prohibitive of
it. When man feels himself strong, then he takes delight in his ability to enrich
everything from out of his own strength; his ability, that is, to make the world
not merely significant, but sublime: "This compulsion to transform into the
perfect is - art."37
But of course: "It would be permissible to imagine an antithetical condition .,. a
mode of being which impoverishes and attenuates things and makes them
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consumptive." 38 To imagine, that is, the artist as decadent and art as something
which serves reaction and corruption. This is what Lawrence imagines in Women
in Love; portraying the two artists of the work, Gudrun and Loerke, as fleurs du
mal. Unfortunately, to imagine the becoming-decadent of the artist is not very
difficult. For as Nietzsche notes; "nothing is more corruptible than an artist." 39
Just like the philosopher or scientist, the artist can suffer from a collapse of the
primary instincts and become a sick animal, in thrall to the ascetic ideal and ready
to serve the "approaching barbarity't.w Or, at the very least, be willing to accept
a role in which he is reduced to the level of one who interprets nihilism, rather
than struggling to create a new vision, form new hopes, and build new habitats.
Thus Herr Loerke, who, explaining to Ursula and Gudrun why he has accepted a
commission to produce a great granite frieze for a factory in Cologne argues;
"'since industry is our business now, then let us make our places of industry our
art - our factory area our pantheon'" (WL, p.424). Gudrun asks whether he
believes, then, that art should subordinate itself to industry and Loerke replies:
"'Art should interpret industry, as art once interpreted religion'" (ibid.)
This, however, is clearly not Lawrence's view; any more than it is Nietzsche's.
For both, art should create the world - not merely interpret, represent, flatter,
or sustain it. Indeed, if need be, the artist should assume the role of world-
destroyer; i.e., one who is prepared to challenge the present order by "returning
it to its originally explosive character. "41 That is to say, artists are those who are
obliged when life becomes stifled beneath the great grey umbrella of convention
and the ready-made, to tear open the artificial sky that has been painted on the
underside of this umbrella, allowing us to breathe a little fresh air and to form a
new vision. For the artist, as for all men, the struggle against chaos (the struggle
to give style to chaos), is a human necessity. But this is not the only necessity,
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nor the limit of the artists duty:
"It IS as if the struggle against chaos does not
take place without an affinity with the enemy, because another struggle develops
and takes on more importance - the struggle against opinion, which claims to
protect us from chaos itself. "42
For Deleuze and Guattari, quoted above, as for Lawrence whom they are
paraphrasing here, the role of the artist goes far beyond simply holding up fifty
mirrors to the world. If, on the one hand, the artist does have an obligation to
"live out and give expression to the reality of his time"43, so too, on the other
hand, must he become 'untimely' and not rest content with serving the order of
his day (be it the order of the Church or the Reich). Only by becoming in some
manner untimely will the artist be able to bring to presence the greater reality
that lies external to the cliches of motley-spotted modern man and his molar
daubs painted crudely over himself and every living thing.
But alas, the becoming-decadent of the artist IS far more common than his
becoming-untimely; and thus there flourishes a style of art "whose secret essence
is scatological't+' For, as discussed earlier (II.iii.), decadence results in man's
inability to distinguish between the creative and excremental forces and flows; all
becomes dirt and foulness in his mind and he becomes paralysed with fear and
hatred of his own body. According to Lawrence, this is doubly disastrous for the
artist; because to lose his instinctual health and to become gripped by a horror of
his physical being, both distorts his life and thwarts his artistic vision. For it is
from out of our physical (specifically our sexual) being that arises an intuitive
awareness of beauty and form. If, on the one hand, Lawrence claims that this
hysterical fear has become particularly acute during the modern period, it is
nevertheless the case that, on the other hand (and like Nietzsche), so too does he
suggest that the slow-death of the healthy instincts and man's intuitive
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consciousness (his phallic or blood consciousness), has been an on-going process
since the triumphant rise of Socratic reason, Platonic idealism and Christian
morality.
Lawrence writes: "The history of our era is the nauseating and repulsive history
of the crucifixion of the procreative body". Adding: "Art, that handmaid, humbly
and honestly served the vile deed, through three thousand years at least. "45 This
history is the history of man and nihilism; the slow death of culture and the
body. As a result, we have become knowledgeable and productive, but we can no
longer feel or create. Having lost our sense of live beauty, we have become
radically impoverished in world and surrounded by ugliness which undermines our
feeling of power and well being.46
For Lawrence, then, we are all now to a greater or lesser extent born corpses;
inhabiting a world of shadows or simulacra of the real. The number of genuine
artists and artworks (i.e., works which exhibit a new becoming and which do not
reterritorialize back onto the cliche), is extremely small. And yet Lawrence, like
Nietzsche, retains a stubborn faith in the promise of art; if, on the one hand,
avant garde artists such as Loerke represent the last word in self-consciousness
and corruption, then, on the other hand, "it is through art that Lawrence seeks
redemption from this 'fallen' condition. "47 And - let us be clear on this point -
the 'promise' of art (i.e., the redemption it offers) is a restoration of the real;
that is, the restoration of the libidinally material realm of the physical and
sensual; the resurrection of the flesh, be this the flesh of man, beast, or fruit.
Naming Cezanne, and referring to the latter's attempts to overcome the cliche and
resist the ideal forces of the dominant socius via the painting of an apple,
Lawrence writes: "It seems a small thing to do: yet it is the first sign that a man
has made for thousands of years that he is willing to admit that matter actually
exists. "48
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Thus, crucially, great art is not an escape into fantasy, or a move away from the
world of experience. Rather, it is a way of coming into touch with things; be they
apples, shoes, sunflowers, stars, vases, landscapes, or - ultimately - the bodies
of men and women. Art, as Deleuze and Guattari write, is a means of awakening
in ourselves a greater sensitivity to intensities. We do not retreat into it, so
much as use it as:
a tool for blazing new life lines ... all those real becomings
that are not produced only in art, and all those active escapes that do not consist
in fleeing into art, taking refuge in art, and all those positive deterritorializations
that never reterritorialize on art". 49
Loerke, of course, would find the above view anathema. For him, a work of art:
"'has nothing to do with anything but itself, it has no relation with the everyday
world of this and the other, there is no connection between them, absolutely
none'" (WL, p.430). And the greatest error is to "'confuse the relative world of
action, with the absolute world of art'" (Ibid., p.431). Gudrun agrees. But Ursula
still has the health and naivety to challenge this idealistic and ultra-sophisticated
view of art preached by Loerke and subscribed to by her sister. She tells them;
"'you have to separate the two [ie, the world of art and the world of realityJ
because you can't bear to know what you are'" (Ibid.) For Ursula, art reveals the
'truth' of the artist and of the real world and only the decadent who is "'too far
gone to see it'" (Ibid.) would wish to deny this. 50
Thus Cezanne's apple may seem, as Lawrence says, a small act, and yet "it is the
first step that counts, and Cezanne's apple is a great deal more than Plato's Idea.
Cezanne's apple rolled the stone from the mouth of the tomb ... he gave us a
chance. "51 A chance, that is, to live and to "displace our present mode of mental-
vision consciousness . . . and substitute a mode of consciousness that was
predominantly intuitive, the awareness of touch. "52 In other words, art forms not
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only a tool for blazing new life lines, but also allows for the development of what
Marcuse would call a new 'reality principle'; one that is fundamentally antagonistic
to the principle which is currently central to Western industrial civilization.
Freud, and others since, have disputed the possibility of such, arguing that art
cannot supply or itself become a future reality without a serious human
regression. That the magical images and sounds of art could point towards an
"unconquered future of mankind rather than its (badly) conquered past ... seemed
to Freud a nice utopia. "53 But Freud's understanding of art is as seriously flawed
as his understanding of sex and power; and, ultimately, he wishes to retain the
great umbrella of civilization. The revolution affected by artists like Cezanne is
not in line with the politics of his own project.
Arguably, Cezanne affects more than just a revolution; his work signals the
beginning of an actual revaluation of values - not just between man and fruit, but
between man and man (and man as fruit). Thus it is that:
"When he said to his
models: 'Be an apple! Be an apple!' he was uttering the foreword to the fall not
only of ... the Christian idealists ... but to the collapse of our whole way of
consciousness, and the substitution of another way. If the human being is going
to be primarily an apple ... then you are going to have a new world of men: a
world which has very little to say, men that can sit still and just be physically
there, and be truly non-moral. "54
That is, a world 'beyond good and evil', as Nietzsche would say; a world of men
and women who have left behind their personal-egoic and human, all too human
selves full of shame and bad conscience. The promise of art is that it alone can
'save'55 us and lead towards a delicious golden age in which we have become the
apple plucked by Eve. When Birkin accuses Hermione of having the 'eternal apple'
forever stuck in her throat ( WL, p.40), he is implying that what she needs to do
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is to swallow the thing at last and fully digest it; to become-apple herself, i.e., a
creature who has had the full experience of good and evil (and not merely
knowledge of such in her head) and is thus able to move beyond such to an
extra-moral future.
A golden age: and why not? Nihilism is, in a sense, the ne plus ultra: "So why
shouldn't it be a prelude to a golden age?"56 But let us not deceive ourselves on
the likelihood of this. For if the return of the apple in Cezanne's work marks the
promise of the above, it is worth noting that after a forty year struggle Cezanne
himself only achieved limited success in his goal of revealing an apple; and never,
according to Lawrence, managed to capture the appley quality of man or woman.
It took thousands of years to kill the body and construct an ideal organism; who
can say how long it will take to dismantle the latter and build once more a 'body
without organs'v>? Cezanne, for all his efforts, was soon emasculated and his
apple abstracted into 'significant form'; the resurrection of the flesh and the
revaluation of values was postponed once more - as it will be postponed "ad
infinitum by the good bourgeois corpses in their cultured winding-sheets". 58
But art remains, we may conclude, the great counter-nihilistic force par
excellence that Nietzsche recognized it to be. Certainly it can itself become a tool
in the service of reaction. But those who would make art subservient rely, like
the capitalist upon schizophrenia, on releasing chaotic forces in order to invest
their systems with a certain necessary dynamism. The hope has to be that one
day they will find they have allowed too great a hole in their umbrella to be
repaired and there will be an irruption of desire the likes of which we have not
yet begun to imagine and which will "bring forth miracles, create utter new races
and new species, ... new forms of consciousness, new forms of body, new units
of being (WL, p.4S3).
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III.iii. Closing Remarks: From Among the Ruins to Beyond the Ruins; From a
Politics of Style to a Politics of Evil.
We have examined how modern European nihilism manifests itself in various
forms and why it must be explored at numerous points, in a number of ways.
The revaluation of all values longed for by Nietzsche and Lawrence is achievable,
if at all, only once the above has been perfected. But if the consummation of
nihilism and the revaluation is essentially a cultural-philosophical concern, it
cannot be divorced from a social, economic, and political context and thus the
question of style is more than an abstract one to do with aesthetics or 'art for
art's sake'.
Acutely aware of this, both Nietzsche and Lawrence show a pronounced interest
in how power manifests itself at a political level and each seems attracted to the
idea that a revolutionary solution to the problem of nihilism can be found that
would enable man to gain control of the forces of history and forcefully push or
kick his way beyond the ruins and over himself. If they do not wish to posit
systematic metanarratives of the kind that characterize modernity, then still they
are keen to arrive at a 'grand politics' of their own in which an uneasy balance is
struck between a desire to 'take over' and a radical-nomadic wish to '''wander
away from the world's somewhere's'" (WL, p.315). As strong as this latter desire
to drift outside the gate is within them, like Birkin, Nietzsche and Lawrence
realize that they cannot simply cut themselves off from a 'degenerate' society
merely by taking flight and, in fact, all that they have gained in 'free, proud
singleness' becomes meaningless and wasted without their being able to operate
and create within a wider social context. Thus Nietzsche and Lawrence affirm an
ethos, or way of living and relating, which is constructed ultimately in the bonds
between people.
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As artists too, Nietzsche and Lawrence cannot resist the temptation to give style
to the ruins and dress the chaos of existence with new myths and illusions,
thereby enabling man to form a new conception of reality or 'truth' (the latter not
at all loving to go naked as romantics like Rousseau and scientific voyeurs choose
to believe). This is not to suggest that Nietzsche and Lawrence argue for the
reformation of a unified and centralized whole, reorganized out of heterogeneous
bits and leftovers; but they clearly do wish to do more than merely play with
these fragments in an 'ironic' fashion. Having recognized the danger of slipping
toward totalitarianism or absolutism, in which all value is mistakenly assigned to
the whole and one forgets that the latter is simply an abstraction that overcodes
the parts, Nietzsche and Lawrence are also alert to the contrary (yet related)
danger which mutates what is an undoubtedly healthy attitude of "incredulity
towards metanarratives">? (i.e., an unwillingness to accept any ail-encompassing
truth claim except as a possibly convenient fiction), into a hopeless relativism and
a counter-belief in the ruins that invests the latter with some kind of intrinsic last
value; the fragmented and heterogeneous becoming celebrated and promoted as
the good-in-themselves. Croire dans les ruines! is ultimately no more than a
nihilistic slogan mouthed by disappointed slaves on the recoil from a belief in the
Whole. Robbed of the resources needed to move forward and the courage to do
so, the latter "consider it ludicrous and shameful that they should be expected to
restore order to the chaotic world"6o (or give it style) and thus opt to remain
content at the level of disintegration, frustrating all attempts at revaluation and
deriding all efforts to build new little habitats and hopes as 'reactionary'.
Nietzsche and Lawrence, to conclude, were both weil aware that life is not
predetermined and does not come ready made; i.e., that there are no ideal forms
in the past to which we can return, nor any ideal forms in the future to which we
can progress. Thus a move beyond the ruins must involve more than a vain
attempt to reterritorialize along old lines, or the reconstructon of old unities and
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old selves. Similarly, it must involve more than the desperate hope of a
transcendent utopia to come. But it still seems doubtful to Nietzsche and
Lawrence whether man can live without forming some kind of narrative
concerning his origins and his destiny; without positing some kind of 'grand
politics' that is founded upon the Nietzschean formula for human fulfilment ("a
Yes, a No, a straightline, a goal "61) and which understands that destruction,
disintegration, and dissolution remain "merely the propaedeutic to [the 1 positive
activity of creation and invention. "62 Thus Women in Love ends, but does not
conclude. Having achieved an almost total devaluation of values, Lawrence looks
for a way forward - but a way that doesn't rest upon the social optimism with
which he concludes The Rainbow. Like Nietzsche, he affirms a new philosophy of
power and a politics of evil that furthers his thinking on art, culture, and society.
69
Chapter II: Beyond the Ruins: Love, Power,
and the Politics of Evil.
Part I: Opening Remarks on How the Disease of Love Infects Modernity and Its
Politics in Relation to Lawrence's Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo.
Aaron's Rod (AR) and Kangaroo (K) are the first two novels in what is commonly
known as Lawrence's 'power trilogy'; the third, The Plumed Serpent, forms the
focus of our next chapter. Both works are written against a background of post-
War crisis and collapse, Lawrence adopting an episodic style in order to reflect
the chaos and uncertainty of the world in which they are set. The Great War
itself, however, is regarded as an overt symptom - and not the cause - of the
underlying cultural malaise that Nietzsche terms modern European nihilism (as
discussed in chapter one). Nor does the War's end signify the termination of the
latter's unfolding, for when peace finally returns in 1918 it results merely in the
resublimation of violence back into "the general air" (AR, p.S). This is not to say
that nothing has changed, the conflict did cause a break of some kind and for
Lawrence "the world before the War is no longer thinkable; it has been deranged
by a historical nightmare whose significance cannot be contained by the familiar
categories of the world that has been disrupted." 1
Thus we see Aaron Sisson take up his 'rod' and abandon his old life as he seeks
to embrace the 'incalculable'; and thus we see Richard Somers, the Lawrencean
protagonist of Kangaroo, set off on a quest for a post-moral and, if need be,
transhuman future, in which power, not love, is the key. Refusing all
segmentation (husband/worker/citizen), Aaron and Somers go with the flow of
desire, breaking away from one form of bondage after another and "everywhere
setting the molecular charges that will explode, make fall what must fall, make
escape what must escape" 2, rejecting slave values and conventions.
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But as much as both characters want to move "almost violently away from
everything" (AR, p.178) and are primarily concerned with reconfiguring the
forces of the soul, Aaron and Somers are acutely aware that their individual quest
for a new self and a more meaningful and fufilling way of life is not "separable
from a general political context". 3 Thus each strives to form a new series of
relations and accepts that whilst it is sometimes vital to be able to stand aside and
stand apart from their fellow men, ultimately "'you can't keep on being alone'"
(AR, p.241). Like Nietzsche, Lawrence does not promise or promote a liberation
from all ties into an ideal freedom or individuality and he concedes that
"implication in the 'horrible human affair' cannot be avoided by one who seeks the
new age"."
However, as indicated above, Lawrence wishes to suggest a new basis for
individual and collective being: power - contra love. And the power trilogy of
novels is essentially concerned with the struggle between these two life-modes,
Lawrence developing Nietzsche's philosophy and politics of power on the one
hand, his critique of love on the other.
If the power mode is our concern in Part II, here we shall examine 'love', by
which we refer to a once healthy process of the "incomprehensible human soul"
(AR, p.166), but which has now mistakenly been turned into a goal and, as such,
become a disease to us. We refer also to the altruistic and egalitarian values of
moral-idealism which are symptomatic of the love-disease; values such as pity
and self-sacrifice which lie at the heart of Christian culture.
It is interesting to ponder why it is that so many still cling to the foot of the
Cross following the death of God. For, after all, we are none of us obliged by
any law to remain faithful to our old ideals; particularly once they have been
shown to be born of base and reactive origins. It is not only unintelligent and
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lazy to persist with such values, but, as Nietzsche points out; "through this
faithfulness we are injuring our higher self". 5 There is thus only one thing to be
done: "we have to become traitors, be unfaithful, again and again abandon our
ideals'< if we are to advance from one mode of life into another. Of course this
will involve a degree of pain and man will thus need to 'become hard' as
Zarathustra demands of him. But if we do not do this, if, rather, we allow our
excessive sensitivity which has produced many of the "enormous social problems
today?", to grow still more acute, then we may possibly enter a terminal decline
as a species.
Richard Somers understands this: '''Let's be hard, separate men", he tells
Kangaroo, in order that they may meet and understand one another at a level
"deeper than love" (K, p.209). Kangaroo, uncomfortable with the request and so
often mistaken in his attempts to understand Somers, is not wrong when he
responds by accusing the latter of wanting to betray his human self.
Like Somers, Aaron too is prepared to abandon his ideal human status and social
identity; he too wants to become hard and unlovable. But most men when shown
God's corpse, refuse to surrender their old faith and old selves, preferring to
burrow contentedly into the corpse and insisting that the stench of decay is the
veritable perfume of love. Nietzsche knows this is how the majority of men are,
which is why they are a threat to man's creative evolution and self-overcoming.
Therefore he calls upon those who would preserve the promise of tomorrow to
not only break the old law tables, but also "shatter the good and justt''", resisting
the urge to show pity; as Somers resists when Kangaroo lies dying in his hospital
bed still insisting that "'Love is the greatest'" (K, p.323) and imploring Somers to
accept this. But Somers looks on impassively and in silence; refusing the appeal
made to his pity. Refusing, that is, to give Kangaroo that which the latter wanted
all along - his unconditional love. Ultimately, for all his talk of giving love,
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Kangaroo has only ever wanted to be given love all along. As Deleuze
perceptively writes: "The man of ressemiment does not know how and does not
want to love, but wants to be loved. "9
It's not that Somers is incapable of pity, nor that he wishes to deny love
altogether. In fact, he concedes: "Love is an eternal part of life. But it is only a
part. And when it is treated as if it were a whole, it becomes a disease" (K,
p. 328). It is this monomaniacal, disease-producing insistence on love which
Somers hates and resists, adamant that love is not and never can be "'the one and
only, exclusive force or mystery of living inspiration ... There is something else'"
(K, p.134). And this something else is power: that which love hates.
In expressing his discontent with the love-ideal, however, Somers finds himself in
opposition to the great edifice of modern civilization which has attempted to
found itself exclusively upon this ideal, most usually expressed as the command
'love thy neighbour as thyself' (i.e., practice universal consideration of others
equally and impartially, recognizing no marks of difference or distinction). Of
course, such a claim is anathema to Nietzsche and Lawrence, who would protest
that it radically falsifies the nature of the relationship between men. Even Freud
admits that this moral diktat is "impossible to fulfil"!" for beings who are not
naturally inclined to be "gentle creatures who want to be loved". 11 But civilization
pays no attention to this fact: "it merely admonishes us that the harder it is to
obey the precept the more meritorious it is to do so." 12 Thus civilization IS
obliged from the outset to be oppressive, viewing man as a dangerous animal In
need of taming via the expedient that is love. Freud says this is unfortunate, but
necessary for man's own benefit. That which Nietzsche would regard as man's
healthiest expression of will to power, Freud describes as man's 'primary
hostility'; i.e., that which perpetually threatens destruction and chaos. Thus, for
Freud, civilization is understood in the same manner that Nietzsche characterizes
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liberal-democracy; as a sort of 'quarantine arrangement', forming "systematic
protection against the unrelenting impulses of sex ... aggression, cruelty etc." 13
Where these impulses cannot be usefully turned against themselves within the
'soul', they are denied expression (and, if possible, destroyed).
In addition, civilization uses varIOUS methods intended to incite people into
identification with one another, attempting to merge "single human individuals,
and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the
unity of mankind.vl+ Nietzsche and Lawrence oppose this process; the latter
declaring flatly that there "can never be love universal and unbroken" 15 and
arguing that the attempt to insist on such and deny the instincts of man results
ultimately with a recoil at last into hatred, insanity, and violence (the so-called
'return of the repressed'). Whereas for Freud, all that does not conform with
Eros (which he exclusively associates with life) is permeated with a 'death
instinct', for Nietzsche and Lawrence it is the love-ideal itself that displays a
nihilistic will to negate difference and becoming, thereby preserving a state of
mechanical sameness and fixed being.
As Marcuse points out, the continual restrictions on man's instinctual life and the
frustration of his most active forces (i.e., the 'civilizing' of man), ultimately has
the effect of weakening the above and of thereby ensuring their becoming-
reactive. Thus, ironically, the forces of nihilism are strengthened by those
attempts to deny the active powers a place within the will. Thus it is that Freud's
thinking comes "face to face with the fatal dialectic of civilization" 16; i.e., the
very progress and triumph of the latter leads to the accumulation of increasingly
destructive forces. Appreciating this, Lawrence characterizes moral-idealism as an
extremely dangerous disease: "We think that love and benevolence will cure
anything. Whereas love and benevolence are our poison." 17 If, on the one hand,
we have been made into 'interesting' animals full of potential via morality, so too
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have we been turned into sick animals full of secret self-loathing and profound
ill-will for all that is non-self, or other. Driven by ressentiment and the spirit of
revenge, civilized man is willing to murder those who refuse to accept his love
and give their love to him and prepared also to throwaway his own life in an act
of self-sacrifice.
This is illustrated by Lawrence In Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo. Jim BricknelI, a
Christian-socialist character in the first of these novels, confesses to the
Nietzschean-like Lilly that he would be happy to see '''crucifixions ad infinitum '"
because for him '''love and sacrifice are the finest things in life'" and the greatest
joy resides in "'sacrificing oneself to love" (AR, p.77). To Lilly, this lusting for
suicide is the sign of one who is world-weary and lacking in the strength to
accept life as a continual struggle, and an inevitable consequence of turning love
from a process into a goal. But ideal-love also becomes homicidal as well as
suicidal, so that the murderer too is merely an "extreme lover acting on the
recoil''' (AR, p.294). Thus it is that Jack Callcott, the sentimental fascist
paramilitary of Kangaroo is at his happiest when breaking heads with an iron bar
and boasting of it afterwards with "indescribably gloating joy in his tones" (K,
p.319). It is because ideal love cannot recognize limits of any kind that it ends by
becoming deadly. Men cause or accept death not because they love too little - but
too much. If this is bad enough at an individual level, it is obviously worse on a
collective or mass-scale, such as happens when love infects our social
organizations and Nietzsche warns above all we should be wary of underestimating
"the fatality that has crept out of Christianity even into politics!" I!! about which I
wish to make a few remarks below.
According to both Nietzsche's and Lawrence's reading of history, there have been
a series of 'slave revolts in morality'. Behind these they detect a spirit of revenge
and what Nietzsche calls the 'ascetic ideal' (i.e, essentially a will to negate power).
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The 'politics of love' in the modern period - particularly, though not exclusively
in its liberal and socialist manifestations - is a continuation of this slave revolt
and results, according to Lawrence in the triumph of "painfully inferior and even
base politicians" all wielding the "insentient bullying power of mediocrity". 19
In the Genealogy (11.16), Nietzsche tells his tale of the slave revolt; a story that
unfolds in a manner suggestive of Hegel's philosophy of Geist. Only Nietzsche's is
not a story of spiritual and intellectual progress made by man, but of
physiological decline; a story of love's triumph, but also of revenge and hatred
and the destruction of the classical ideal based upon an active and affirmative
conception of power and life. Beginning and continuing at a micro-level of forces
and values, the slave revolt nevertheless has molar political and social
consequences, even though some critics have argued that there is in fact no
conclusive evidence to prove a decisive link between Christian moral teaching at
the metaphysical level and the demand for equal rights at the secular level of
modern politics and socio-economics. Certainly it IS true to say that Nietzsche's
reading of European history in the Genealogy is an imaginative and highly
speculative account, designed to emphasize in a dramatic and rhetorical manner
his opposition to both the Christian moral tradition and modernity. But despite
this and the seemingly reductive nature of an interpretation which characterizes
liberal-democracy as being no more than a secularization of Christian-moral
culture ("a demand that the actual world embody the Christian-moral promise'S"),
it has surely to be conceded that: "Nietzsche's views on the continuity of
Christian and liberal democratic culture do reveal significant affinities. This
suggests in important aspects he was justified in holding that liberal democracy
was implicated in the crisis of modern European nihilism. "21
In Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo, Lawrence, having already rejected liberal
democracy, sets out to explore the two dominant alternatives on offer in the
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1920's: socialism and fascism. Thus, for example, in chapter VI of the earlier
work, Aaron falls in with some middle-class, would-be socialist revolutionaries,
dreaming naively of liberte, egslite. and tretcrnite on the one hand, whilst
thrilling to the thought of a violent upheaval and a whole drama of 'blood and
crime' on the other. Lawrence is keen to show to what extent it is the latter that
really motivates; a lusting for brutal spectacle and sensation, only thinly veiled
behind the fairest idealism. Jim Bricknell, insists explicitly that the only hope for
man lies in imitating Christ whilst hoping for social and political revolution. When
Lilly pours scorn on his creed of love, Bricknell leaps up in a violent rage and
gives the latter "two or three hard blows with his fists" (AR, p.82); a dramatic
illustration of the return of the repressed rage and aggressiveness that lies in the
souls of the good and just.
Later, Lawrence introduces another socialist character into Aaron's Rod, Levison;
this time one of the Marxist-Hegelian variety, insistent that socialism is '''the
inevitable next step'" (AR, p. 279). Lilly agrees that if we continue along the
present path of idealism, then this is indeed likely to be the case. And in
Kangaroo, Somers will also conclude when considering this argument that "if the
old ideal had still a logical leaf to put forth, it was this last leaf of communism -
before the lily-tree of humanity rooted in love died its final death" (K, p.265).
Thus Levison is not wrong: but what he welcomes as the perfectibility of human
society formed upon the logical development of an ideal, is what Lilly and Somers
both dread; the final degeneration of mankind into "a sort of slime and merge"
(AR, p.166). For the latter, the idea and the ideal of love and all that this implies
(e.g., the unity of mankind, the sanctity of human life, the notion of self-
sacrifice), has gone dead: '"And when the ideal is dead and putrid, the logical
sequence is only a stink'" (ibid., p.280).
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Unable to see anything other than the logic of his own socialist position, Levison
asks Lilly what his (political) alternative is: "'Is it merely nihilism?'" (AR,
p.281). If there is an undoubted irony in his asking of this question, nevertheless
it is an important question which demands to be raised and deserves to be
answered. And even if Lilly's quasi-Nietzschean aristocratism is meant to be
counter-nihilistic, it does present problems in its own right to be addressed. In
many ways, Lilly is as 'modern' in his political grandeur and aristocratic
ambitions as Levison is in his socialism; and just as mistaken. It will fall to
Somers in the later novel to begin to move away from the political and
revolutionary altogether (and even then he doesn't get terribly far). For as he
comes vaguely but increasingly to realize via his contact with the likes of Jaz,
Struthers, Kangaroo, and Jack, all hopes for a seizure of history and all grand
political projects are fatally contaminated with the same poison: even his own.
Having arrived in Australia already convinced of the connection between
Christian-moral idealism and political liberalism, Somers initially aims his critique
at the democratic world, which, he agrees with Jack Callcott, is "'fermenting
rotten with ... the will of the people'" (K, p.89). But he eventually rejects also
the revolutionary alternatives offered to democracy by Left and Right; realizing
that it is not just liberals but also socialist workers and fascist paramilitaries who
have "learned to consider I their 1 existence an injustice" 22 and who seek revenge
upon life accordingly. Somers recognizes. as we will see. that it is modern man
per se who is the problem; that whilst those infected with the political virus and
the disease of love may be particularly dangerous. the real issue concerns the
nature of our humanity itself.
To conclude. we may say that if bourgeois civilization has become an
impossibility. standing as it does upon a ruined moral support, so too have the
traditional political alternatives become redundant. What is needed is something
78
radically different; a politics which works not to preserve man as he is, but to
further his transfiguration and self-overcoming and a politics that opens up an
order of rank between men, doing away with the aggressive overfamiliarity and
"promiscuous mixing in" (K, p.36) that characterizes the virulently egalitarian and
highly authoritarian politics of love. We travelled far in the direction of Christ
but it turned into a dead-end at last: "No further progress is possible in that
direction, we have reached breakdown and failure. If life is to continue, a shift
must be made to the power-mode". 23
Part II: Power: The Philosophy, Politics, and Problem Of.
II.i. Remarks on the Philosophy of Power.
Having reflected on "the conventionally bonoriti term 'love'" 1 and found it to
disguise a good deal of hatred and resentment, I wish now to examine the attempt
made by Nietzsche and Lawrence to revalue the complementary term 'power' and
form a critical conception beyond the reactive representations of moral and
rational idealism. That is, a conception which is free from "the superficial
contempt for power which most of us feel and express today"; contempt born of
the fact that we moderns "only know dead power. which is force". 2 But power,
Lawrence insists, is not mere force and has nothing to do with bullying authority.
For Lawrence. as for Nietzsche, the distinction between power and force is vital,
not least of all if they are going to be able to develop an effective critique that
can be taken seriously once truth claims have been abandoned in favour of power
claims. The former is usually construed as something predominantly active and
affirmative that deserves to be esteemed, obliging as it does a man to act with
profound obligation; the latter, force, is portrayed as reactive and negative which
deserves to be devalued and regarded as fundamentally base and irresponsible.
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Unfortunately, as indicated above, the traditional representations of power
common within Western thought and modern political theory from Hobbes to
Hegel, have been ones in which the latter is characterized in a:
"strangely restrictive way, in that, to begin with, this power is poor in resources,
sparing in its methods, monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of
invention, and seemingly doomed to repeat itself.
Further, it is a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power
to say no; in no condition to produce, capable only of positing limits, it is
basically anti-energy." 3
Deleuze anticipates Foucault's analysis above in his 1962 study of Nietzsche and
Philosophy, arguing that the problem resides in the fact that when we make
power an object of representation, we necessarily make it dependent upon the
factor according to which a thing is represented or recognized or not: "Now, only
values which are current, only accepted values [i.e., herd values 1 give criterion of
recognition in this way. "4 We need thus to form a new non-representational and
energy-based model of power outside of accepted values and beyond the "negative
and emaciated forms of prohibition'f that are currently mistaken as the only
possible manifestations of power. Somewhat ironically, it is power itself which has
today to be liberated from the 'repressive hypothesis' which assumes dominance
within modernity and provides a generally acceptable model of thought. Power has
to be allowed to regain something of its Dionysian and positive aspect. If this
seems disconcerting to the modern mind, the fact remains that beneath the dull
grey representations of power given us by the puritan, power has always
remained gay, which is why as Foucault concludes: "What makes power hold good
is simply the fact that it doesn't weigh on us as a force that says no, but that
it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasures, forms knowledges,
produces discourse. "6
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In other words, and importantly, power is the great "productive network which
runs through the whole of the social body"7; i.e., power _ and not love _ is that
which keeps us alive to one another and in touch. This is why Lawrence argues
that power is not only prior to love, but that the latter is also ultimately a
product and secondary form of power: "Even the phallic erection is a first blind
movement of power. Love is said to call power into motion: but it is probably the
reverse; that the slumbering power calls love into being. "8 This reversal by
Lawrence, in which power is now posited as the "first and greatest of all
mysteries"? behind our being and existence, brings us back once more to
Nietzsche's assertion that we, like the rest of the world, are will to power II_ and
nothing else besides!" 10
Thus it is that despite Jesus, despite Freud and all the other moral-idealists and
castrati, man wants more than simply to love and be loved and will always
ultimately value as the good that which brings him a "deeper flow of life and life-
energy"!", heightening his sense of power; whilst, on the other hand, branding as
bad that which impairs this flow and "proceeds from weakness." 12 At least this is
what Nietzsche and Lawrence pin their hopes for a revaluation of values upon.
Thus power, to reiterate, so often thought of as 'evil' by the conventionally moral
(the weak and tame), is affirmed by Nietzsche and those who follow him in their
thinking as the good. So it is that when Nietzsche describes his politics of power
as a politics of evil, we need not imagine fascist brutality or the torture chambers
of the Marquis de Sade.l ' Evil is simply Nietzsche's word for power,
appropriated from the moral vocabulary of the meek and assigned a new meaning
and a new value. As a philosopher of power, Nietzsche is affirming "those
processes that flagrantly violate all human utility, all accumulative reason, all
stability and all sense" 14, convinced as he is that these criteria are rooted in the
reactive impulses of self-preservation belonging to a "peculiarly sordid, inert, and
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cowardly species" 15 of man and herd animal who has learned to believe as Truth
that: "Good is the passive that obeys Reason. Evil is the active springing from
Energy." 16
Nietzsche, after Blake, wishes to argue that the above is not in fact the case; to
demonstrate that: "Energy is the only life, and is from the Body" and that,
ultimately: "Energy is Eternal Delight." 17 He attempts to do this by stripping
away the regulations that have been used to control and legitimize power within a
philosophy of right; revealing thereby power in its 'Machiavellian' nature: "pur.
sans melange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans toute son aprete."18
Let us not, however, be mistaken into thinking that Nietzsche's understanding of
power is one that somehow purifies the latter of all harmful and dangerous
aspects, even if it does, in a sense, seek to sanctify power. Nietzsche does not,
for example, deny that power even at its most life-creative and life-affirming
contains within it a destructive element and is anything other than that which
preserves life. Rather, when a man or animal is full of active energy, they are full
of the desire above all to increase their feeling of power (Machtgefiihl ) and they
achieve this, paradoxically, via an expenditure of strength and via the process of
self-overcoming. Thus what a man most wants is not simply length of days; he
wants intensity of life, not duration.
But how, it might be asked, does one acquire such active life and enhance one's
power to begin with? Nietzsche answers by saying that one must first of all need
strength; "otherwise one will never have it." 19 This is also Lawrence's reply to
the above. But as he and Nietzsche also both stress it is by no means a question
of consciously seeking after power. As Deleuze rightly notes. to want or seek
power is "only the lowest degree of will to power, its negative form, the guise it
assumes when reactive forces prevail'<"; i.e., it is the will of the slave who
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understands power only as something he lacks. Radically, Nietzsche frees his
notion of will to power from all egoism and consciousness; i.e., from all residues
of philosophical humanism. We cannot know power, nor possess it, nor seek it
out. We can only accept it as a gift which "flows into us from behind and below.
We must turn our backs to it, and go ahead. The faster we go ahead, the
stronger the river flows into us. "21 That is, the more intensely we live, the more
power we need, the greater the power we will receive.
"From earliest times, man has been aware of a 'power' or potency within him -
and also outside of him - which he has no ultimate control over. "22 Traditionally
man has thought of this power in terms of the divine and/or the daimonic. The
saying of Heraclitus - 'ethos anthropoi daimon' - more than simply meaning that
a man's character or fate is determined by his 'demon', means too that a man is
produced and constituted by the element of power; that is to say, he is formed
between the forces that he contains in relation to and combination with those
forces external to himself (solar-cosmic forces, environmental forces, social,
cultural, and technological forces etcetera). Thus Richard Somers's confession to
the all-too-human Kangaroo that he identifies primarily with his demon: 'tilt's my
best me, and I stick to it'" (K, p.137), means that he prefers to essentially think
of himself as a creature of power and not a spirit of ideal-love. And when, as we
will see, Somers at the end of the novel declares it is his intention to seek out
'dark gods', he means that he wishes to find new and alien forces with which to
forge a new relationship, thereby reconstituting the self. Somers knows what the
pre-Socratic Greeks (and Nietzsche) also knew, namely, that it is only by listening
to one's demon (the voice of active power and affirmative will inside one) that
man will be able to move forward beyond the ruins and find new values. For as
Zarathustra says; 'timan needs what is most evil in him for what is best in
him"'.23
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Thus once more we arrive at the equation power = evil. And once more we note
the anti-humanistic element in the thinking which leads to such an equation. This
should not surprise us; for what is humanism after all other than "everything in
Western civilization that restricts the desire for power "24 and the flow of power.
Everything which accustoms us to see the figure of Man (or a God made in the
image of Man) behind every event, every phenomenon, blinding us to "the other
realities, and especially the reality of power"2S in its active and life-creative form
and as that which produces us. The culture of love which rests upon such
humanism, is one that ultimately lacks the ability to give birth to the future; for
it is the power which such a culture would deny that alone can "bring about that
which may be"26 and produce the radically new and different. Thus such a culture
ossifies into a fixed mechanical form (a 'civilization') which merely ensures the
continuance and permanence of the present.
Similarly. the man who denies power fears change; the ego, being the automatic
principle in a man, having declared 'I am', wishes to know nothing of difference
and becoming. And it is right for the static ego to fear the active forces external
to itself; for the latter are destructive of the former. Power is monstrous,
immoral, unreasonable. But Lawrence, like Nietzsche, is adamant that it is
preferable to experience the Dionysian nature of power even at its most
destructive "than to live like a well-to-do American, and never know the mystery
of power at all." 27 What does it matter to secure all the benefits of civilization
('good food and good plumbing'), they go on to ask, if our lives are inglorious
and without meaning? Men remain fundamentally depressed if they are not
fulfilled in their 'power-souls'. which is to say, in their collective selves. Only
when a man feels himself satisfied here is he able at last to become "almost happy
- as happy as man and demons can be. "28 And this happiness, although not
directly informing the will to power itself (which cares neither for pleasure or
displeasure, but only for more power), is crucial to a Nietzschean ethic; for.
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Nietzsche argues, contrary to Christian teaching, only if a man is happy will he be
good (and that he is not happy feeling righteous, but powerful).
If Nietzsche's anti-humanist philosophy of power does not consider producing
goodness as its primary aim (and clearly it doesn't), nevertheless there is a notion
of joy connected with the exercising of power and of overcoming resistances from
out of which the latter can flourish. The key, then, is surely to proliferate the
"complex mechanisms and devices of excitation and inticernenr'<? via which
feelings of fulfilment and pleasure can be increased and intensified. Deleuze rightly
argues that due to the negative representations given to us by Christians and
humanists of every description "what we in fact know of the will to power is
suffering and torture, but the will to power is still the unknown joy, the unknown
happiness, the unknown god." 30 This is the dark god whom Somers seeks and
affirms; the god whom Nietzsche baptizes as Dionysus.
III. ii. Remarks on the Politics of Power (or a Politics of Evil ).
It is not simply the case that having developed a critical ontology of power,
Nietzsche and Lawrence then seek to construct a political philosophy of power
upon this. For in fact, their ontological speculation is entwined with their political
thought in such an intimate and pervasive manner that one is dubious about the
attempt to divide the one from the other. This is not to argue that there is
necessarily an intrinsic connection between the philosophy of will to power and
the 'natural aristocratism' of Nietzsche and Lawrence, merely that there is a much
closer and more carefully thought out relation than is often suggested in some of
the critical literature.
For Nietzsche and Lawrence, the need for the feeling of power gives rise to a call
for such a 'grand politics'; this need is the strongest tide which carries the latter
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forward and it "streams up out of inexhaustible wells not only in the souls of
princes and the powerful but not least in the lower order of the people. "31 It is a
call, ultimately, for new social relations and new bonds between people formed on
the basis of a newly active conception of power and a newly affirmative will. They
simply attempt to give voice to this call - and answer it as best they can within
their work.
In Aarons Rod, for example, Lawrence hints that the "shadowy relation" between
Aaron and Lilly "is nothing less than the birth of a new society", as if he were
attempting to realise the "vision of fraternity between men that is glimpsed
momentarily in Fantasia". 32 So argues Steven Vine in an introduction to the above
novel (1995). Essentially he is right, but his use of the word 'fraternity' is
unfortunate and careless, for Lawrence frequently and explicitly dismisses this
notion in his work, and as Somers makes clear in Kangaroo the relationship that
is sought as the basis of a new social and political order is a 'living fellowship'
not of "affection, not love, not comradeship. Not mates and equality and
mingling. Not blood brotherhood. None of that" (K, p.l07). Upon what
foundation the new relationship of active power IS then to be based is not
something Somers is sure of:
"Perhaps the thing that the dark races knew ... the
mystery of lordship ... The mystery of innate, natural, sacred priority. The other
mystical relationship between men, which democracy and equality try to deny and
obliterate. Not any arbitrary caste or birth aristocracy. But the mystic
recognition of difference and innate priority, the joy of obedience and the sacred
responsibility of authority" (K, p. 107).
If there are key passages m Nietzsche's work, such as Beyond Good and Evil,
257, or The Anti-Christ, 56, which conveniently summarize much of his late
political thinking, the above must constitute such in Lawrence's mid-period; this
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passage forming the heart of what it is he is attempting to explore in the 'power
trilogy'. Essentially, we are given here almost the entire vocabulary of Lawrence's
political philosophy at this time. If most of these terms (frequently employed by
Nietzsche also), are regarded as 'politically incorrect' or simply redundant in this
liberal-democratic (and secular) age, yet it would be impossible to discuss a
politics of evil without recourse to them.
It is a vocabulary with which Rawdon Lilly would feel perfectly comfortable; for,
like his author and like Nietzsche, he is prepared to accept the need for some
form of slavery as a social and political necessity if culture and the cultural
production of greatness is to be guaranteed. But cultural greatness is not the only
concern of the above; they make the troubling leap from the latter to a concern
also with biological advance or species development, often equating the two things
under the general heading 'life', which in turn is then reduced to a political
problem. Because they believe that culture and evolution both depend upon the
subjugation and exploitation of weaker powers (without which, they argue, there
can be no higher forms), Nietzsche and Lawrence are both prepared to see these
things inscribed and reinforced socially as well as promoted politically. In the
name of life as will to power, they insist on the need for "'a real committal of the
life-issue of inferior beings to the responsibility of a superior being'" (AR, p.281)
Not the submission of man to the will of the People, or to the State-machine, or
to capital and industry, but to those others in whom a greater degree of active
power is manifest and who are moving on toward a new consummation of some
kind.
According to Lilly, we have little choice in the matter; "'once the love-mode
changes, as change it must ... then the other mode will take place in us'" (AR,
p.298); i.e., the power-mode, which demands life be lived on the basis of
submission and obedience. Aaron is sceptical of this ever happening. But Lilly
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insists that all men have the urge to submit and offer obedience; not because they
have been 'Oedipalized' and had their desire so perverted that it has turned back
upon itself as a desire for its own oppression. but because it is only via
submission to the greater soul and by offering obedience that they can hope to
find collective and individual fulfilment. And it is this. fulfilment within a
relationship of power and a social order (not individual autonomy in an ideal
sense). that man most passionately desires; that which Lawrence calls man's
'living wholeness'. Anyone who genuinely cares about man and his fulfilment will.
argues Lawrence, wish to see "a society of power in which men fall naturally into
collective wholeness" 33 and can give obedience.
Thus obedience becomes an ontological and existential imperative for Lawrence.
one inscribed in nature. as it is for Zarathustra. who says: '''All living creatures
are obeying creatures'''. 34 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche also writes at
some length on the essential importance of obedience, suggesting that "from out
of that there always emerges ... something for the sake of which it is worthwhile
to live on earth". 35 In addition. he claims that the people which has lost the art of
obedience "shalt perish and lose all respect" for itself'.J"
It should be clear, then, that it is absolutely not the sign of the slave to submit
and give obedience; but. rather, the mark of a noble people engaged in the
struggle to produce greatness, find fulfilment, and, ultimately, transfigure
themselves via an act of self-overcoming. If such a people on the one hand accept
their responsibility to master the inferior cycles and forces of life and give
command. on the other hand. what really distinguishes them as aristocratic is
their "pride in obeying" 37. that is, their willingness to yield before those cycles
and forces of life which are over and above and moving beyond them.
The danger IS that the slave, although he cannot command and resents giving
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obedience, does know how to bully and is only too happy to conform; the
reactive aspects of command and obedience as understood in the negative
representations of slave-morality. And this danger is compounded by the fact that
the need to obey, practiced and cultivated among mankind for so long that it has
become established as a sort of 'formal conscience', has been inherited far more
successfully and at the expense of the much more difficult art of command.
Nietzsche warns that if the above trend is taken to its 'ultimate extravagance'.
then there will be "no commanders or independent men at all". or, if a few such
still remained, "they would suffer from a bad conscience". 38 Arguably, this is
exactly what has come to pass within the modern democratic political order,
where nobody rules in their own name or accepts the obligation of power. and
where the slave has assumed authority and control. What Nietzsche hopes to do
via his attempt to revive a noble ethic and memories of aristocratic political
culture, is restore a good conscience to commanders and those men who still feel
themselves to be full of a degree of active power. For Nietzsche, it is vital that
such men can be preserved; for without such, as even Freud concedes, there can
be no healthy group formation, nor any higher collectivity than that of a herd
(without meaning, without justification, without direction). Masters are not just a
luxury formation; they are also a social necessity. Deny their existence - as the
slave would - and you deny power. Deny power and you are not simply acting in
an anti-social manner, but are also revealing a will that is anti-life (i.e.,
fundamentalIy nihilistic). This wilI, according to Nietzsche and Lawrence, is today
uppermost, and thus we witness "a grim determination to destroy all mastery, all
lordship, and all human splendour out of the world, leaving only a community of
saints as the final negation of power, and the final power." 39
And the above is carried out in the name of what the slave thinks of as 'freedom'.
Whilst Nietzsche and Lawrence do have a notion of such themselves (freedom =
fulfilment within an order of rank), they rarely use the term, so vitiated has it
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become by its usage within the vocabulary of idealism. For Nietzsche and
Lawrence, the reactive conception of freedom (i.e., freedom from rather than
freedom for) is simply of no value, even when achieved: "What is more
hopelessly uninteresting than accomplished liberty?" asks Richard Somers of
himself, adding: "The vacancy of this freedom is almost terrifying ... without any
core or pith of meaning" (K, p.2?). In an age of nihilism, freedom is simply
another exhausted ideal and has no relevance to a politics of evil. Thus Nietzsche
says explicitly: "My ideas do not revolve around the degree of freedom ... but
around the degree of power ... and to what extent a sacrifice of freedom ...
provides the basis for the emergence of a higher type. "40
If freedom is thus dismissed as an empty and boring slave-ideal, so too does the
politics of evil do away with the notion of equality. For, as Richard Somers
argues, new values can only be reached via "'an awakening of the old recognition
of the aristocratic principle, the innate difference between people'" (K, p.277).
Critics such as J.A. Bernstein are therefore not wrong to identify the desirability
of inequality as "the basic doctrine" of Nietzschean political philosophy. 41 For it
is certainly the case that Nietzsche thought it crucial that a pathos of distance be
established not only within the soul, but in society too, so that men could form a
sense of their own value and power in relation to, but also as a mark of
distinction from, one another. Only a society which believes in and establishes an
order of rank and difference between man and man, and which limits freedom,
will produce the true blooms of culture. That is to say: "Every elevation of the
type 'man' has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic order - and so it will
always be". 42
In an ironic reversal of liberal thinking, Lawrence even goes on to suggest that
freedom, if it is to mean anything at all, must mean the freedom to be different
and unequal; not the right to sameness and equality: "How can there be liberty
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when I am not free to be other than fraternal and equal?", he asks.s ' Equality,
which denies power differentials is thus too a form of decadence, or a principle of
"dissolution and decay+' which reveals a will to the denial of life. And this is
why Nietzsche argues liberal institutions are subversive of a healthy will to power
and democracy should be regarded as "a symptom of waning power, of
approaching senescence, of physiological fatigue". 45
But if democracy and liberalism are to be overcome, what is to replace them?
This is what Somers sets off to discover. At first his search for an alternative
political creed leads him to militant fascism and revolutionary socialism.
Ultimately, however, he rejects both of these options, recognizing the same
decadence (the same reactive forces and negative will) behind them as behind the
politics of equality and freedom; and an even more virulent form of acute
rcsscn tim en t. What he wants is not merely something different from modern
liberalism, but something other to modernity and its slave morality itself. Like
Nietzsche, whom Lawrence indicates Somers is familiar with, he decides that what
is needed is a revived and radicalized notion of aristocracy; for only this form of
society and political culture breathes power in an active and affirmative manner.
Thus in Lawrence's text Zarathustra's call is echoed: '''0 my brothers, there is a
new nobility needed; to oppose all mob-rule and all despotism and to write anew
upon law-tables the word 'Noble'. "'46 This new nobility - a natural aristocracy -
shall form the "'cultivators and sewers of the future'r+?
What Zarathustra/Nietzsche wants is what Somers/Lawrence wants; a form of
aristocracy in which power manifests itself inside a man and is acknowledged with
reverence by all men. They do not want an economic elite, such as the bourgeois
class of capitalism ("'a nobility that you could buy like shopkeepers with
shopkeepers gold"'48). Nor do they want an elite composed of a tiny handful of
men all of similar type and disposition: "'for many noblemen are needed, and
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noblemen of many kinds, for nobility to exist! "'49
This latter is an important remark, for it demonstrates how Nietzsche saw his
new aristocracy as one founded upon difference and plurality; i.e., a multiplicity
of types all in relation with one another within the communion of power.
Difference does, for Nietzsche, as for Lawrence, imply 'higher' and 'lower' human
types, but they posit an infinite variety of such within an ever-changing order of
rank. For just as power continually flows and transforms, so the selves and the
relations between selves formed on the basis of and by power change and mutate.
Politics is, in fact, nothing other than the problem of these changing relations; an
interplay of mobile power-forms and becomings. Ideal democracy, for all its talk
of pluralism and opportunity for personal growth and self-expression, is actually
far less dynamic (because based upon reactive and inactive forces) than the sort
of society envisioned by Nietzsche and Lawrence. The former signals the end of
politics understood in terms of the agon (i.e., struggle and change) and collapses
at last into the "tyranny of No-power" that is nihilism.V'
Nietzsche's and Lawrence's political and social model is based upon caste and
hierarchy "in which a people gradually culminates'<i! and relates closely to the
model Nietzsche finds support for in the 'Law-Book of Manu'. In this text,
Nietzsche claims, noble values are to be found everywhere and it constitutes a
magnificent affirmation of life as will to power, encouraging a people to "become
masterly, to become perfect - to be ambitious for the highest art of living. "52
The (religious) caste system posited by Manu, is praised by Nietzsche for
sanctioning "a natural law of life of the first rank over which no arbitrary
caprice, no 'modern idea' has any power" 53, thereby returning us to an argument
we found in Nietzsche and Lawrence earlier, namely, that there is to be found a
categorical difference between classes which is also a distinction at the level of
being or nature. Anne Fernihough reminds us in her study of Lawrence that as
92
soon as the 'decadent' forces of modernity are linked to democracy, then recourse
is quickly and easily made by opponents "to 'natural categories' and to a 'natural
hierarchy' grounded in biology'<+; the problem with this will be dealt with
shortly.
Problematic or not, according to Nietzsche once society is divided into its
essential classes of "divergent physical tendency'P>, each can find their own
happiness and fulfilment: Lawrence agrees. It is a classical division of man and
society (almost Platonic in its claim that the great man justifies the existence of all
men), which reveals Nietzsche at his most philosophically traditional and
seemingly at odds with the more radical aspects and implications of his own
theory of power. In order to resist this conclusion, it is necessary to assume that
when Nietzsche insists on the radical nature of his aristocratism it is because he
posits a different will behind his own thought to that found in Plato and political
philosophy since Plato; thus his insistence on the importance of being able to
determine the forces that compose a will and the direction that the will takes in a
philosopher, or artist, or would-be leader of men. What is a healthy desire to
command in one man, is an unhealthy wish to bully in another; what is an active
desire to give obedience in one man, is a reactive wanting to conform in another;
what is an affirmative will to social and political stability in one man, is a negative
will to mechanical and ideal order in another. This is why it is crucial that
Kangaroo, for example, who, like other fascists, at times sounds overtly
Nietzschean in his pronouncements on power and politics, is not to be mistaken
as such.
What, then, to conclude this discussion of the politics of power, is our primary
task? It is to learn to perform genealogical investigations of our own and thus to
recognize the difference between active and reactive forces in ourselves and in
others. Or, as Lawrence puts it, we must learn to see; "the spark of nobleness
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inside us, and let it make us. To recognize the spark of noblesse in one another,
and add our sparks together to flame. And to recognize the men who have stars,
not mere sparks of nobility in their souls, and to choose these for leaders. "S6
Thus Lawrence terminates his political thinking with a vision of the stars and a
rather wistful hope that men will be able to form a 'solar aristocracy' in which
each man is adjusted to another and the small "are as perfect as the great,
because each is itself and in its own place. . .. And the joy of each is that it is
so. "57 That there could be a social order such as this may seem fanciful at the
very least. But, as we will see in the following chapter, post- Kangaroo Lawrence
looks to Mexico and the Aztecs to find support for the idea of an aristocracy of
the sun; a social order based upon the materiality of power, a politics of cruelty,
and a notion of a general economy.
Far from abandoning politics in favour of the gods, Lawrence reconfigures his
political thinking in terms of the daimonic and the divine, reintroducing the gods
back into history and seeking out those prepared to become 'the lords of the
earth' and form a "new aristocracy, irrespective of nationality ... a confraternity
of the living sun, making the embers of financial internationalism and industrial
internationalism pale upon the earth. "58 This again reflects Nietzsche's view that
from now on politics will assume a different form and be absorbed into the larger
question of competing moralities, or a "war of the spirits". 59 And it is clear that
whilst both authors were prone to speculate metaphorically and imaginatively,
each also is genuinely concerned with developing a grand political project that
involves the seizure of history, the domination of the earth, and a revaluation of
all values. It seems appropriate before going any further, to discuss our concerns
with the above and address the problems and dangers raised by such a philosophy
of power and politics of evil.
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III.iii. Problems, Concerns, and Dangers.
The philosophy and politics of power developed by Nietzsche and Lawrence poses
a provocative challenge to modernity, standing opposed to the ideals shared by
Christians, liberals, and humanists of all varieties. It is important to concede this
point and mistaken to try and pretend otherwise by arguing, for example, that:
"Even in Nietzsche's ostensibly most politically oriented and power hungry
statements actual political power and leadership is not foreseen". 60 Or:
"Lawrence's distinction between 'aristocrat' and 'democrat' does not involve any
of the undertones of authoritarianism or .. 'fascism'. Lawrence's view of man is
deeper: it is not political but spiritual". 61 We have hopefully shown why both
these statements can be challenged as inadequate and misleading.
Here, then, in an attempt to be honest, we will say something in reply to the
concern that Nietzschean political philosophy dispenses with a notion of 'human
rights', and address the danger that by so doing it veers too far towards fascism.
It should be noted, however, that this concern and the related danger are dealt
with in rather more detail and at length in chapter three and that our primary
concern here relates to the charge that Nietzsche's (and Lawrence's) politics of
evil is not critical enough, resides on an untenable and potentially disastrous
naturalism, and, finally, betrays the radicalism of their own thinking on power to
which it has an uneasy relation.
For liberal commentators, the main difficulty is that a Nietzschean politics of evil
will be vitalist at best; anti-humanist at worst. That is to say, it will concern
itself primarily with flows and forces, 'dark gods' and strange desires, and not
with the principles of Enlightenment or the defence of civilization and its values.
Such commentators are convinced that such a polities will lead to monstrousness
and barbarism: "This will be, they argue, the inevitable result of an analysis that
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denounces all notions of subjectivity and all humanism while regarding society to
be an arena of competing forces. "62
Firstly, neither Nietzsche, Lawrence, or any serious post-Nietzschean thinker,
denounces 'all notions of subjectivity'; as we we will make clear in the first
section of part IV of this chapter, the above are at pains to reconfigure the
subject on the basis of an active conception of power - not denounce or do away
with altogether. Secondly, whilst it is the case that Nietzsche does not allow space
for the metaphysical notion of 'human rights' within his texts, he does not deny
rights altogether. Rather, he simply argues that these cannot be thought as things
which can be fixed eternally and made universal. Just as there is no 'man as such'
outside of history, time, and culture, nor can there be acontingent 'rights of man'
as such, outside, that is, of what Nietzsche terms the anthropomorphic vanity of
idealism. Affirming as he does the world as will to power, means that Nietzsche is
obliged to define rights as things produced by and coordinated within the
continuous struggle of competing forces. In other words, rights are "recognized
and guaranteed degrees of power" and, importantly, if "power-relationships
undergo any material alteration rights disappear", to be replaced by newly
created ones.s '
So, to reiterate, Nietzsche does not deny the subject and does not deny rights; he
simply attempts to materialize these notions by showing their relation to his
theory of will to power. Further to this, whilst celebrating and appearing to
promote the 'Dionysian' aspects of power on the one hand, he also concedes the
importance of reaffirming the human (all too human) need for a degree of
stability, statute, and structure. The need, that is, to impose limits and to form
habits; to give style to chaos. If the latter can no longer be legitimated via an
appeal to God and the old values, then, Nietzsche argues, maybe it is possible to
do so on aesthetic grounds; thus the vital importance of art as a counter-nihilistic
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force par excellence (and as an organic function of the will to power) within his
work (see chapter one where this was discussed).
Of course, it is precisely the attempt to turn philosophy into an art and to
'aestheticize' the political realm, coupled to an active and aggressive conception of
power, which lays Nietzsche's thinking open to the charge of 'fascism'. And
fascism is the great danger and most pressing concern for many commentators,
disturbed by the potent mixture of art, ideology, and the daimonic in Nietzsche's
texts. Again, we have said something about fascism in relation to Nietzsche's
work in chapter one, and will say more in chapter three to follow. But let us
make some additional remarks here.
It is perhaps best to once more begin with a confession: "Whether one likes it or
not ... Nietzsche's thinking will always remain susceptible to fascist appropriation
simply because, in its political mode, it does not conform to the liberal view of
'man' and 'society"'. 64 The same can be said of Lawrence's thinking: Both offer a
non-egalitarian vision of the future in which hierarchy, discipline, and breeding all
come far more into power and play, as we have seen; both argue for the
establishment of a new master race, which, if predominantly thought of in cultural
and religious terms, is nevertheless socially instituted and politically secured with
violence where necessary; finally, both were prone to using an extreme and
apocalyptic rhetoric and to advocate the sort of despotic terrorism that, when
associated by Nietzsche in his mid-period works with militant socialism, he is
quick to condemn. Is, therefore, their thinking not merely open to fascist
'appropriation' as suggested above, but also on some level essentially fascist in its
own right? I think the answer here is no. If there are similarities as we have
indicated, nevertheless Bataille is justified in his claim that: "Between the ideas of
the fascist reactionaries and Nietzsche's notions there is more than simple
difference - there is radical incompatibility. "65 And this is because Nietzsche's
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political philosophy and fascism express entirely different wills to power, the
former, in stark contrast to the latter, having freed itself to a radical degree from
the spirit of revenge and the poison of ressentiment.
Thus it is, for example, that one does not find in either Nietzsche's or Lawrence's
writings, justification for their political beliefs along either nationalist or racist
lines; the former claiming that if he and his kind are not 'French' enough to love
humanity, neither are they 'German' enough to resort to such base stupidities
(described by him as "scabies of the heart").66 And this is why, despite speaking
in terms of the great man as commander and of the mass whose destiny is to
serve, Nietzsche and Lawrence do not pervert desire; as fascists pervert desire
and as all those who use the above figures to Oedipalize history pervert desire.
For they do not seek to reduce the social field to the familial, or the level of the
nursery (exactly the enviroment that Aaron, Lilly, and Somers wish to flee from).
If Nietzsche and Lawrence encourage submission to the greater souls and promise
fulfilment via obedience, they want men to submit as free men; not as infants or
slaves.s? It is only by denying the new spirit (of innocence and affirmation) in
their texts and by offering a reactive interpretation of the latter, that justification
can be found by those political nihilists who would commit their crimes not
beyond good and evil, but in the ethical void beyond good and bad. Fascism is
not inherent in Nietzschean political philosophy; it is the cancerous mutation of it,
if formed on the same (or at least a parallel) line of flight. Lawrence understands
this, as is clear from a careful reading of Kangaroo.
If not inherently fascist, still Nietzsche's political thinking may be inherently
flawed, or limited. J.A. Bernstein, for example, claims that Nietzsche ignores the
problem which had so troubled Plato in The Republic, namely; "that those fittest
to rule are those who genuinely do not wish to do so" .611 But, as with many of
the criticisms of Nietzsche, this seems to be based upon only a partial reading and
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is thus of reduced validity. The fact is, as we have shown earlier in this chapter.
Nietzsche does not ignore this dilemma; rather he emphasizes the crucial
importance of being able to overcome what he terms the 'bad conscience of
commanders'. Only when this is accomplished, will the best then want to rule and
accept their obligation or duty to do SO.69
A rather more serious charge is that Nietzsche fails to address the fact that his
positing of a neo-aristocratic political order as a counter-modern alternative to
democracy is self-defeating because, by reaffirming the master/slave dichotomy
and a hierarchical ordering of society, he recreates the conditions that were
originally productive of ressentiment. In other words; "his great politics do not
address the major cause of the rise of the metaphysics of resentment. namely, the
experience of political alienation. "70
Here again though, such criticisms can be challenged. For surely Nietzsche does
address the problem of ressentimeru. arguing, rightly or wrongly. that the latter
is only produced in those socio-political systems in which men feel themselves
unfulfilled and impotent (i.e., feel their existence is lacking in meaning and
direction). His aristocratic arrangement is specifically designed to make all men -
even the lowest - feel fulfilled, and to allow each man the opportunity to
experience and express his own degree of power; each will feel his existence
justified by serving greatness. 'Alienation' and feelings of resentment will simply
be dissolved within a vital community of power-relation and an order of rank
which assigns each man a place within the former.
In addition, Nietzsche's model of society is designed to solve the problem of how
those rich in power and health can give (of themselves) to others without the
dishonour and debilitating effect of pity; another prime cause of ressentiment.
Christian charity and social welfare programmes make men feel small and paltry;
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he naturally grows resentful at having to receive in such circumstances (and those
who give are also denied pleasure in the act of bestowing). Nietzsche assumed,
again, rightly or wrongly, that within the new order he envisioned where power
could flow between all men (and be the property of none), that each would be
enabled to a greater or lesser degree to give and receive with reverence and
gratitude.
Admittedly, Nietzsche does at times sound more hopeful than convinced of his
own arguments, and the latter are underdeveloped in his texts. Unfortunately,
although Lawrence adopts many of these arguments as his own, illustrating and
debating them in his fiction and essays, he doesn't do much to actually develop
them in detail and in relation to the dominant realities of his time. Ultimately, one
has to ask whether it isn't the case that their understanding of power,
particularly the politics of power, lacks complexity. Critics claim that when the
attempted move is made from a philosophy of power to a politics, Nietzsche and
Lawrence betray their own thinking and expose its shortcomings; mistakenly
employing the former as a "metaphysics of domination specifically to justify
political domination". 71 Too often, Nietzsche and Lawrence appear to slip back
into thinking of power as some kind of essence which can be located within and
possessed by the great man and from which all kinds of empirical manifestations
follow. Clearly this is not the case; power is today disseminated and dispersed
throughout an incredibly complex network of institutions, bureaucracies, and
individuals, in a decentralized manner much closer to the Dionysian flux that
Nietzsche imagines in his philosophy of power, but seems unable to coherently
and consistently conceive of in his political thought. Mistakenly, he and Lawrence
both resort to outmoded and redundant molar models which are of no use for
conceptualizing the micro-physics of power or the molecular nature of politics.
Thus, one is obliged to agree with Mark Warren here: "Nietzsche did not give his
own philosophy a plausible political identity. He failed to elaborate the broad
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range of political possibilities that are suggested by his philosophy in large part
owing to unexamined assumptions about the nature of the political. "72
Failing to conceptualize in terms such as markets and bureaucracies, information
and technology, relevant to the social, political, and economic realities of his own
age, may have made Nietzsche an 'untimely' thinker on the one hand; but on the
other, it had the unfortunate result of significantly reducing his critique of
modernity.
Finally, and perhaps most damagingly of all for Nietzsche's social and political
thinking, is its operating upon certain untenable conservative traditions of
thought, such as the assumption that one could look to the 'natural world' to
legitimate human practices and justify social and cultural arrangements. Nietzsche,
although attempting to be radical and challenge traditional ways of thinking the
political, nevertheless ends up subscribing to "the organic metaphor for society
that was common to political philosophy from Plato through to Hobbes, and
remains in use among conservatives even today."73 Warren suggests that he did
so not due to any necessity internal to his philosophy of will to power. but
simply because he lacked the conceptual categories of analysis appropriate to the
late 19th century (as we have said above). and because by referring back to
'nature' (or 'life'), Nietzsche was able to find convenient justifications for his
political ideas; but this is due to the fact that he used the same terms to cover
both his philosophy and his understanding of the processes and 'laws' of nature.
With undue confidence, Nietzsche moves back and forth from nature to society,
claiming that his thinking on the latter is more valid and more vital than the
decadent and 'unnatural' ideals of liberal-democracy, because he stays faithful to
the former (understood as will to power).
The problem with this is twofold and has been identified by Keith Ansell-Pearson:
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Firstly, seeking justification for the political in a theory of nature; i.e., seeking to
disguise the noble lie with the natural law, is precisely that which is no longer
credible in the modern age of nihilism?": and, secondly, anyone who "attempts to
derive ethical and intellectual values from the 'laws of nature' is guilty of an
'extreme anthropomorphism', and ... of an employment of reason that oversteps
the bounds of the permitted'T"
Here then is the major problem and illegitimacy of Nietzsche's political
philosophy; not only are all attempts to establish a 'natural' aristocracy untenable,
but may very well be as "philosophically dubious and pernicious as the attempt of
social Darwinism to derive social and political values from Darwin's original
theory of natural selection. "76
To conclude, we must concede that there are genuine problems, concerns, and
dangers with Nietzschean political thought; and that there is a disjunctive tension
between this and his Dionysian philosophy of power. This tension, however, often
characterized as existing between the postmodern style of the latter and the pre-
modern content of the former, cannot be solved - as liberal critics are wont to do
- by simply decoupling the philosophy from the politics and abandoning the
latter; they are too intimately connected for any such clean division. Besides
which, such tension need not be a problem; least of all for those who are strong
enough not to require harmony and intellectual consistency, and who know how
to use the tension to challenge thinking which fears paradox and self-
contradiction. Due precisely to its disjunctive and underdeveloped nature,
Nietzsche's political philosophy is of much greater value to us today in thinking
about our modernity than any grand narrative in which all loose ends are tied, all
solutions finalized, and all freedom to experiment prohibited. Those critics who
bemoan the fact that his aristocratism is incomplete and who apparently long for
the certainties provided by those totalizing blue-prints of Utopia so common to
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modern theory, have missed the point of Nietzsche's work (or at least its
advantage). If the relations of power (i.e., the politics) he proposes are today of
no interest to us, then the way is still open for different relations, different
models. It is our problem to decide upon these, to search for them, and to
develop them.
Part IV: Beyond the Molar Level of Politics.
IV.i. The Reconfiguration of the Subject as a Power-Formation.
If the move made from love to power is played out by Nietzsche and Lawrence at
a molar political level, so too is it described as a molecular process at the level of
competing forces within (and constitutive of) the human subject. Indeed, in a very
real sense Aaron's quest can be regarded primarily as an attempt to define and
form a new 'single' self; the shattering of the blue ball symbolizing the breaking
and loss of his old identity and the world which reinforced that identity (see
chapter 1 of Aaron's Rod). With his old self exploded into a myriad fragments
(i.e., deterritorialized back into a primal chaos of forces without form), Aaron is
thrown toward a new becoming in which the above forces of the will to power
recombine with the social, cultural, technological and other external forces to give
rise to the form 'man'.
By developing a notion of the self that is not defined in terms either of
consciousness or fixed essence (i.e., in the terms of rational and moral idealism),
Nietzsche and Lawrence foreclose the possibility of positing any notion of a
transcendent individual able to "attribute a senseless importance to himself". I In
other words, such a notion undermines the idea of a self as an eternal unity
beyond temporality and contingency. Thus despite its celebrations of singular
selfhood, "Aaron's Rod refutes the idea that the self is a fixed or given entity;
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instead it pictures the self as a movement or .. a blossoming." 2 Being is thus
characterized as becoming; i.e., a travelling and a multiple phenomenon of
difference. As Lilly insists; "'there are lots of meso I'm not only just one
proposition'" (AR, p.103).
Thus the self, as Lilly goes on to argue, can never be fully 'known' - only made
manifest and lived; never perfected in conformity with an ideal standard or
representation. One shows a Nietzschean 'love of fate' by accepting that one's
singleness is one's destiny; i.e., that we have no duty other than to become who
we are. As Lilly says: "'The only goal is the fulfilling of your own soul's most
active desire and suggestion'" (AR, p.296). But become thyself does not mean
assert thy ego; rather, and crucially, it means know that the mysterious inflow of
power that generates the self comes from behind and below (i.e., it is not
generated by one's own will), and, further, it means accept the unknown god or
'Holy Ghost' who develops your actions within you-'
Thus, to reiterate, we may say that the self is a product of power and a
derivative of the Outside; not an inner essence. "I am myself", writes Lawrence,
"and I remain myself only by the grace of the powers that enter me, from the
unseen, and make me forever newly myself. "4 If we want to bud as a species and
overcome our present (all-too-human) status, then we need to find a way to
increase our power and find new powers to form connections with (inhuman and
alien forces). If love preserves and keeps safe, then power, more than simply
moving us mechanically, transfigures us.
If in Aaron's Rod the possibility is raised of becoming 'single' (or sovereign), in
Kangaroo Lawrence puts forward the more radical Nietzschean idea of becoming-
other in the sense of overcoming our humanity. However, before we examine this
latter possibility, we need to first make clear what Lawrence, following Nietzsche,
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understands by the 'human' and why both of the above write of distinct classes
within this form; i.e., master and slave types. In other words, we need to first
see what hope, if any, lies in the animal man, before we perhaps prematurely
speak of his death.
The Nietzschean idea of the overman presupposes, of course, the man. But,
unfortunately for those who would will the former as Zarathustra instructs, there
are within democratic and love-sodden modernity very few of the latter. As Lilly
says, there are today for the most part only 'people', and people are not men;
"they are insects and instruments, and their destiny is slavery'" (AR, p.281).
Nietzsche claims that genuine philosophers despise such ideal representations of
men who form a universal 'humanity' which reflects all that is sick and absurd.
How much more valuable than "the 'desirable' man of any ideal hitherto'" is what
he calls an 'actual' man of flesh and blood. The latter "makes up for and redeems"
man as a species and "enables us to retain our faith in mankind! "6 Such actual
men are those whom Nietzsche and Lawrence also think of and refer to as 'natural
aristocrats'; i.e., those who have attained their own singularity and are full of
active power and an affirmative will.
"There is no getting away from it", writes Lawrence, "mankind falls forever into
the two divisions of aristocrat and democrat''": i.e., master and slave. Crucially,
he adds: "We are speaking now not of political parties, but of two sorts of human
nature: those who feel themselves strong in their soul, and those who feel
themselves weak. "8 Likewise, Nietzsche primarily thinks of the division as an
ontological one in terms of will to power and how one styles the forces that one
is, even if he does also attempt to construct a sociology and a politics upon this
in order to accentuate the pathos of distance between higher and lower types.
This he regards as vital, because: "It is this operation in which certain men are
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separated off and isolated from the others that will constitute the condition for
the possibility of the production of beings surpassing man. "9
Importantly, having said this, we need to note that both Nietzsche and Lawrence
recognize that no man is pure aristocrat, or pure slave. There is, as Nietzsche
confesses; "master morality and slave morality ... even within the same man,
within the one soul." ID And Lawrence, once more echoing Nietzsche adds: "Every
man has two selves among his manifold self. He has a herd-self, which is vulgar,
common, ugly ... And he has a better self"!", which is individual and noble. Such
remarks save Nietzsche and Lawrence from the charge that they posited master
and slave in terms of an untenable and lazy biological essentialism (i.e., a material
idealism) and demonstrate that they were using what appear to be a set of binary
concepts strategically, in order to challenge and subvert other dualistic models.
Because power is not stable, but, rather, constantly flows, and because the
arrangement of forces within the individual is therefore constantly shifting, so
man's status or rank can never be finally determined. However, still Nietzsche and
Lawrence insist on the need to distinguish between those in whom active-noble
forces predominate from those in whom reactive-base forces have the upper-
hand. And they make such a distinction by observing whether a man seeks to
possess power and preserve himself, or release flows of power in himself and in
all men, thereby opening up the possibility of new becomings and providing life:
"The providing of life belongs to the aristocrat. If a man, whether by thought or
action, makes life, he is an aristocrat.") 2
Without such men, mankind in general falls out of touch with desire and the
flows of power, thereby "exhausting its human possibilities ... degenerating into
repetition, torpor, ennui and lifelessness")3; i.e., what Nietzsche describes as
slavery and nihilism. The problem is, does mankind know of anything other than
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this condition of becoming-reactive? To answer no to this question would be to
reach what Deleuze rightly describes as a "distressing conclusion". 14 But is there
another possible answer; another possible becoming of forces (i.e., a becoming-
active)? "Everything tempts us to think perhaps there is", says Deleuze hopefully:
"But, as Nietzsche often says, we would need another sensibility, another way of
feeling." IS That is, a way of feeling beyond moral sentiment and rational
calculation; a way born not of love or logic, but of power. Can we achieve such -
and if so, how? Politics and revolution we will suggest as Somers concludes, are
not the answer; they do not and cannot provide a new sensibility. Thus we need
to look beyond the political (certainly in its conventional and molar terms) and,
indeed, beyond and over the human. And Nietzsche spends a good deal of time
seeking out the signs of a different becoming; "an involution of forms and forces,
in which novel kinds of self-overcoming can be cultivated.r '" Here, with
reference to Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo, let us briefly examine such novel kinds
of self-overcoming as suggested by Lawrence.
Aaron-Lilly-Somers: if they are single and distinct, like stars, nevertheless each
is in some ways the becoming and overcoming of the other. None of the above is
ever quite at ease with themselves to be thought of 'sovereign' individuals in the
classical sense; each is too restless and discontent and they are perhaps all three
best thought of as characters convalescing from the disease of love and still
struggling to shed their ideally formed selves. In other words. they are best
described as 'free spirits' of the Nietzschean variety. Or, arguably, we can even
see anticipated in the above trio the 'schizo-nomads' of Deleuze and Guattari; men
fighting to be free of the Oedipal yoke and keen to liberate themselves from the
last vestiges of slavery. Thus it is that: "They know incredible sufferings,
vertigos and sicknesses. They have their spectres. They must reinvent each
gesture." 17 But ultimately, if successful in this, such men produce themselves as
those who are "finally able to do something simple in Itheir] own name, without
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asking permission ... a name that no longer designates any ego whatever." 18
Such men make it clear that even in this age of universal wage-slavery, they do
not believe for one moment in the 'dignity of labour', or that their pride resides
in their pockets. Rather, they arrive at the conclusion that men of their class who
would retain their dignity and pride must refuse paid employment and flee abroad;
"to seek to become master in new and savage regions of the world ... to keep
moving from place to place as long as any sign of slavery seems to threaten". 1q
Thus Aaron flees to Italy and Lilly decides to get out of Europe altogether, whilst
Somers finds himself wandering in the Australian bush and, at the novel's end. on
board a ship sailing for America. All three are thus on what Lawrence himself set
out upon and termed a 'savage pilgrimage'.
"Good people say that we must not f1ee"20 - but the nomad knows that there is
nothing else to do but to run and keep running (for the old world is behind him).
As for the schizo, "continually wandering about, migrating here, there and
everywhere as best he can"21, he pushes still further on with the process of
deterritorialization: which does not simply mean travelling in foreign lands. but
involves a trip along the Open Road-? in order to escape from the choice with
which he is threatened by civil society "of being compelled to become either the
slave of the state or the slave of a lpolitical] party". 23
Thus Aaron-Lilly-Somers all opt to step outside the gate and to flee; seeking new
lands and strange regions "where the connections are always partial and non-
personal ... where desire functions according to its molecular elements and
flows. "24 This is not, as Deleuze and Guattari add, a promised and pre-existing
utopia, but is rather a world created in the very process of deterritorialization.
For the above type, there is no option; all they can do is become hard, love their
fate and live dangerously as they make themselves homeless in "a distinctive and
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honourable sense". 25 Like Zarathustra before them, Aaron-Lilly-Somers are men
who feel "unsettled in every city" and thus look to "depart from every gate". 26
And like Zarathustra they never dare speak of their love for present humanity;
rather, they content themselves with the thought that: "There has been and will
be life, human life, such as we do not begin to conceive" (AR, p.265).
To conclude, we may say that man is more than merely human being as defined
within the moral-rational tradition and that he exceeds the definition homo sapien
(i.e., a creature of 'same-wisdom' or common sense, and the known forces of
reactive consciousness). Man is also beast and superbeast; a creature of difference
and active power. Perhaps, therefore, the term hetero daimon defines him better;
making Somers's identification with the demonic elements in his nature both
significant and appropriate. It is this identification which obliges him to move
from the humanistic politics of love and the revolutionary politics of grandeur,
towards a concern with the daimonic and the divine and an altogether different
type of politics.
IV.ii. No More Great Events.
Realizing that there were problems with left and right-wing attempts to formulate
a grand politics (and perhaps uncertain how to address these), Lawrence begins to
move beyond the political in conventional terms; indicating that revolutions and
great events are not what are needed, if a new sensibility is to be evolved and
new feelings produced. This is well illustrated in Kangaroo, as Richard Somers
"comes to an understanding that his alienation from the currents of political
history is something he has no choice but to sustain. "27 Particularly if he is to
safeguard the degree of freedom in his own thinking he has fought so hard to
secure and be able in his writings to "transmit something that does not and will
not allow itself to be codified'v" within the modernist political monologues
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subscribed to by party-men such as Kangaroo and Willie Struthers.
Thus Somers opts to stand aside and stand alone; remammg loyal to his own
singularity and exercising, as Foucault would say, a 'decisive will not to be
governed'. From early on in the novel it is evident that Somers does not feel
comfortable within the realm of political action; despite the fact that he has made
an international name for himself as a writer of essays on political and social
themes. He tells Jack Callcott: 'ttl never take any part in politics at all. They
aren't my affair'" (K, p.46). Later repeating this claim to an apolitical status to
Jaz: '''1 really don't care about politics ... I'd rather have no country than be
gulfed in politics and social stuff" (ibid., p. 63). This being his so, it is not
unreasonable for his wife Harriett to want to know why it is he is flirting with
two would-be revolutionary political movements. His attempts to explain his
actions to her fall far short of convincing. He says, for example, that he feels he
must "Tight out something with mankind'" in order to '''make some kind of
opening'" (K, p.68). With an increasingly desperate need to convince himself
(more than Harriett) of the rightness of direct political action, Somers even
suggests at one point that it may only be via militancy that a new life form can be
created; i.e., he foolishly adopts the mistaken view that the revolutionary can
seize control not only of the state and of history, but also impose human
direction over the process of evolution. Harriett is quick to point out that such
anthropomorphic conceit is in complete contradiction to what he himself has long
believed and reminds him also that '''life doesn't start with a form. It starts with
a feeling, and ends with a form" (K, p.98). And you cannot create a new feeling
via political violence (at most you may be able to shatter an old form). Further,
Harriett also reminds Somers that that which has been truly of value in a cultural
sense "has been apolitical, even anti-political tt .29 She says: "You didn't change
the Roman Empire with a revolution. Christianity grew up for centuries without
having anything at all to do with politics - just a feeling, and a belief" (K, p.98).
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Somers, even when his infection with the political virus is at its most acute, is
not unaware of this; not unaware that he himself has said often enough that "a
new religious inspiration, and a new religious idea must spring up and ripen
before there could be any constructive change" (ibid., p.99). He knows that it is
important to be patient and that education must also play an important part in
producing change; that if one is to develop a 'second nature' and new sensibility
one should endeavour to "build on the reason and virtue that already exists" 30,
not smash everything back down to an ideal zero-point. And yet, still Somers felt
"that preaching and teaching were both no good at the world's present juncture"
and so there had to be "brave action, brave, faithful action: and in action the new
spirit would arise" (K, p.99).
Clearly, this is a question at the centre of Lawrence's power trilogy: do we need
men of action, or those who "know how to be silent, lonely, resolute, and
constant in invisible activities'Y '! Heidegger too is troubled by this question;
particularly of course following the experience of national socialism and his
involvement in it. For Heidegger, what he terms 'transcendence' is a distinctly
human capacity which gives "to every single person the power to start over, to
begin anew - to take up, reshape, and transform the world."32 However,
following the war and his own 'turning', Heidegger "in effect tried to purge
transcendence of its conventional ties, not simply to logic, morality, and
metaphysics ... but also to the 'very possibility of taking action'." 33 What was
now required, he argued, was not action, but rather "a silent waiting, an
essentially reverent contemplativeness that might keep open the (slight) possibility
of a new neo-pagan religion" .34 As we will see, Lawrence comes very close to
anticipating this Heideggerean position. And yet, for one reason or another, it
seems that attempts by both Lawrence and Nietzsche to work on a micro-political
level and develop a genuinely 'postmodern' theory of power, self, and society, are
always betrayed by their own modernist ambitions and molar concerns. It would
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be left to a later generation of Nietzschean thinkers (with Deleuze and Foucault at
the forefront) to finally abandon all dreams of a global and total revolution, which
whilst perhaps involving a cosmetic reconfiguration of certain power relations
tend to ultimately "leave untouched the very relations of power that make possible
the functioning of the state apparatus." 35 What does remain impressive,
nevertheless, about Nietzsche and Lawrence, is the fact that they were able to
intuitively anticipate this necessary surrendering of political sentimentality and
prepare the way for a new type of political thought based upon the view
expressed via Harriett in Kangaroo that revolutions were something that could no
longer be taken seriously; that they were, in fact, "vieux jeu, out of date" (K,
p.103).
Eventually, Somers is able to echo his wife's view, and to tell his friend Jaz that;
'''like Nietzsche I no longer believe in great events. The war was a great event -
and it made everything more petty'" (K, p.161).36 And later, Somers tells Jack
that he cannot, after all, lend his support to '''revolutions - and public love and
benevolence and feeling righteous" (K, p.290) having clearly made the connection
in his own mind between all of the above. Having tried so hard to become a
revolutionary man of action, Somers ends at best as a rebel of the kind that
Camus finds so admirable. Because of this, he ends by "taking sides against the
revolurion'T' and detecting in the revolutionary a mixture of policeman, judge,
and hangman who is fundamentally opposed to all genuinely rebellious forces and
flows which move outside of (and are subversive of) party politics and the state
machine. In the end, Somers is more interested in how via a number of alien
becomings and by following unfamiliar lines of flight he can make the present
order explode:
"Well all right then, if I am finally a sort of bomb ... I hope the
hour and place will come for my going off: for my exploding with the maximum
amount of havoc. Some men have to be bombs, to explode and make breaches in
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the walls that shut life in" (K, p.165).3H
Mac Daly is right to refer to the 'spiritual vacuum' of modern European nihilism
in his introduction to Kangaroo; but he is mistaken to claim that "Somers's
problem is that ... he cannot summon up enough faith in any cause that might
give this eventuality meaning. "39 For actually this is Somers's strength and saving
grace - not his 'problem' - it is what prevents him from deteriorating into
something dreary and political, such as a fascist or socialist. If Somers cannot
find the 'faith' to become a party-believer, a sign, as we have said, of his
spiritual superiority, he finds what he is looking for by making a turn to the
inhuman and non-human worlds and the dark gods outside the gate. Accepting
life as a play of will to power, Somers refuses to limit or coordinate this by
vainly attempting to channel it into an ideal political formation.s" Daly correctly
notes in this case that: "The search for a satisfactory metanarrative is what has
brought Somers to Australia ... but once there he discovers that 'life makes no
absolute statement'''. 41
Thus, Somers finds an answer to the question asked of himself at the beginning
of the novel: "Why had he come? ... What was he looking for?" (K, p.l3); even
if it isn't the political answer he had anticipated. Kangaroo and Struthers were, in
their own way, "both right, both of them" (ibid., p.327); but something else was
also true and more vitally so - something beyond (and beneath) the political. If
sometimes when the reactive spirit of revenge is strong within him, Somers feels
he would '" give anything, soul and body, for a smash-up in this social-industrial
world we're in" (ibid., p.161), at other times, when he realizes this would solve
nothing and simply leave "'just people - the same after it as before'" (ibid.,
pp.161-2), then he doesn't care about bloody revolution, but feels "it's time to
turn to the gods'" (ibid., p.162).
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IV.iii. Dig Deeper and You Will Find Yourself Standing on Pagan Ground.
If Nietzsche is to be believed and democracy is Christianity made 'natural'. then
perhaps the "sulphurous politico-theological speculations+? offered by
Somers/Lawrence in the latter half of Kangaroo is Nietzsche's own radical
aristocratism made not so much supernatural as unnatural (alien, occult); i.e ..
transformed into a secret doctrine that the profane will condemn and dismiss as:
"Jargon, rant, mystical tosh and so on" (K, p.297). What Lawrence seems to be
suggesting is similar to Heidegger's claim that 'only a god can save us'. and we
here wish to explain what is meant by this and why they reach such a conclusion.
This may not be easy, for "the language of Somers's musings regularly wanders
into a semantic fog"43, as, arguably does Heidegger's philosophy. However,
whilst conceding this point, one does not agree that the above thinking often
collapses into "fatuous bombast". 44
Wittgenstein says in a well known section of the Tractatus (6.5.22) that: "There
are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They are what is mystical. "45
They are also the things which our electrically luminous civilization has attempted
to banish to the outer darkness; those things deemed threatening because
resistant to codification and therefore interpreted as evil, irresponsible, perverse.
Most thinkers and writers choose to ignore that which falls outside of man's self-
representation and belongs to the Unthought, but not Lawrence or Heidegger.
both of whom display an uncanny and almost preter-human awareness that:
"There is always something outside our Iknown I universe. And it is always at the
doors of the innermost, sentient soul" (K, p.296), where it knocks and awaits
entry. Unlike the majority who hear nothing (or pretend to hear nothing) of that
which goes bump in the night, Lawrence and Heidegger strain their ears and
attempt to find some way in which to think of such, experimenting with the full
resources of language. I would argue that their efforts should be admired - not
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dismissed as 'fatuous bombast'. For whilst it is easy "to regard Lawrence's dark
god as a piece of portentious flummery'l+", it is more becoming of the serious
critic or commentator to accompany the artist-philosopher as he ventures outside
the gate to that non-site where forces arise. If the language used takes on a
'theological' character, this is perhaps necessary if one is to express values
beyond the conventional political terms and "point up the inadequacy of the whole
sphere of the political in respect of the life-form which must ultimately underlie
politics. . .. In particular the political cannot encompass the realm traditionally
addressed by religion. "47
Heidegger was fond of citing the following saying: "Dig deeper and you will find
yourself standing on Catholic ground. "48 If this is the case, perhaps it is also true
to say; dig deeper still and you will find yourself standing on pagan ground. Both
propositions make clear that beneath the political paving stones, lies the sand of
religion. Thus whilst God is dead and the holy age has seemingly passed, Somers
nevertheless finds himself awaiting the arrival of a dark god who is coming from
the Outside to enter him from behind and below: "The god you can never see or
visualise, who stands dark at the threshold of the phallic me" (K, p.l35), as he
informs an irritated and shocked Kangaroo. We as readers should not be
surprised by this turning in Lawrence's thought, however, for there are clearly
pagan and occult elements in his work, as in Nietzsche's.
Of course, if readers should not be surprised by Somers's talk of dark gods, the
living unutterable, the phallic self, etcetera, nevertheless many will be quick to
repudiate such as dangerous nonsense. But Somers: "As a poet ... felt himself
entitled to all kinds of emotions and sensations which an ordinary man would
have repudiated" (K, p.l4). Lawrence, anticipating the response to this, playfully
concedes: "It is always a question whether there is any sense in taking notice of a
poet's finer feelings. The poet himself has misgivings about them" (ibid., p.l5).
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But of course, Lawrence does think we should listen to our poets; particularly
those poets who have in turn dared to listen to the voice of their daimon, as all
truly great poets - and philosophers - have. Heidegger also reaches the
conclusion that it is to the poets men must turn for guidance in this time of
nihilism; that the poet, acting as an emisary of the gods, is he who can best show
man a way back to himself and forward to a new revealing: "In the midst of
nihilism and waste of spirit ... it is the poet who, supremely, perhaps even alone,
is guarantor of man's ultimate Heimkehr ('homecoming')". 49 This means of course
that salvation lies not within the political, but the poetical; "not praxis but
poiesis" .so
Thus the man of action is forced to give way before the man of spirit; the poet,
the artist, the philosopher. And thus it is that the god who can save us "that
emerges in Heidegger's late writing is a profoundly poetic god">! in the pagan
tradition, and counter the Judea-Christian idea of God as a being of logic,
jealousy, and moral insistence. Nietzsche calls him Dionysus. Lawrence thinks of
him as Pan, or, in The Plumed Serpent, as QuetzaIcoatl. What we call this god
and how we conceive of him is perhaps somewhat irrelevant, for he is: "The god
who is many gods to many men: all things to all men" (K, p.266).
But still the question of how this dark god can save us remains unanswered; what
does such a gnostic saying mean? The answer returns us to the problem of
nihilism and how to move beyond it; and in making this return we simultaneously
revive the political aspect. We saw how Somers, prompted by Harriett, reaffirmed
that one cannot legislate a new understanding of being, or a new sensibility. But
perhaps it is the case that;
"some of our practices could come together in a new
cultural paradigm that held up to us a new way of doing things ... An object or
event that could ground such a gestalt switch in our understanding of reality
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Heidegger calls a new god, and this is why he holds that only a god can save
us. "52
In other words: "only by finding some set of shared meaningful concerns that can
give us a new focus ... and enable us to resist acquiescence to a state that has no
higher goal than to provide material welfare for all"53, can we overcome the
nihilism of the modern age. Heidegger is essentially arguing that following the
death of God we revolve around a void, lacking as we do any socially recognized
meaning or goal "that would enable us to decide collectively what is the right
course of action for humanity to pursue. "54 If we are to change this, then we will
need to find a new 'god' to save us in the above sense. But some of course do
not see the absence of any unified centre as a problem; God's death is for them a
liberating experience to be positively welcomed and affirmed. They would suggest
that: "Not only is it futile, but it is also deeply unintelligent to lament the loss of
a centre of gravity". 55 As we saw in chapter one, even nihilism may be something
to be explored and experienced, not postponed or defeated. Whilst Nietzsche
supports the strategy of acceleration and affirmation (in order to reach the
consummation of nihilism) on the one hand, on the other, he too seems, like
Heidegger and Lawrence, to have hopes for divine and daimonic intervention and
assistance. Leaving aside the question of whether such hopes are valid and
legitimate philosophically (or merely futile), our task in the next chapter and in
chapter five is to examine this turn to the gods and follow Nietzsche and
Lawrence down the 'dangerous' pathways they choose to take (dangerous because
they lead us outside of love and the light of reason, away from the moral
autonomy so cherished by liberal-humanism).
In order to secure the promise of renewal, Nietzsche and Lawrence commit
themselves to the demonic event that may well also bring disaster; in taking note
of the immense changes taking place in the Godless world around them, they risk
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concocting "a horrible mix of vague science, confused VISion, and dubious
theology" .56 In order to initiate the revaluation of values and give back to man a
renewed sense of "passionate religiousness and inward ... magnificence" (K,
p.328), the political project in Nietzsche and Lawrence becomes 'mythical' rather
than 'grand'; transferred to a "sacred primal site"57 outside the gate, so that
modern consciousness can be decentred via contact with archaic and alien forces.
It is, as Habermas says; "the dream of an aestheticized, poetic politics purified of
all moral elements'P", directed towards "the god who is coming". Sq The question
which arises once more is: "how the subversively spontaneous expression of these
forces and the fascist canalizing of them really differ. "60 This is the question we
shall address in chapter three, as we examine Ramon's plumed serpent revolution
and the politics of cruelty, abandoning still further the civilized world of welfare,
good plumbing, and the happiness of the last man.
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Chapter ITI:Only a Dark God Can Save Us Now:
Quetzalcoatl and the Politics of Cruelty.
Part I: Sulphurous Politico- Theological Speculations: Opening Remarks on
Lawrence's The Plumed Serpent and the Re-Introduction of the Gods Back Into
History.
I.i. Outside the Gate.
Just as there is a hardening of attitude towards the political question In
Nietzsche's work post-Zarathustra, so too in Lawrence's fiction and essays during
the period 1915-26 is there a decisive move away from the liberal-humanist and
Christian-moral tradition of the West. This move comes to a climax in The
Plumed Serpent (PS); a novel which provides an interesting and instructive point
of central reference to this chapter.
Richard Aldington says in an introduction to the above that it is "a curious and
original novel with no affinities" 1, but this is not so. For in fact, the novel has
many affinities and does not appear to be half so curious if one has knowledge of
the cultural, philosophical, and political context in which the book was written and
first published. As Frank Kermode rightly argues in his study of Lawrence, even
the novel's occult preoccupations were surprisingly common ones within
modernist circles: "A blend of theosophy, socialism, sexual reformism,
evolutionism, religious primitivism, was common enough in the avant-garde
thinking of the time". 2
It is precisely the above blend of politics, religion, and art that I wish to examine
here, via reading of The Plumed Serpent, a work that has remained controversial,
not only due to its anti-democratic politics, but also because of its experimental
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nature at the level of language, being at times as irritating in style as it is
disquieting in content. Arguably, it is second only to Nietzsche's Zarathustra in
this regard (a work to which it is closely related). Lawrence indicates his
increasing frustration with the limitations of language when it comes to best
expressing those powers, forces, and flows ('dark gods') that move outside of
human consciousness. Just as the book's central character, Ramon, has difficulty
in finding an appropriate method of articulating his new 'life-urge', so too does
Lawrence struggle to articulate the novel, aware that modern man does not want
to hear a new conception uttered in an alien tongue: "For the machine of the
human psyche. once wound up to a certain ideal, doesn't want to stop" (K, p.297)
and treats every new word as anathema: "Evil and anti-civilization" (ibid.) But
Lawrence, like Nietzsche, pushes thought onto new territory regardless; each
refuses to dwell within doxa and each reveals how "thought is impoverished when
it fails to think relentlessly". 3 Each also obliges us to adopt an alien perspective.
By becoming-Aztec (even at the risk of becoming-fascist). we are able to gain a
wholly other perspective upon modern European nihilism and critically examine
those presuppositions and prejudices that characterize modernity. In other words,
The Plumed Serpent allows us to interrogate and "loosen the aura of necessity and
sanctity surrounding categories of the present". 4 And we do this from a
perspective that is strangely both in time and space (the novel takes place in the
real Mexico of the 1920's) and yet is also outside of the above. set in the fictional
universe that Lawrence creates within his own novels. The 'problem' is that
Lawrence does not divide off one world cleanly from the other, so that, as
Michael Bell points out, he constantly seems to advocate straying beyond any
appropriate aesthetic limits, in order to explore new possibilities of action and
new realms of knowledge. Via the use of idiosyncratic narrative techniques and
radical literary devices which transgress the usual conventions of the novel,
Lawrence manages to make plausible that which is improbable and transform a
quest for the impossible into an apparently reasonable demand. Thus: "Who is to
120
say In just how speculative or literal a spirit its Utopian project is to be
understood?" 5
Again, for some critics this presents a problem with the work; for others, it is
one of the strengths and attractions. In endeavouring to show how life-
philosophy-art can have a more profound and congenial relation to each other,
Lawrence brings together prophecy, fantasy, and politics in an attempted
substantiation of creative mystery. Personally one would agree that "much of
Lawrence's significance lies in his attempts to relate his ontological vision to the
everyday and communal realms". 6 Jurgen Habermas suggests that Nietzsche
exclusively directs the gaze of those who, like Lawrence, do their thinking in his
light to that which is extraordinary, so that they "contemptuously glide over the
practice of everyday life as something derivative or inauthentic". 7 But this is
simply not the case. As we will increasingly see in this thesis, immanence is of
great importance to Nietzsche and his 'successors'; for thinking overcomes
metaphysics not by transcendence, but by grounding itself in the body and in the
sensual realm of everyday things. What is true to say, is that by 'world'
Nietzsche and Lawrence do understand something wider than simply the space in
which man acts on a daily basis and likes to pretend he has his full being within.
This latter, the known world, is not, they argue, the whole world; rather, it is
simply a little clearing of morality and reason fenced off from the wider, darker,
inhuman environment outside the gate. Unfortunately; "the wondrous Victorian
age managed to fasten the door so tight, and light up the compound so brilliantly
with electric light, that really, there was no outside, it was all in. The Unknown
became a joke: is still a joke." (K, p. 285).
It is because of this, because the outside and the extraordinary remain ludicrous
notions to the majority of people today (not just writers and guardians of the
interior such as Habermas), that we still find it difficult to take what Nietzsche
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and Lawrence say seriously; we find their critical analysis of modernity
stimulating, stylish, disturbing, but without ever really considering the possibility
that they were right. Right, for example to seek a connection with and
substantiation of the forces outside the gate and by so doing effectively shatter
conventional political frameworks and models of political thinking. That is to say,
Nietzsche and Lawrence are right to wish to form a new relation with what
Foucault terms espace d'une exteriorite sauvage; i.e., that "still almost unexplored
realm of dangerous knowledge'< full of "tigers and palm trees and rattle snakes"?
and all the other marvels the hot sun hatches; the realm where King Kong still
bristles in the darkness and human sacrifice remains the most sacred ritual.
Nietzsche and Lawrence challenge us to do our thinking here; thinking which may
have tragic results for man and yet may also help us restore to the world an aura
of primordial mystery.
Lii. "Jetzt wilr es Zeit, dass Getter triiten / aus bewohnten Dingen. " 10
Richard Somers, as we saw in the last chapter, ultimately realizes that politics, of
whatever variety, is not enough. And so he turns from right-wing paramilitaries
and left-wing revolutionaries to "the old dark gods, who had waited so long in
the outer dark" (K, p.265). It is these pagan deities, older than and entirely other
to those given us by the Jews - "a mental Jehohav, and a spiritual Christ" (ibid.,
p.206) - whom Lawrence invokes in The Plumed Serpent.
Initially, one is dubious about all mention of the gods and the 'god-stuff' roaring
eternally; skeptical about the attempt to re-introduce them back into history and
establish a politics upon some manner of post-Christian occult ontology.
Essentially, one is tired of the gods. For as Nietzsche correctly recognizes, there
is today an understandable "weariness in regard to religion: people have finally
grown tired, exhausted by the weighty symbols" .11 This weariness, itself a
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symptom of course of our own decadence, is illustrated in The Plumed Serpent by
Kate's reaction to Ramon's claim that one is always driven at last to search for
God: '''I rather hate this search-far-God business and religiosity,' said Kate ....
'And you can't really 'find God'!' she said. 'It's a sort of sentimentalism, and
creeping back into old, hollow shells'" (PS, p.73).
Even Ramon, who acts throughout the novel on the conviction that only religion
will serve to bring about fundamental change in Mexico, or anywhere else, is
obliged to concede this point: '''No!' he said slowly. 'I can't find God in the old
sense. I know its sentimentalism, if I pretend to'" (Ibid.) But what he can do, he
argues, is to locate the source of that which is god-given within himself; i.e.,
find the source of his own strength (or 'man-hood', as he calls it) and remain
loyal to this, whilst also forming new relations with the wider world (both human
and non-human) on the basis of this power. Further, and contentiously, he claims
he can substantiate the mystery of power via a revolutionary politics which is
counter-modern in its challenge to liberal-humanist arrangements and overtly
Nietzschean in its aim of a revaluation of all values.
Thus if, on the one hand, The Plumed Serpent should be thought of as a work of
art (and perhaps a religious text), on the other hand: "More than any other
Lawrence work, this novel moves on a social level .,. a spiritual revolution that
becomes political when realized in pragmatic terms." 12 And this because, as seen
earlier: "Lawrence's creative vision worked on at least two levels of
truthfulness" .13 That IS, like Nietzsche, Lawrence is concerned both with the
little, everyday things of the surface and with those things which are, in some
way, extraordinary. For Lawrence cannot rest content with theosophical
speculations that are entirely and artificially divorced from the 'real' world; he
wishes to transform the Word back into the Flesh (i.e. back into that from which
it originated); just as Nietzsche wishes to translate the Ideal back into a non-ideal
123
and immoral nature.
It is when this project of revaluation becomes materialized in terms of a politics
of cruelty and evil, that many readers become uncomfortable. The mixture of
political violence and neo-paganism detailed in The Plumed Serpent seems all too
familiar to those with knowledge of Hitler's revolution. Indeed, it is interesting
to note that one of the minor characters in the novel - a German hotel manager -
dismisses the cult of Quetzalcoatl as merely another form of "national socialism"
(PS. p.103). founded primarily upon the leadership fantasies of Ramon.I" It is
therefore important to examine why it seemed so vital to Lawrence to bring
together politics and religion and advocate a substantiation of mystery. There are
perhaps several reasons. but I will focus on what appear to be the most important
two: Firstly. (a) the belief that the regeneration of culture requires myth and the
recognition of the 'holy lie' as a socially useful and politically expedient means
towards this end. Secondly, (b) the belief that man can only achieve his full
coming into being via a living connection to the sacred realm or what Lawrence
sometimes calls the 'Fourth Dimension'.
(a) It is perhaps the case that Ramon is suffering from what Nietzsche terms a
'psychology of error'; i.e .. from a form of delusion in which the religious mystic
mistakes his heightened sense of power to be the result of the gods, rather than
acknowledging that his belief in the gods is itself the effect of his elevated well
being. But with Ramon. it is hard to tell. For on other occasions he appears to be
much more of a 'noble liar'. than a genuine 'holy fool'. If he genuinely believes in
the unseen god outside the gate. he is prepared nonetheless to admit when
pressed that QuetzaJcoatl is "just a living word" (K, p.209) for the consumption
of the people.
At best. we can perhaps think of Ramon as one of Nietzsche's 'higher types'; a
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combination of creativity, skepticism and ecstasy. A philosopher of the future
who understands the importance of history, the people's need for displays of
cruelty and transgressive spectacle and the usefulness of the holy lie in preserving
political stability and cultural unity. Nietzsche writes: "The philosopher as we
understand him ... will make use of the religions for his work of education and
breeding, just as he will make use of existing political and economic conditions." 15
Later, in Twilight of the Idols, he adds that no major religious teacher ever
doubted "their right to tell lies." 16 Thus Ramon acts with good conscience as he
attempts a la Rousseau to "dissolve politics into unity and to ground unity in the
faith of a religion inscribed in the fabric of civil society." 17 But the problem that
Ramon soon comes up against is that faith is no longer possible in this modern
age of nihilism in which the holy lie has been revealed as such. As we saw in
chapter one, the artist-philosopher may wish to preserve illusions as necessary to
cultural life, but he is opposed in this by the unrelenting will to truth. This, says
Henry Miller. is precisely the 'tragedy' of Lawrence's life: "THAT HE SOUGHT
WHAT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US ANY LONGER: A FAITH AND AN
AUTHORITY." 18 If this is so of Lawrence, then so too is it true of Nietzsche.
Sometimes. each seems to delight in the very impossibility of their own demands.
At other times. however, one senses a frustration and a despair in their texts;
out of which grows their politics of excess and violent transgression. Although,
again as we saw in chapter one, both men valued and stressed the importance of
art, both also realized that art itself forms no substitute for religious faith and
that you cannot take refuge in the former when one's religious responses are
either fatally reactive (as in the Christian) or inactive (as in the Ugliest Man; i.e.,
the athiest). And this because, as Lawrence simply puts it, the essential feeling in
all art is religious and therefore demands and requires an active religious
response. Lawrence. like Nietzsche, does not therefore avoid the religious issue;
he accepts it as st ill the primary issue - even after (if not especially after) the
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death of God. He understands that the revaluation is ultimately to do with re-
establishing the sacred character of life, in the knowledge that culture is born
outside the gate (the very word deriving from 'cult', i.e., a system of religious
belief, and related to 'occult', i.e., that which remains outside of knowledge and
belonging to the dark).
"The true religious faculty". says Lawrence, "is the highest faculty in man, once
he exercises it. And by the religious faculty we mean the inward worship of the
creative life-mystery" .19 But not dogma: for religion is always a question of
feeling and not fixed belief; "and the only irreligious thing is the death of feeling,
the causing of nullity". 20 But how is modern man to be encouraged and enabled
to exercise his religious faculty in an active and affirmative manner? Nietzsche
and Lawrence both look for assistance to other peoples in other times; Greeks
and Romans. Aztecs and Etruscans. It is not that they believe it possible or even
desirable to go back to such a way of life, but that they think a clue can be found
amongst these former cultures about how to live with vitality, faith, and feeling.
Nietzsche. in an important passage, stresses:
"One, certainly very high level of culture has been attained when a man emerges
from superstitious and religious concepts and fears ... Then, however, he needs
to take a retrograde step: he has to grasp the historical justification that resides
in such ideas. likewise the psychological; he has to recognise that they have been
most responsible for the advancement of mankind and that without such a
retrograde step he will deprive himself of the best that mankind has hitherto
produced. "21
In The Plumed Serpent. Kate recalls her former husband telling her that "evil was
the lapsing back to old life-modes that have been surpassed in us" (PS, 137).
Isn't this precisely what Nietzsche is advocating above, however? But isn't the
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notion of a return to the primitive and "the old savage form of expression" (PS,
p.138) also a form of romantic decadence? Wary of such a charge, Lawrence has
Kate declare to herself and to us as readers: "No: It's not a helpless, panic
reversal. It is conscious, carefully chosen. We must go back to pick up the old
threads. We must take up the old, broken impulse that will connect us with the
mystery of the cosmos again, now that we are at the end of our own tether."
(ibid. )
Of course, the Question IS 'how?' Are song, dance, and prayer the answer?
Perhaps, but it would seem only a part of the answer, for, like Nietzsche,
Lawrence refuses to let go of a belief in the need for political action. Kate may
say that politics doesn't really matter and revolutions '''are so, so stupid and
vieux jeu .., (ibid .. p.166), echoing Harriett in Kangaroo, but this is not her
author's view at the time of writing The Plumed Serpent. And Don Ram6n, for all
his doubts about involving himself in the political sphere (displaying what
Nietzsche would condemn as the 'bad conscience of commanders') ultimately feels
there is a need for direct action: "'The change has to be made. And some man has
to make it ...' (PS, pAD7).
Thus the turn to the gods is made within a social, political, and military
environment and involves knives and guns, as well as song and dance. But the
problem arises that the attempt to rekindle religious feeling via a political
movement supposedly expressive of such, soon requires "manipulative controls
and coercive regulations to sustain itself against those who resist or evade its
strictures. "22 And thus, as we will see, Ramon's vision collapses in the end into
something sinister: "The whole country was thrilling with a new thing, with a
release of new energy. But there was a sense of violence and crudity in it all, a
touch of horror" (PS, P .420). Finally, the country falls into civil war. And this
because for all his eloquence and showmanship (indeed, for all his sincerity),
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Ramon can only ever speak to and for the few; the cult of Quetzalcoatl is not
generalizable in the modern age in which it is offered without the armed force of
Cipriano to support it and crush opposition. It is from necessity that although
Ramon's concerns "are religious and his affinities largely artistic, his practical
alliances are still military and political. "23 And it is this combination which causes
the tension within the novel and a concern for those who hold the view that:
"Politics is not religion, or, if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition. "24
Thus whilst the regeneration of culture mayor may not require violence and the
substantiation of mystery, it cannot be designated in advance, or legislated into
existence. A politically rubber-stamped culture supported by the threat of armed
force effectively violates the notion of what a culture is. We have again reached a
conclusion drawn in chapter one: culture and the state are irreconcilably opposed
to one another.
(b) Lawrence, we have seen, understands Nietzsche's project of revaluation as
fundamentally a religious question, as much as a philosophical or cultural one.
And certainly Nietzsche himself does not object to religion per se, as is often
assumed, in fact, he is happy to affirm the holy lie, providing that it serves a
noble and life-enhancing (and/or a politically useful) end. His main objection to
Christianity is that it does not serve such an end - quite the contrary. Nietzsche
argues that just as one can deny God in either an active or a reactive manner, so
too can one affirm the sacred in either a healthy or degenerate manner. His aim is
to free man from the disabling belief in 'other worlds' that are supposed to exist
'beyond' this one and 'after' life. He wishes to substantiate mystery and channel
religious feeling into a faith in this world, this life. Modern culture is decadent
for Nietzsche "because it has proved incapable of sublimating religious passions.
Consequently these passions have atrophied. "25 Thus, to reiterate, revaluation is
an attempt to rekindle religious passion and to form a 'faith' in contrast and
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opposition to the Judea-Christian tradition; i.e., a neo-paganism and neo-
pantheism in which man is offered the opportunity to regain 'paradise' here and
now (paradise simply being another name for the earth itself).
Evidence for the above reading of Nietzsche is provided throughout his texts. But
one of the most important sites is to be found in the second essay of his
Genealogy. Here, Nietzsche speaks positively and unambiguously about the
conception of the gods. As claimed above, he does not condemn the god-idea as
such, only the Christian version of this, which strikes him as feeble and radically
false: God as the denial of will to power, rather than as its highest expression.
That there are other, non-perverse and non-decadent, ways of conceiving of the
gods is proved, he argues, by the example of the Greeks; their gods being:
"reflections of noble and proud men in whom the animal in man felt deified, did
not tear itself apart and did not rage against itself! Those Greeks, for most of the
time, used their gods expressly to keep 'bad conscience' at bay so that they could
carryon enjoying their freedom of soul ... They went very far in this, these
marvellous, lion-hearted children". 26
So too did the Aztecs of course, and many other pagan peoples around the world.
The question is: can we go still further? Or did the above take the god-idea to its
very limit (to the point at which it collapsed into the exhausted Christian notion)?
Perhaps, in order to mature, these 'lion-hearted children' had to develop bad
conscience and refrain from using their gods to keep it at bay. For although it is
a sickness, so too is it a sickness 'like pregnancy' according to Nietzsche (from
out of which we modern human beings have been born). Now, however, in order
for us to mature, it may be necessary to overcome bad conscience and enter into
a new innocence, even if this means having to overcome our own humanity as we
have understood it within the rational-moral tradition. We cannot go back: our
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post-Christian paganism will not be the same as the pre-Christian paganism of
our forefathers; our second innocence will be an advance upon and something
other than Greek naivety. We move beyond good and evil; we do not slip back
before it.
Can there be a religious sensibility beyond good and evil? Nietzsche answers in
the affirmative, suggesting even Buddhism is an example of such - albeit still a
form of decadence in his view. In a note from The Will To Power he says that in
principle it should be perfectly possible to conceive of a post-moral god: "God
conceived as an emancipation from morality, taking into himself the whole fullness
of life's antithesis and, in a divine torment, redeeming and justifying them. God
as the beyond and above of the wretched loafers' morality of 'good and evil'. "27
Such a god would be non-ideal, non-anthropomorphic, and non-humanitarian. A
god rather like Quetzalcoatl; one of power who has been stripped of all other
traits and sentimental trimmings:
"Let us remove supreme goodness from the
concept god: it is unworthy of a god. Let us also remove supreme wisdom: it is
the vanity of philosophers that is to be blamed for this mad notion of god as a
monster of wisdom ... No! god the supreme power - that suffices! Everything
follows from it, 'the world' follows from it!"28
This affirmation of the world is central as we have said to both Nietzsche and
Lawrence. Yet it is arguably Heidegger who best illustrates what is implied by
this and whose work plays an important role in helping us understand the
revaluation as an overcoming of metaphysics and, indeed, allows us to develop a
philosophically informed reading of The Plumed Serpent's mysticism.
Firstly, and most importantly. it is crucial to recall that when Nietzsche refers to
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'the world' he, like Heidegger, "does not in any way imply earthly, as opposed to
heavenly being, nor 'worldly' as opposed to 'spiritual'. "29 Likewise, man, a
creature who has being in the world, is not "merely a 'worldly' creature
understood in a Christian sense, thus a creature turned away from God and so
cut loose from 'Transcendence'vr '? Rather, man, as Heidegger puts it, 'ex-sists',
that is, he stands out into the clearing of Being on the basis of his own essence,
that which we saw Ramon call his 'man-hood' and which Nietzsche would identify
in terms of power. In other words, man comes into his own outside the gate,
bubbling over the confines of his own humanity. But outside the gate is not
beyond the earth, any more than over-human is non-human. As Heidegger
writes: "Thought in terms of existence, 'world' is in a certain sense precisely 'the
beyond' within existence and for it. "31 It is world in this wider sense which
Lawrence sometimes calls the 'fourth dimension'; the sacred realm in which things
- flowers as well as men as well as beasts - have their creative-being and
fulfilment. Only in the fourth dimension does man achieve sovereignty, wherein
"he knows himself royal and crowned with the sun". 32
The actual possibility or impossibility of the gods is not touched on by such a
definition, which balances mid-way between theism and atheism, making any easy
identification with one side or the other unnecessary and inappropriate. Unlike
nihilistic indifference on the religious question, this opens up the opportunity "to
reflect freely on the nature of the holy and hale, as of the malignancy and rage of
evil" 33, i.e., to begin to think that which is today left almost entirely unthought
and locked outside. But to do so does not involve thinking beyond lived-
experience. Rather, it involves the substantiation of mystery in order that we are
thereby able to think the sacred as the near at hand. To quote Heidegger once
more:
"Thinking does not overcome metaphysics by climbing still higher,
surmounting it, transcending it somehow or other; thinking overcomes
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metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness of the nearest. The descent
... is more arduous and more dangerous than the ascent." 34
This important concern with the everyday and the close by is of course
fundamentally Nietzschean, although it is a concern that can be traced back to
Heraclitus who, concerning the everyday world of the familiar remarked: "Einai
gar kei entautha thea us " - i.e., 'here too the gods come to presence'. 35
Thus we see again how deeply mistaken Habermas is in his view quoted earlier.
And we repeat that immanence is one of the key terms for an understanding of
Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean philosophy; the giving back to things their
fourth dimensional quality and allowing them to exist in their own right (a la
Cezanne's apple: see chapter one). For Heidegger, the thing is the place where
'the Fourfold' (das Geviert ) meet in correspondence; this fourfold consisting of
earth, sky, mortals, and the gods - i.e., precisely the fourfold concern of
Lawrence in The Plumed Serpent, symbolized by Ramon as the man-god and
eagle-snake (sky-earth) assemblage Quetzalcoatl.
Such thinking to do with the mystery of immanence, forms an important part of
Nietzsche's Dionysian philosophy; i.e., a post-Christian doctrine of will to power
and being which is being-in-the-world and being-in-the-flesh. We shall develop
this at length in chapters IV and V. What is of interest to us here, however, is
the way in which Nietzsche, Lawrence, and Heidegger, all insist on relating their
onto-theological insights to the political. We are aware of course what this meant
in the case of Heidegger during the 1930's, who unfortunately allowed his
thinking to become entwined with German racial-nationalism. Without wishing to
'excuse', 'justify', or 'defend' Heidegger's political option (and without wishing to
suggest that either Nietzsche or Lawrence would have made the same mistaken
choice had they lived during the Nazi period), it does seem to be one which is
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closely related to the above beliefs. And interestingly, if there is one area in
which both Nietzsche and Lawrence do allow themselves to think in racial-national
terms, it is when it comes to the substantiation of mystery. Like Heidegger, they
seem to believe that "every nation ... must find for itself, the grandeur and the
truth of its Bestimmung (its 'determination', its 'assignment through its
calling'). "36 That is, its own national form of faith; it's own gods. Thus when
Lawrence looks at Mexico he decides that Christianity has essentially failed there
- and failed with disastrous consequences for the native people thereof. In other
words, it has proved impossible "to graft an alien myth onto a native tree with
any lasting success, without damaging the tree beyond repair. "37 There is a need,
Lawrence thinks, for each people to find its own myths: Ramon tells Kate toward
the end of the novel to spread the religious revolution he has begun in her own
country (Ireland) when she returns. When, not unreasonably, she asks how, he
replies: '''Let them find themselves again, and their own universe, and their own
gods. Let them substantiate their own mysteries'" (PS, p.427), having earlier
declared; "'if I want Mexicans to learn the name of Quetzacoatl, it is because
want them to speak with the tongues of their own blood'" (ibid., p.248).38
Again, such thinking can be traced back to Nietzsche's texts. In The Anti-Christ,
for example, he writes:
"A people that still believes in itself still also has its own
god. In him it venerates the conditions through which it has prospered, its
virtues - it projects its joy in itself, its feeling of power on to a being whom one
can thank for them. He who is rich wants to bestow; a proud people needs a god
in order to sacrifice." 39
Only when, Nietzsche goes on to say, a people feels itself weak do you get a
'cosmopolitan' god; poking his nose everywhere and moralizing:
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"There is in fact no other alternative for gods; either they are the will to power -
and so long as they are that they will be national gods, - or else the impotence of
power - and they necessarily become good"40 (and universal).
Whether one decides such thinking is inherently 'dangerous' in its racial-
nationalism, or a healthy (perhaps naive) religious response to the monotheism of
Judeo-Christianity (a flowering into plurality and polytheism), may depend on
one's political persuasion before anything else. However, the turn to the gods and
the re-introduction of the gods back into history should not be regarded as
something only longed for by the reactionary thinker. It is interesting to recall in
closing the response of Michel Foucault to the Iranian Revolution of t 978. Here,
the world was somewhat surprised to see one of France's foremost radicals greet
a religious revolution positively, arguing that it "held out the promise of a
welcome new form of 'political spirituality', unknown in the West 'since the
Renaissance and the great crisis of Christianity. '''41 For Foucault, the Iranian
attempt to substantiate the mystery of Islam signified an attempt to not only
change government, but to transform their entire world. He wondered if the
revolution might not represent "the first great insurrection against the planetary
system, the most mad and most modern form of revolt. "42 But of course, as
soon as the Ayatollah assumed control in February t 979 then the "chimera of
'political spirituality' was dispelled by the reality of a ruthless theocracy. "43
Undoubtedly, the same would have happened in Ramon's neo-Aztec Mexico, had
Lawrence chosen to follow the revolution through. Probably Ramon would have
quickly become disillusioned with events and either removed himself from the
scene, or found himself overthrown by Cipriano whom he distrusted and feared,
for the latter, "whenever he was away on his own for sometime, slipped back into
the inevitable Mexican general, fascinated by the opportunity for furthering his
own personal ambition and imposing his own personal will" (PS, p. 253).
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Ultimately, Lawrence is too great an artist not to concede the truth of even his
own revolutionary fantasy; i.e., it is doomed to failure. Thus, as we will see, he
backs away from the edge of the abyss and ultimately rejects bloody revolution as
an option, even whilst not surrendering his faith in the dark gods, his concern
with politics, and his desire for a revaluation of all values.
Part II: The Politics of Cruelty.
If a non-metaphysical 'transcendence' of metaphysics is to be achieved then, along
with a substantiation of mystery, Nietzsche and Lawrence suggest that a 'politics
of cruelty' is also required, based upon: (i) an anti-humanist philosophy of power
or 'evil' (see chapter two); (ii) the notion of a general economy of the whole; (iii)
the belief that violence and oppression are essential to society and culture (see
chapter one).
In other words, transcendence is accomplished via transgression; a deliberate
violation of the norms of behaviour within liberal-democratic society and a
forceful breaching of the limits of our own humanity. Through hell, the theory
suggests, we shall reach heaven; or at least enter into a new becoming. Certainly
transgression, by its very nature, opens up new possibilities of action and new
fields of knowledge; for by shattering established limits and calling into question
the status of established dualities which have largely determined our thinking, it
allows us to tap into the Dionysian forces outside the gate and form a new
understanding of the primal mysteries.
But if transgression always involves the graspmg of new knowledge (a la Eve's
plucking of the apple), so too does it always seem to involve murder (cl la Cain's
slaying of Abel) and, as we will shortly see, one of the key scenes in The Plumed
Serpent is the ritualized execution-cum-sacrifice of political prisoners, Lawrence
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seemingly sharing the view that is found fully developed in the work of Bataille,
namely that; "in a fundamental way the impetus of the sovereign man makes a
killer of him" and this because "by killing he escapes the subordination that he
refuses, and he violently rids himself of the aspect of a tool or thing." 1 That is to
say, he comes into his own full being, which, in the case of man, means achieving
divine status: becoming a god in one's own right. I shall return to this essentially
occult idea shortly.
Firstly, I wish to say something in addition to the remarks made last chapter
about 'evil' and to discuss the three things upon which I have suggested a politics
of cruelty is founded. In a letter, Lawrence writes: "The real principle of evil is
not anti-Christ or anti-Jehovah, but anti-life. "2 And what is life? Life is will to
power, according to Nietzsche as we have seen. Thus when Nietzsche writes of
evil, he simply means power and means life; means the world understood in terms
of monstrous energy, without beginning or end; means all those forces and flows
which violate human order and stability. He uses the word evil because it is the
term which the Christian-moral world uses, in its fear, to describe these forces
and flows. He calls himself an 'immoralist' and advocates the cultivation of evil,
because he wishes to restore vitality and health to mankind; to make life strong
once more and rooted firmly in the instinctive and intuitive (i.e., in the body),
instead of feeble and sickly and based upon bloodless ideals which the impotent
mistake as the 'good'.
In many ways, Nietzsche and Lawrence are both continuing a romantic tradition
when they write positively of evil, a tradition which ultimately suggests that it is
better to be one of the damned than to live a 'good' life in the Christian sense;
i.e., a life which Nietzsche would condemn as a form of cowardice and sterility.
Damnation becomes, paradoxically, a means of salvation; redeeming one from
what T.S. Eliot calls the "ennui of modern life. "3
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The evil of the slave may in practice be every bit as 'banal' as Hannah Arendt
found it to be; just as the goodness of the slave is as insipid and ressentiment-
ridden as Nietzsche described it, but the evil of the master is something else. In
fact, the evil of the strong is, according to Nietzsche, man's best strength and it
is this he wishes to see cultivated by a new social and political order in order to
counter the Christian-moral tradition. He writes:
"What is mediocre in the typical
man? That he does not understand the necessity for the reverse side of things ...
that he combats evils as if one could dispense with them; that he will not take the
one with the other ... Our insight is the opposite of this: that with every growth
of man his other side must grow too ... That man grow better and more evil is
my formula. "4
Essentially, Nietzsche has gained this insight (as so many others) from his reading
of ancient Greek culture, as founded upon what he terms a 'pessimism of
strength'; i.e., a tragic philosophy which affirms life in its totality, or as what
Nietzsche calls a 'general economy of the whole', in which the natural drives and
instincts of man (his evil qualities) were regulated, but still allowed some measure
of expression - not repudiated as within Christian-moral culture, which works for
the extirpation of such drives and the complete taming of man.
The above notion of a general economy is crucial to an understanding of
Nietzsche's politics of cruelty; arguably, as much linked to it as free-market
economies are linked to liberal-democratic politics. According to Nietzsche. the
festival of passions and evil inclinations staged within Greek society as spectacle,
sport, and drama, constituted the real paganism of the non-Christian world and
allowed instinct a clear place and value (if of the second rank) within social and
religious life: "This is the root of all the moral free-mindedness of antiquity. One
granted to the evil and suspicious, to the animal and backward ... a moderate
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discharge, and Idid] not strive for their total annihilation." 5
And cruelty was central as "one of the oldest festive joys of mankind" and as a
means via which man experienced "the highest gratification of the feeling of
power. "6 But of all the methods of producing this gratification and joy, one has
long stood out: "it has been human sacrifice which has at all times most exalted
and elevated man. "7
Interestingly, The Plumed Serpent contains acts of cruelty and human sacrifice.
The novel opens in fact with an ancient ritual of public cruelty, a bull-fight,
experienced by Kate as something sordid, however, rather than exhilarating and
reflective of the "squalid evil" (PS, p.2l) she senses crawling uncomfortably close
to the surface of everyday life in Mexico, and which threatens to erupt in one
form of atrocity or another at any moment. If Kate has been driven to the bull-
ring by the modern 'will to happiness' (i.e., a will to find and experience life as
thrilling and sensational), she nonetheless is not infected with what Lawrence calls
the "insidious modern disease of tolerance" (PS, p. 26) and is thus able to reject
that which seems to her base and profoundly objectionable. Men! she thinks to
herself: "They all had this soft rottenness of the soul, a strange perversity which
made even the squalid, repulsive things seem part of life to them. Life! And what
is life? A louse lying on its back and kicking? Ugh!" (Ibid.)
Here we must pause for a moment, however. For whilst Nietzsche too rejects any
notion of queasy liberal tolerance (tolerance as a form of decadence) he does
insist with his notion of general economy that we acknowledge al1 aspects of life -
even the squalid, the perverse, the repulsive, and the cruel, allowing each the
right to find expression. For what is life? Life is will to power; and even a louse
lying on its back and kicking, the thought of which makes Kate shudder, is life as
will to power. Lawrence, who also formulates and subscribes to an economic
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model of the whole in his work, nevertheless has as much difficulty as Kate in
accepting the full implications of the notion. Like Kate, he sometimes insists that:
"A thing isn't life, just because somebody does it. "Il And this because, for
Lawrence, true life is a creative flow and not merely sensational activity
experienced within and worked from the fixed self; it has a fourth dimensional
quality. It is this quality Kate is searching for; "a strange beam of wonder and
mystery, almost like hope. A strange darkly-iridescent beam of wonder, of
magic" (PS, p.58). However, as she is obliged to learn during the course of the
novel, this quality grows out of something other than this - just as the lily grows
from out of the marsh. For Lawrence concedes - even though he does not appear
to be fully comfortable with the fact - that although certain forms and
experiences are sterile, mechanical, or degenerate in some manner, nevertheless
they have an important part to play in life as a whole and that there is no pristine
life, purely active, purely affirmative, free from all taint of death and corruption,
except in the ideal-realm, which is, of course, the greatest expression of hatred
for the actual world ever conceived by sick brains.
Thus when Kate expresses concern about accepting a marriage proposal from
Cipriano on the grounds that she is fearful of letting Mexican horror into her
soul, Lawrence has the latter reply: '''Horror is real. Why not a bit of horror, as
you say, among all the rest?" (PS, p.235).
However, the oscilliation experienced by Kate to the very end of the novel (and
not resolved even then); from attraction to repulsion and from acceptance to
rejection of Ramon's plumed serpent religion and political philosophy, is shared
by many readers. Even the most sympathetic to Lawrence and Nietzsche cannot
simply discard their human, all too human selves and embrace the dark gods they
offer us. Contemplation of cruelty and the reality of pain, is something modern
man finds extremely difficult; it is his most dreadful thought. To admit that the
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above is not only an essential part of life, but has also played a profound and
intimate part in our own self-formation and history, as revealed by Nietzsche in
the Genealogy of Morals, is a huge test of our own honesty and courage. The
truth is hard; but the truth, for Nietzsche, is that the origin of man and the state
is a violent one and that culture rests upon cruelty.
Perhaps the question might be asked why modern man is so afraid of physical
pain and why he seems to suffer so at the thought of physical cruelty? For he
clearly does not object to the internalization of cruelty and the suffering caused
by bad conscience and all manner of torture within the confines of the soul.
Sublimated and disguised violence raises little objection, even though the
internalization of cruelty does not in any way lessen the pain caused; in fact, as
Foucault shows in his studies of the treatment of the insane and the punishment
of the criminal, by refining and 'spiritualizing' cruelty, suffering has been
intensified and made more effective."
No doubt part of the answer is to do with our fear and hatred of the physical; we
cannot stand the thought of any kind of genuine physical interchange of passion
and the touch of another is what we shrink from. Thus we are uncomfortable not
only with genuine sexual contact (i.e., non-headbound), but also with corporal
punishment, or any overtly physical discipline which strikes us as 'barbaric' and
'inhumane' . The most insidious forms of emotional-spiritual bullying and
blackmail, are accepted as belonging to a morally just society, but the thought of
a flogging sends us into a state of near nervous hysteria, even whilst the latter, if
carried out within the context of passion, is, according to Lawrence; "a natural
form of human coition." 10 In fact, the argument is put forward by both Lawrence
and Nietzsche, that it is far preferable to have a passionate politics of externalized
power, desire, and cruelty, than an ideal politics of reason and will to love which
suppress the above, causing the animal in man to become perverse and full of
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self -loathing.
Like Blake, then, Nietzsche and Lawrence seem to be of the view that: "He who
desires but acts not, breeds pestilence." 11 However, there are times when
Nietzsche writes approvingly of restraint and the internalization of cruelty;
describing it as a positive advance upon the splendid but half-idiotic spectacles
staged in the Roman arenas, because it was the moralization of man which made
him an interesting creature full of tremendous possibilities for the future. But
now is the time for man to once more direct his violence outward; for, according
to Nietzsche, the crisis of modernity is so great and modern man so enfeebled,
that we require "not merely war but the greatest and most terrible of all wars -
thus a temporary relapse into barbarism "12 if we are to overcome the above and
find our best strength once more. New barbarism is necessary not only for the
establishment of new culture, but for the survival of man as a species.
Lawrence echoes the call for a new barbarism in The Plumed Serpent, as
elsewhere in his work. Thus we see Ramon declare it impossible for him to go on
being "gentle, good, and loving, and trying to make the whole world more gentle,
good, and loving" (PS, p.206). For despite the frenzied protests of his devoutly
Catholic first wife, Carlota; "it was borne in upon him that the world had gone as
far as it could in the good, gentle, and loving direction, and anything further in
that line meant perversity. So the time had come for the slow, great change to
something else." (Ibid.)
That is, something other than ideal-love worked from the white will which we
discussed last chapter, and the 'cruel kindness' of Christian charity; something
similar to the politics of evil and cruelty we have been attempting to describe
here: "'I serve Omnipotence!'" (PS, p.343) says Ramon, at the opening ceremony
of the church of Quetzalcoatl. And as such, as a man of power, Ramon belongs to
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the type whom the world brands evil; dangerous individuals who are rightly
perceived as world-destroyers as much as culture-founders. Neither Nietzsche or
Lawrence would deny this, nor flinch in the face of such a truth; the former in
particular had a penchant for such figures in the Caesar-mould; a mixture of the
inhuman and superhuman. Perhaps the predilection d'ertiste is always for the
natural aristocrat who puts us in touch with fire and ice.13 For Lawrence too sees
the greater danger presented not by the powerful and sovereign individual, but by
the vast herd of slave humanity: "It is not the leopard or the hot tiger, but the
masses of rank sheep" 14 that are nibbling the face of the earth into a desert. And
they need, he thinks, this herd, to be either mastered - or slaughtered. Lawrence
writes:
"Sweet, beautiful death, come to our help. Break in among the herd, make
gaps in its insulated completion. Give us a chance, sweet death, to escape from
this herd and gather together against it a few living beings." 15
And he continues in the same vein of anti-humanist rhetoric so characteristic of a
politics of cruelty: "Smash humanity, and make an end of it. Let there emerge a
few pure single men." 16 Whilst such rhetoric is probably not meant to be taken
literally, still the extremity and violence of the language used is shocking all the
same. And, as we saw in chapter one, there are times when Lawrence does seem
to view death as a genuine solution to the nihilistic frustration of life and life's
movement and becoming, arguing that before new forms and species can evolve
and "gain strength enough to assert their vitality" there will need to be "a
holocaust of individual deaths" .17 For, as Lawrence puts it: dead men make good
mould.I"
But as we also argued in chapter one, death is only a pure thing when it is free of
egoistic self-will and "life becomes an echo of the sun, realizing its inevitable
destiny, which is pure loss." 19 That is, when man no longer tries to save himself
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inside an old form, but is prepared to let go and accept that he too belongs to the
solar-Dionysian economy of energy and chaos; when man realizes that as he
begins his descent from Pisgah he must once more use the 'ladder of religious
cruelty' up which he climbed. For having attained the third rung (the sacrifice of
God), he must step once more onto the second; the sacrifice of self from self.
But if on the ascent he was obliged to sacrifice his instincts, passions, and
desires, he is on the descent restored once more to his healthy, natural state and
asked to sacrifice instead his ideal-illusions, his logical obsessions, and his static
forms, along with all: "the obstructions to life" and anything that belongs to him
and yet is an ugly impediment to the "free motion of life". 20 Quetzalcoatl, the
Aztec deity of life and death who demands human blood, wishes for man to "slay
not the best bright proud life" that is in him - i.e., "not that which is noble and
generous and spontaneous" - but that which is "mean and base and squalid and
degenerate.U
Sacrifice, then, IS a central notion in Nietzsche and Lawrence. But not just
sacrifice of and from the self, whilst the latter remains essentially unchanged,
unharmed. For the final rung on the ladder of religious cruelty is human
sacrifice. It is this, the death of man as human being, and this alone which
fascinates Nietzsche and Lawrence as it does Richard Somers: "Human sacrifice! -
he could feel his dark, blood-consciousness tingle to it again, the desire of it, the
mystery of it" (K, p.238).
It would be comforting to once more insist that what Nietzsche and Lawrence are
thinking of here is sacrifice in a purely philosophical and metaphorical sense; not
as a real act to be carried out in the real world; to assimilate the notion of human
sacrifice to the project of man's self-overcoming. However, in answer to the
question what role ought cruelty and violence play within society once it is
acknowledged that they cannot be done away with, Nietzsche and Lawrence seem
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to suggest that a substantiation of the mystery of sacrifice is an appropriate
measure.P In other words, they do wish to see externalized acts of blood-shed
and the projection of cruelty back into the world. They are both keen to stress
that the great man must be able not only to sacrifice himself, but others; not only
endure suffering, but inflict pain. As Nietzsche writes in an aphorism entitled
What belongs to greatness:
"Who will attain anything great if he does not find in
himself the strength and the will to inflict great suffering? Being able to suffer is
the least thing ... But not to perish of internal distress and uncertainty when one
inflicts great suffering and hears the cry of this suffering - that is great, that
belongs to greatness. "23
The sacrificing of political opponents is more than an act of expediency and
'compassion', as Machiavelli argues.P It also constitutes a test upon those who
would be leaders; a test of their strength and greatness. And yet if a man's
greatness and sovereignty makes of him a killer (as we saw Bataille suggest
earlier), so too, paradoxically for the moral and rational-minded, does it allow
him to achieve a state of grace; i.e., to come into a second innocence: for
innocence too belongs to greatness and the final perfect strength. It is this fact
which will, perhaps, enable the very greatest of men to not only kill in good
conscience, but to let go and advocate a new justice and a new mercy. To become
a Dionysian god and man who "cannot only afford the sight of the terrible and
questionable, but even the terrible deed"2s, and who can also, finally, be capable
of noble pity. Let us explore the above ideas in the context once more of The
Plumed Serpent.
Chapter XXIII of the novel, HuitzilpochtJi's Night, is perhaps the most infamous.
At its centre sits a ritualized scene of political execution-cum-sacrifice. Prisoners,
captured after a failed attempt on Ramon's life, are brought to the church of
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Quetzalcoatl and then stripped, bound, and killed. Two have their necks broken
with a cord; three are stabbed through the heart with a dagger by Cipriano. One
man, however, is pardoned; having received the 'green leaf of Malintzi', and here
lies a clue as to what kind of strong justice could possibly develop out of what
appears to be the most reactionary form of punishment. Following the public
executions, there is a private, male-only, ceremony held within the church,
during which human blood is sprinkled onto a fire and prayers offered.
Understandably, Kate is at first horrified: "When the women were shut out of the
church, Kate went home gloomy and uneasy. The executions shocked and
depressed her. ... It seemed to her all terrible will, the assertion of pure, awful
will" (PS, p.387). That is, something fixed and mechanical; something bullying -
not at all an act of spontaneous passion. But Kate's initial reaction eventually
gives way to an acceptance of her new husband's penchant to engage in a little
ritualized murder, because, she realizes, he kills in good conscience and with an
innocence that makes him truly one of the gods. Just as profound sexual
experience of a transgressive nature (usually anal sex in Lawrence, as we have
seen in chapter one) frees one from shame, so too it is suggested immoralism
leads to innocence in a wider context; and cruelty to compassion. If the active
cultivation of evil and a politics of transgression appears a dubious way of freeing
oneself from bad conscience, nevertheless there are, as Kate realises, "more ways
than one of becoming like a little child" (PS, p. 393). And perhaps it is the least
likely road which leads furthest; that we will become-children only by first
becoming-wild beasts. This, surely, is what Zarathustra is teaching in his
discourse Of the Three Metamorposes, in which the child who is "innocence and
forgetfulness, a new beginning'<v, is reached by way of the camel and the lion.
The hope of a new beginning (of reversing the myth of the Fall) is, as we have
seen earlier in this thesis, crucial to Nietzsche's and Lawrence's thinking; only a
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new beginning will allow us to arise as pristine beings, unashamed before
ourselves and free of all guilt. Beings with evil desires and capable of cruel acts,
but who are not made wretched and insane by the thought of such desires, or by
guilt over one's own deeds. When one becomes newly innocent, one becomes as a
child in spirit and, further; "one realizes one is among the gods" (PS, p.394).
It is this, the divine status of Ramon and Cipriano, who have become the living
Quetzalcoatl and Huitzilpochtli respectively, which ultimately sanctions their 'swift
cruelty' and murder of political prisoners in Kate's view: "when she remembered
his stabbing the three helpless peons, she thought: Why should I judge him? He
is of the gods ... what do I care if he kills people? His flame is young and clean."
( Ibid.)
This is certainly a remarkable leap of faith made by the woman who demonstrated
such a strong aversion to cruelty at the bull-fight which opened the novel. The
question is: are we, as readers, also as convinced by Don Ramon and Cipriano, to
the point at which we too can accept their divine revolutionary justice? Most
readers are not. And it undoubtedly does not help matters when one recognizes
that Lawrence himself is undecided on this question; seemingly losing faith in his
own project as carried out in The Plumed Serpent. Typically, Lawrence leaves
things radically incomplete so that we are never to find out whether the green leaf
of Malintzi sprouts into something worth cherishing, or simply whithers away.
Historical experience (gathered from such events as the Iranian Revolution we
mentioned earlier) seems to suggest the latter is the more likely scenario. Ramon
and Cipriano are never really given the opportunity to show that having learnt
how to kill in good faith, endure and impose great suffering, they have learnt also
to let go and show pity, not in a reactive manner, but in a truly noble fashion.
They are, that is to say, never given the chance to sit Zarathustra's final test:
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'''I desire beauty from no one as much as I desire it from you, you man of
power: may your goodness be your ultimate self-overcoming. I believe you are
capable of any evil; therefore I desire of you the good. In truth, I have often
laughed at the weaklings who think themselves good because their claws are
blunt!'''27
Part III: The Flight Back Into Paradise: Further Remarks on the New Innocence.
"But we storm the angel-guarded
Gates of the long-discarded
Garden
... and as victors we travel
To Eden home.
Back beyond good and evil
Return we." 1
As we saw in chapter one, for Lawrence and Nietzsche it is imperative that man
smash the hard-shell of himself and his civilization, so that he can be re-born
beneath open skies. Both shared the belief that the gates of the latter and the
selves we have been given do not protect us from evil and insanity, so much as
lock us into morality and reason; i.e., that these molar overcodings form more of
a prison to man than a genuine dwelling place, keeping us from the home outside
the gate from which we have long been exiled.
And where is man truly at home? Only in the presence of gods and demons and
in contact with other men and women, and with animals; his feet planted firmly
on the non-ideal soil of a genuine blood-homeland. This, at least, is the idea that
Lawrence continually returns to; even after having described the disintegration of
and future impossibility of such in The Rainbow. Nietzsche too seems unable to
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surrender the idea of paradise regained. Here, I would like to explore this notion
by picking up once more the debate to do with innocence and the question of
civilization which has been opened in the earlier chapters.
For Freud, in Civilization and Its Discontents, the problem is simple and
straightforward and can be reduced to the "irremediable antagonism between the
demands of instinct and the restrictions of civilization. "2 Like Nietzsche before
him, Freud argues that civilization is founded upon a repression of the instincts
and the 'guilt' which results from this repression, achieved via an internalization
of cruelty and the formation of a 'super-ego' (conscience).
For Freud, as we saw last chapter, this non-satisfaction of man's most powerful
instincts is not only necessary, but positively a good thing; civilization working in
the service of Eros and for the benefit of all men who are better off tamed in the
name of a universal love-ideal which Freud associates with life itself, than allowed
to give free expression to wild desires and passions which Freud claims are
derivative of and 'representative' of the 'death drive', or will to destruction. As
for the suffering caused by the development of guilt and the admitted loss of
instinctive happiness, this, says Freud, is simply "the price we pay for our
advance in civilization". 3
Effectively, then, Freud is arguing that we must choose between civilization - or
death. The former is thus sanctified as the sole means capable of resisting man's
destructive impulses and psychoanalysis reveals itself to be weakly pessimistic in
its fear of the 'unconscious' whilst naively optimistic in its faith that it can prevail
on behalf of civilization against the 'horror' it believes to be lurking there.
Politically. for all its surface radicalism. it forms a conservative force and ends
serving the powers of reaction and normalization. Thus Freudians ultimately part
company with true radicals such as Nietzsche and Lawrence. Whilst the latter
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accept the need for discipline and breeding (the active stylization of man and
culture as an aesthetic project), they reject the taming and repression of man (the
reactive subjectivation of man as a moral-rational machine). Further, they seek to
liberate those forces presently denied; not because they wish for death and
destruction, but because they wish to make people happier and free of bad
conscience. Nietzsche writes:
"Why do we fear and hate a possible reversion to
barbarism? because it would make people unhappier than they are? Oh no! The
barbarians of every age were happier: let us not deceive ourselves!"!
But there is a problem with hoping for a new barbarian force to come from the
outside; a problem that Lawrence identifies: "there are not now as in Roman
times, any great reservoirs of energetic barbaric life ... The world is very full of
people, but all fixed in civilizations of their own and they all have our vices, all
our mechanisms". 5 This being the case, it falls to a few relatively strong and
healthy 'barbarians' within to find a way forward. The meek have inherited the
world and so, as Ramon realizes, he must act to somehow 'un-tame' his people
and rekindle the active forces within them. But this will not be an easy task to
accomplish, after man has, as Nietzsche says, "inherited millennia of conscience-
vivisection and animal torture'< inflicted on himself; viewing his most natural
inclinations with an 'evil eye'. As Lawrence concedes: "it is nonsense to pretend
we can un-tame ourselves in five minutes. That, too, is a slow and strange
process, that has to be undertaken seriously. "7
But although the task may not be easy, it is not necessarily an impossible one.
Providing there are those few with sufficient vitality, then a 'reverse experiment'
should be possible, says Nietzsche, by which he means: "an intertwining of bad
conscience with perverse inclinations, all those other-worldly aspirations, alien to
the senses, the instincts, to nature, to animals, in short to all the ideals which up
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to now have been hostile to life and have deformed the world. ,,!!
This important passage not only provides us with a clear statement of what the
revaluation of values means (i.e., not just an escape from morality and reason,
"but an affirmation of and trust in all that has hitherto been forbidden, despised,
accursed:"). but reminds us once more that Nietzsche does not oppose all forms
of cruelty and experimentation practiced on the self; merely those attempts made
to devalue the flesh and life on earth.
Essentially, what Nietzsche is argumg - and Lawrence follows - is that both
individual and collective health can be restored only by accepting back into our
life as it is lived the repressed and rejected. This involves a sinking down into the
"the darkness and elemental consciousness of the blood" 10 and meeting one
another there. It is in this rather special sense that Lawrence affirms a new 'dark
age', which Henry Miller accurately describes as "a long night in which ... the few
rare spirits work with knowing mystery for the resurrection of a new body, a
new spirit, a new culture." 11
By suggesting that we need to listen to our blood and the dark gods which flow
through our veins, Lawrence counters the Christian prayer of baptism: "0
merciful God, grant the Old Adam in this child may be buried." 12 For according
to Lawrence, the 'Old Adam' or demonic aspect of man should be held in inner-
most respect. And while church fathers and Freudians may view the latter as a
"monster of perversity", it is they themselves who see with "the perverted vision
of the degenerate tame: tamed through thousands of shameful years." 13
Our task, then, is to seek out the Old Adam buried within; to become-blonde
beast and new barbarian. But this does not mean become savage and degenerate.
Rather, we seek the man whom Lou awaits in St Mawr, a short novel written by
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Lawrence shortly before work on The Plumed Serpent. Sick and tired of well-
domesticated modern man, Lou suggests to her mother that "'there's something
else besides mind and cleverness or niceness or cleanness. Perhaps it is the
animal. "'14 Her mother, Mrs. Witt, is not impressed. But Lou knows her mother
misunderstands her position and attempts to stress she is not arguing for
mindlessness, but, rather, for a complete animal-man (i.e., a combination of beast
and superbeast) who lives from the body and not just the mind alone. Still Mrs.
Witt is unconvinced, and suggests that her daughter is simply looking for a cave
man to come and club her over the head before then carrying her away with him.
To this, Lou replies:
'''Don't be silly mother! That's much more your subconscious
line. You admirer of Mind. I don't consider the cave man is a real human animal
at all. He's a brute, a degenerate. A pure animal man would be as lovely as a
deer or a leopard, burning like a flame fed straight from underneath .... He'd be
all the animals in turn, instead of one, fixed automatic thing, which he is now,
grinding on the nerves. "'IS
And if only, says, Lou, echoing Nietzche's desire, such men were commanders in
the world today!
Thus we can conclude that irrationalism and anti-humanism do not lead to brute
stupidity; that the latter, like spiritual-intellectual over-refinement, results from a
perversion of instinct and a falling away from the wholeness of complete being
into degeneracy. And just as the Old Adam would be other than the fear-
distorted caricature of the priestly mind, so too, Nietzsche and Lawrence insist as
we saw in chapter one, would a genuine civilization be other than an institution
for the taming of man, replete with barb-wire fences; it would be, above all,
founded upon other than guilt - a culture of innocence and the mystery of
lordship. A culture too formed upon the 'Morning Star' which rises between men
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collectively. For one achieves one's own perfect strength only Via relationship
with others and as part of a living-fellowship.
The realization that we have no individual selves in isolation is one of the great
shocks suffered by Kate: "She had thought that each individual had a complete
self, a complete soul, an accomplished I. And now she realized as plainly as if she
had turned into a new being, that this was not so" (PS, p.1OS). Hard as she finds
it, Kate has to accept that there is no ideal-individuality; only a self formed in
relation to others. Thus, as we have stressed throughout this thesis, for all their
talk 'anti-civilization', Nietzsche and Lawrence posit community and relationship
at the heart of their thinking; rejecting the very notion of the individual which is
so central to liberal thought.
We find our best strength in relation to others and from out of this comes also
the power of innocence; the power to accept oneself as a thing of forces and
flows and to forgive oneself for past 'crimes' (from scrumping to deicide).
Indeed, innocence also involves the ability to forget past deeds, past shames, past
stupidities, past fears and uncertainties; to forget that there is anything to feel
guilty about, or apologise for. When man can forget, then too can he rise
innocent before each new moment as though the past had no claim over him.
Man's self-overcoming is, then, in a very real sense, an overcoming of himself as
a historical construct. By liberating himself from the past, he is able to interpret
himself anew in the present and project himself differently into the future.
As we saw in chapter one, it is fatal to the living thing - be it the individual or
the collectivity - if it cannot close itself from the past, learning how to
discriminate and evaluate among memories (i.e., exercise a healthy will to power).
The stronger an individual or a people, however, the more history it will be able
to recall and assimilate without developing a bad conscience; the less it will be
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obliged to forget. Nietzsche refers to this as the 'plastic power' of an individual
or people. Those who could incorporate the entire historical experience of modern
humanity as their own and endure such (i.e., exhibit plastic power of superhuman
proportion), would consitute, according to Nietzsche, a new nobility: "the like of
which no age has yet seen or dreamed of." 16
Not only would such a new nobility be innocent, but they would be happy too
Nietzsche claims, for "if one could burden one's soul with ... the oldest, the
newest, losses, hopes, conquests, and the victories of humanity; if one could
finally contain all this in one soul and crowd it into a single feeling - this would
surely have to result in a happiness that humanity has not known so far: the
happiness of a god .. "17
Essentially, Lawrence agrees with this; agrees that what is important having
bitten and swallowed the apple of knowledge and fallen into self-consciousness
and bad conscience as a result, is that we need now to digest the fruit (maggot
and all). The revaluation is an attempt to help man over his indigestion. When
this is achieved - when the Old Adam is able to be free of belly-ache - then, and
only then, will man be free to re-enter Paradise and the New Eve pick fresh fruit
and consort with serpents as she pleases.
Lawrence chose to discard the following passage from The Plumed Serpent, but it
is particularly pertinent to our study here and forms a good conclusion to this
particular section of the work. Ramon tells Kate:
"'Go! tell them the Cross is a Tree again, and they may eat the fruit if they can
reach the branches. Tell them the snake coils in peace around the ankle of Eve,
and she no longer tries to bruise his head. The fruit of knowledge is digested.
Now we can plant the core'" (PS, appendix Ill, p.459).
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'The Cross is a Tree again' - i.e., a symbolic instrument of torture and sacrifice
upon which man has for the past 2000 years been crucified and self-divided into a
fatal dichotomy of mind and spirit contra flesh and blood, has been transformed
back into the sacred Tree of Life. And the fruit of this tree may be eaten; for
there is no longer any divine law or categorical imperative to prohibit us (God is
dead) - providing, that is, we can reach the branches; i.e., providing we are able
to surpass ourselves as a species, overcoming our humanity as formed by the old
morality and dare to live as giants and gods upon the earth.
'The snake coils in peace around the ankle of Eve, and she no longer tries to
bruise his head' - i.e., the New Eve in her nakedness and her new innocence has
overcome the burden of shame and fear which had robbed her and all the world
of sunshine and happiness. The serpent of desire has been accepted:
"It has its own raison d'etre. In its own being it has beauty and reality. Even my
horror is a tribute to its reality. And I must admit the genuineness of my own
horror, accept it, and not exclude it from my understanding ....
I must make my peace with the serpent of abhorrence that is within me. I must
own my secret shame and most secret desire ... who am I that I should hold
myself above my last or worst desire? My desires are me, they are the beginning
of me, my stem and branch and root. ...
I shall accept all my desires and repudiate none. It will be a sign of bliss in me
when I am reconciled with the serpent of my own horror, when I am free from
the fascination and the revulsion. For secret fascination is a fearful tyranny.
The serpent will have his own place in me, and I shall be free." I!!
'The fruit of knowledge is digested' - i.e., not only can we at last move beyond
good and evil, but so too can we overcome our obsession with having to 'know'
everything in our heads; overcome our fanatical will to truth. For 'now we can
154
plant the core' - i.e., now we can be free to experience life directly and come into
our own full being as creatures with bodies, not just minds. Now we can develop
a new culture based upon innocence, laughter, and forgetting, as well as a wider
(intuitive) consciousness and a new ethic; now at last we can have a true
civilization in which men are more than house-pets.
Back then to Eden; the garden of earthly delight which lies just West of Nod, that
twilight zone of sleep and death in which we have dreamt mad dreams and
suffered from ideal-delusions for far too long: '''Who sleeps shall wake! Who
sleeps shall wake!'" (PS, p.12S) sing the men of Quetzacoatl. And men shall
awaken they say in the way of the snake; ie., into earthly, sensual life.
This, then, is what Nietzsche's revaluation as mediated and illustrated by
Lawrence in The Plumed Serpent, means: the regaining of innocence and the flight
back into Paradise. This is where a politics of evil and cruelty, transgression and
the substantiation of mystery, is designed to lead us. But, as we concluded at the
end of chapter two, there are dangers and concerns to be faced here, as well as
delights to be won. For the road to Paradise is pitted with numerous black holes
and I would like to reopen discussion of these and offer some closing remarks.
Part IV: Closing Remarks.
IV.i. Revolutions are so vieux jeu.
For a while at least, Lawrence was to insist in letters that he did mean what
Ramon meant - 'for us all' - and that he regarded The Plumed Serpent as his
most important novel. But before long, the reservations concerning Ramon's
revolution, evident throughout the novel, resurface and Lawrence eventually
concedes with direct reference to the above that:
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"The hero is obsolete, and the leader of men is a back number. After all at the
back of the hero is the militant ideal: and the militant ideal, or the ideal militant,
seems to me a cold egg. We're sort of sick of all forms of militarism and
militantism ... "1
In part, the above was the result of Lawrence reacting to his own experience of
Italian fascism and German militarism. It now seemed clear that the only sure
outcome of revolution, be it of the fascist or the socialist variety, was an increase
in the bullying power of the modern state over the individual. Even a
predominantly religious revolution cl la The Plumed Serpent, with its establishment
of a "strange priest-controlled, ritual-fulfilled'< political order was now to be
rejected.
I have mentioned last chapter how Nietzsche's political philosophy is insufficiently
complex; his grasp of the economic and social realities of the modern world
remaining superficial. Although Lawrence does make some attempt in The Plumed
Serpent to accommodate his neo-Aztec revolution to the realities of modern
Mexico, ultimately the same criticism can be made of his social and political
thinking: naive and "no more trenchant or adequate than that of the typical
'romantic anti-capitalist'.":' W.H. Auden is not far off the mark therefore when
he says the political musings of The Plumed Serpent are not so much dangerous,
as silly, because they "treat the modern state as if it were a tiny parish and
politics as if it were an affair of personal relations". 4
Here, then, is a serious criticism of Nietzsche's and Lawrence's thinking: both
seem unable to resist the temptation to blur the "categorical and experiential
differences between the personal and the collective" and thus each frequently
attempts to "recast the collective in terms of a unitary personal image rather than
the difficult, plural realities of community. "5 It seems that each felt justified in
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doing this because each held onto the outmoded belief of conservative political
thinking, that one can equate the organization of the soul with that of the city, or
state. Thus there is a leaping back and forth from ontology to sociology and from
physiology to politics, with either an unawareness of the illegitimacy of so-doing,
or a wilful defiance of what is seen as a decadent notion of legitimacy. 6 This
becomes particulary problematic for some critics when the politics being
advocated is one that 'promotes' cruelty, based on observations, experiences, and
intuitions gathered in the personal realm. For whilst it may be the case that that
what doesn't kill the individual makes him stronger, this does not mean that we
need to affirm and promote pain and suffering unreservedly, nor institutionalize
them within society. Nor need our politics be based upon and reflect the fact that
life is violent, immoral, and unjust. The mistake that Nietzsche makes is that he;
"rushes from the insight that every person's life and actions involve a necessary
and sometimes desirable amount of suffering to the conclusion that misery,
exploitation, and violence in social and political life are inevitable and perhaps
desirable - so much so that their reduction ought not to be a goal of politics. "7
By 1929, Lawrence was prepared to admit of his own limitations, saymg that:
"As a novelist, I feel it is the change inside the individual which is my real
concern ... to know the feelings inside a man, and to make new feelings
conscious. "8 But as to then deciding what changes in the socio-political realm
based upon these new feelings need to be made, Lawrence now concedes that he
does not know. Or, at least, other men know better.
But this is not to say that Lawrence turns away completely from politics; merely
from politics on a macro- or molar-level and of a grand revolutionary nature. As
we will see in the following chapters, his political concerns post -Plumed Serpent
stay on the micro- or molecular-level to do with consciousness, the body, and
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desire; a radical politics interested in exploring new pleasures and new forms of
relation, in promoting new becomings and transformations for man, not in armed
up-rising and seizing the power of the state; a politics of tenderness and touch,
not terrorism and transgression. A politics also of survival and resistance,
designed to help the Old Adam and New Eve struggle through the Ruins and their
engagement with nihilism and the mechanical forces thereof.
Without wishing to anticipate too much of what is to be developed later on, or
repeat what has been said so far, I would like to make a few remarks about the
move from revolution to radical resistance. Perhaps the first and most obvious
question that presents itself is resistance against what and against whom? The
answer has to be against state power itself and against all those who serve the
bureaucracy of state power, flirt with state power, and/or desire state power for
themselves; including the would-be revolutionaries and ascetic political militants
such as Ramon and Cipriano. Resistance also against the temptation to find an
easy and absolute solution to the problems which face us; solutions of the kind
offered by the above and all those who subscribe to and promote the ideal '-isms'
of the twentieth century ("the various swindles of late modernity"). 9 According to
Daniel Conway, Nietzsche teaches us in Ecce Homo that one of the most
important things we can do today is; "commit our remaining volitional resources
to the resistance of idolatry and thus survive perhaps our engagement with
nihilism. Nietzsche consequently advocates a politics of resistance rather than a
politics of redemption or revolution. "10
By learning how to laugh at ourselves and those who would be our leaders, we
may be able to offer at least a "temporary defence against our 'natural' impulse to
implement a final resolution of our constitutive contradictions." 11 One of the
failings of The Plumed Serpent as a novel, is that it lacks this ability to laugh;
even if it does veer towards the unintentionally self-parodic at times. Realizing
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this, Lawrence allows a good deal more humour to enter into his post- Serpent
writings, the only 'sane' revolution now being one made for fun.12
But if Lawrence turns away from large-scale revolutionary politics it is not only
due to a sudden distaste for the perceived puritanism of militant leaders such as
Ramon, but also because he realizes that the above has to be if it is to be
successful in the modern world a mass ideal. Ramon is prepared to reluctantly
accept this, but Lawrence, ultimately, is not. And neither, for most of the time,
is Nietzsche, who writes: "the demagogic character and intention to appeal to the
masses is at present common to all political parties; on account of ths intention
they are all compelled to transform their principles into great al fresco stupidities
and thus to paint them on the wall." 13
Nietzsche concludes the above passage by quoting Voltaire: "Quand la populace se
mele de raisonner, tout est perdLi'l4 and, mostly, he argues that the noble few
must not simply become shepherds to the herd (i.e., leaders of the People).
Lawrence too stresses that the greatness of the great man resides in his ability
not merely to step ahead, but also step aside and his realization that there is no
need to concern himself with violent revolution and the smashing of city walls,
when he can simply "walk through the gates into the open world" 15 if he finds the
courage to do so. The great man knows at last that a new order of life cannot
consciously be pre-determined. Lawrence himself knew this before writing The
Plumed Serpent and realized its truth once again upon completing the novel. That
said, even after The Plumed Serpent Lawrence is not entirely able to conclude that
revolutions and cataclysms are unnecessary. But he seems to hope rather that the
cultivation of a new sensibility via education of the feelings is man's best hope for
the future. Of course, this is not as dramatic as the call to arms, but if what we
want is "to produce the new society of the future, gradually, livingJy" then it will
be "a slow job, but why not?" 16 It is a question of hatching the egg and not
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smashing it, or simply cleaning the nest in which the latter sits. In his stillest
moments, Ram6n knows this - even whilst half-tempted by Cipriano's desire to
crush the whole world like an egg in the coils of a serpent. Lawrence writes; "if
we are to break through, it must be in the strength of life bubbling inside us. The
chicken does not break the shell out of animosity against the shell. It bursts out
in its blind desire to move under a greater heaven." I 7
Nietzsche too, in his less hyperbolic mid-period, would agree that although
revolutionary violence can be the source of stimulation in a mankind grown weak
and decadent via the "resurrection of the most savage energies in the shape of the
long-buried dreadfulness and excesses of the most distant ages" 18 it can do no
more than this. Thus for a change of a truly profound nature, it requires
something other than this; not something bigger, more excessive, more violent,
but, on the contrary, 'small doses' of change over a long period of time:
"If a change is to be as profound as it can be, the means to it must be given in
the smallest doses but unremittingly over long periods of time! Can what is great
be created at a single stroke ? So let us take care not to exchange the state of
morality to which we are accustomed for a new evaluation of things head over
heels and amid acts of violence .. "19
This crucially important passage on 'small doses' concludes with explicit remarks
on the folly of revolutionary politics:
"It is now, indeed, also beginning to become apparent that the most recent
attempt at a great change in evaluations, and that in the political field - the 'Great
Revolution' - was nothing more than a pathetic and bloody piece of quackery
which knew how, through the production of sudden crises, to inspire in credulous
Europe the hope of a sudden recovery - and there with made all political invalids
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up to the present moment impatient and dangerous."2o
The above has, one would argue, to form a central part of any discussion of
Nietzsche's politics, particularly to do with the question of whether he is or is not
a revolutionary. If the above is no more indicative of the 'authentic' Nietzsche, or
any more quintessential than the later writings that do demand grand politics and
the seizure of history, nevertheless it does seem to offer a much more useful and
credible teaching at the beginning of the twenty-first century and can perhaps
mark the end of politics as understood and practiced within the modern age.
Having, in the twentieth century, seen both Russian and German revolutions
collapse into state terror and stupidity, we must surely have learnt in a brutal and
impressive manner that the greatest danger lies in accumulations of state power
and in those political options which whilst calling for great change. merely
recodify and reinscribe relations, leaving in place all the old mechanisms of the
state-machine.
IV.ii. The Question of Fascism Once More.
Firstly, it is important to stress that if Lawrence abandons revolution and
professes his distaste for militantism and militarism, he does so because he feels
such tactics are doomed to failure; i.e., he makes a strategic withdrawal from his
position in The Plumed Serpent and does not beat a horrified retreat. as is often
suggested, tacitly conceding the fascism of his own text and the need to reaffirm
a more liberal and humanist position. Those who argue that the letter quoted
earlier provides evidence that Lawrence drops his concern with power are
mistaken; or, as is frequently the case, deliberately misreading the above in order
to bring Lawrence closer to their own philosophical and political positions. We
often see this happening with Nietzsche too; liberal-humanist commentators fish
around for edifying passages with which to somehow neutralize the material which
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they find distasteful and disturbing.
The fact is, however, that neither Nietzsche nor Lawrence at any time renounce
their philosophy of power, nor abandon hopes of overturning Christian-moral
values and democratic political arrangements. They understand the risk that they
run by advocating the philosophy they do, namely that by giving assent to life as
will to power and the general economy of the whole "the way was open to others
.. , who would gather strength from lies and murder. "21 And, indeed, they do
make some attempt to ensure their work is not misused by the ressentiment-
ridden, whilst ultimately accepting this risk; the risk of a fascist appropriation
which sees their call for a new substantiation of mystery degraded into party-
political dogma and a debased form of idolatry. However, the unfortunate fact is
that The Plumed Serpent gives us an imaginative glimpse of a positive potential
culture and an uncanny prefiguration of what is to follow in Nazi Germany.
For some critics of course, there is no distinction to be made between the
philosophy and politics of The Plumed Serpent and national socialism; the latter is
not the doppelganger of the former, but one and the same. Both can be described
as volatile mixtures of "rebellious emotions and reactionary social ideals". 22
Admittedly, the novel does attempt to "retrieve old, supplanted faculties [and] use
them to advance some form of cultural evolution.v= For in a very real sense, as
we have mentioned earlier, The Plumed Serpent is Lawrence's fantastic and frantic
attempt to recodify both the world within his own fiction and wider society, via
his own mythology; i.e., to form neo-territorialities by "reintroducing code
fragments, resuscitating old codes, inventing pseudo-codes or jargons." 24
Unfortunately, such neo-territorialities are, at best, "artificial, residual,
archaic"25 and, at worst, fascistic. But, importantly, if the above forms a valid
description of the process being carried out in The Plumed Serpent, it also
provides a model by which the entire experience of the modern world can be
162
understood; a model of oscillation from one pole of delirium to another; from
decodification to recodification; from deterritorialization to reterritorialization.
Liberal-democratic society operates in this manner under capital, just as surely as
does fascist or nee-Aztec society. As Deleuze and Guattari say:
"Born of decoding and deterritorialization on the ruins of the despotic machine,
these societies are caught between the Urstaat that they would like to resuscitate
as an overcoding and reterritorializing unity, and the unfettered flows that carry
them toward an absolute threshold ... they are torn in two directions: archaism
and futurism, nee-archaism and ex-futurism, paranoia and schizophrenia ... They
are continually behind or ahead of themselves. "26
Because there are numerous and "astonishing oscillations of the unconSCIOUS,
from one pole of delirium to the other" 27. however. sometimes an unexpected
force of radical change can break free "even in the midst of the worst
archaisms" 28 or. on the other hand, revolutionary force can quickly turn fascist.
reproducing old power-mechanisms and falling back into the most terrible
stupidities of the past.
To reiterate and conclude, we are conceding the relation between fascism and
Nietzschean philosophy; both involve intense lines of flight into the heterogeneous
realm and both can legitimately be characterized as war-machines. Further, both
offer a consummation of modern European nihilism; but it is here they differ
radically. For whereas Nietzsche's perfected nihilism is a form of pure destruction
in terms of self-overcoming and the negation of the negative itself, fascism is a
form of decadent disintegration which refuses to surrender its own fixed will and
self-identity to the process of death and resurrection. It is this will to
preservation and love of self which differentiates fascism from Nietzschean
thought. Ultimately, fascism is only another form of grand idealism acting in the
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name of love (as we suggested last chapter): love of self, of nation, of race, of
leader. Community-Identity-Stability: these are the ideals of the Third Reich (in
theory, if not practice) as of Huxley's Brave New World; the literary counterpart
to Lawrence's Plumed Serpent. 29 The ideals in fact of utopian thinkers and prison
camp builders; i.e., those who secretly lust after that which they fear most -
anarchy and corruption.
Of course, again as we saw last chapter, if love can become corrupted from a
divine process into a fixed goal and obscene ideal, so too can power. For it too
can be transformed into a metaphysical 'thing' to be possessed and worked from
the will. When power becomes degraded into something mechanical and an
attribute of the human will, then it too has ugly consequences. And if Lawrence
edges away from Ramon it is because he realizes the error made in fixing power
into a revolutionary political form and substantiating the mystery of power in
terms of the military.
IV.iii. Heidegger's Letter on Humanism.
If Lawrence does not move away from a philosophy of power, neither does he
abandon his anti-humanism, unlike those post-war intellectuals who thought that
the only possible response to totalitarianism and the only possible way to
safeguard Europe from future tyranny was to make a retreat to the safety limits
of rational-humanism (coupled to the politics of Marx). Of course, after all the
many horrors and atrocities of the 1930's and '40's, it is understandable to want
to hide behind the tricolore once more and reaffirm the principles of the
Enlightenment. But it is a mistaken response nonetheless. And what IS not
understandable and what must represent the greatest loss of philosophical courage
imaginable, is how a number of the so-called 'new philosophers' in the 1970's and
'80's also advocated a return to old values; in order, they claimed, to counter the
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threat of neo-fascism and to provide themselves with the grounds upon which to
assemble a defence of 'human rights'. We feel as Kate felt when Ram6n announced
he was looking for God once more - it's a creeping back into old forms and
hollow shells due to a sort of sentimentalism. I would argue that the very last
thing we need to do today is make a return to the metaphysics of the subject and
a humanist philosophy founded upon a revised understanding of the cogito.
Of course, it may well be that Camus is right in saying that if a man wishes to
live and die as a man, then he must "refuse to be a god". 30 Lawrence concedes
this point after The Plumed Serpent, writing for example in Lady Chatterley's
Lover with no doubt an ironic backward glance at Ram6n and Cipriano that: "'One
has to ... have a heart and a penis, if one is to escape being either a god or a
bolshevist - for they are the same thing: they're both too good to be true'"
(LCL, p.39). But if this marks a turning of some sort. it does not signify a
return to the old understanding of the humanitas of homo human us. Lawrence
maintains as strongly after The Plumed Serpent as before it (in essential
agreement with Nietzsche), that it is not the denial of humanism and humanist
values that leads to nihilism, but the positing of such ideals in the first place. For
when, inevitably, such values collapse and man is forced to realize that he has
dedicated himself to nothingness all along (the nothingness he sought to avoid and
counter), then love recoils into hatred and the malice of rage.
Thus it is not Nietzsche's philosophy of power (or evil) which is the real and
continuing danger today, but the insistence on love and an old morality even
when the latter has been exposed as the product of impotence and ressentiment.
It is the 'new humanism' which constitutes the reaction within politics today; not
Nietzsche's aristocratism. There may well be the need for a new ethic; but fear
does not form such, any more than pain constitutes an argument. If we can no
longer indulge in Nietzsche's somewhat romantic immoralism, still we can point
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out that it is not the latter that leads to nihilism, but the metaphysics of love and
reason.
The neo-humanists are not wrong to argue that a Nietzschean politics is vitalist
and more concerned with power than 'rights'; not mistaken when they claim this
will mean that questions of justice, for example, will be resolved upon the basis
of strength. But they are wrong to automatically assume this is undesirable and
inherently fascistic; as if somehow weakness is morally superior and that
innocence equates with impotence and is more likely to guarantee the security and
well-being of man. They either fail to grasp, or refuse to see, the crucially
important lesson of Nietzsche's Genealogy: real goodness grows from strength;
out of weakness comes spite, pettiness, fanaticism and the will to the denial of
life. Ultimately, it is the strong alone who can grant and guarantee the rights with
which the neo-humanists are so concerned. And ultimately, as we have seen, only
those with claws can show compassion.
This entire debate is perhaps best summarized and, to my mind, resolved in
Heidegger's Letter on Humanism which, in providing a magnificent response to
Sartre's Marxist-existentialist brand of post-War humanism, gives a strong
defence not only to his own philosophical position, but that of Nietzsche and
Lawrence too. In a crucial section, Heidegger writes:
"Because we are speaking
against 'humanism' people fear a defense of the inhuman and a glorification of
barbaric brutality. For what is more 'logical' than that for somebody who negates
humanism nothing remains but the affirmation of inhumanity?
Because we are speaking against 'logic' people believe we are demanding that the
rigor of thinking be renounced and in its place the arbitrariness of drives and
feelings be installed and thus that 'irrationalism' be proclaimed as true, For what
is more 'logical' than that whoever speaks against the logical is defending the
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alogical?
Because we say that the Being of man consists in being-in-the-world people find
that man is downgraded to a merely terrestrial being, whereupon philosophy sinks
into positivism. For what is more 'logical' than that whoever asserts the
worldliness of human beings holds only this life as valid, denies the beyond, and
renounces all 'Transcendence'?
Because we refer to the word of Nietzsche on the 'death of God' people regard
such a gesture as atheism. For what is more 'logical' than that whoever has
experienced the death of God is godless? ...
What is going on here? People talk about 'humanism', 'logic', 'values', 'world',
and 'God'. They hear something about opposition to these. They recognize and
accept these things as positive ... they immediately assume that that which speaks
against something is automatically its negation and that this is 'negative' in the
sense of destructive ....
But does the 'against' which a thinking advances against ordinary opmion
necessarily point toward negation and the negative? This happens ... only when
one posits in advance what is meant by the 'positive' and on this basis makes an
absolute and absolutely negative decision about the range of possible opposition to
it. ...
To think against 'values' is not to maintain that everything interpreted as 'a value'
... is valueless. Rather, it is important to finally realize that precisely through the
characterization of something as 'a value' what is so valued is robbed of its
worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued
is admitted only as an object for man's estimation. "31
In other words, valuing does not let things be in their own right; it allows things
validity only when useful to man. This is what Nietzsche thinks of as nihilism and
Lawrence describes as 'blasphemous living'. It is this they challenge via the
project of revaluation. And it is in this challenge that one can locate an ethic;
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something which those who oppose the revaluation say is impossible to find
within an 'irrationalist ontology' and/or a politics of evil (philosophy of power).
Despite what some may choose to believe, there can thus be a post-moral ethic,
just as, prior to Plato, even though thinking knew not of morality, it still had an
ethical content and concern. Beyond good and evil, as Nietzsche emphasized on a
number of occasions, does not mean beyond good and bad. As we saw in Part I
of this chapter, there can even be a post-moral religion, with post-moral gods,
should we desire to formulate such on the basis of a newly affirmative will to
power. But any such post-moral ethic or religion will have to be grounded in two
things above all: the body and the earth. This is not to posit a form of blut und
baden idealism, or a spurious racial-national mysticism as the Nazis attempted;
rather, it is to suggest the need for a genuine libidinal materialism which values
the physical and sensual world of desire and which encourages a respect for all
living things as things in their own right.
"Mortals dwell in the way they safeguard the Fourfold in its essential
unfolding" 32, says Heidegger. That is, mortals dwell in that they save the earth,
receive the sky, await the gods, and, finally, in that they initiate their own
becoming. As George Steiner says: "There are meaner metaphors to live by.,,:n
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Chapter N: Tenderness: The Philosophy of
Becoming and the Politics of Desire.
Part I: Theoretical and General Opening Remarks.
I.i. The Significance of Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover,'
We concluded the last chapter by arguing that there is a need ultimately to move
away from theoretical terrorism and molar ambitions, toward a micro-politics at
the level of desire and the body. It is precisely such a move that Lawrence makes
in his late fiction, which includes his most controversial novel, Lady Chatterley's
Lover (LCL), and the two-part tale entitled The Escaped Cock (EC), which forms
the main point of reference in our next and final chapter.
Often, commentators have failed to understand the significance of the above move
made by Lawrence. Thus it is that we frequently encounter the following sort of
remark appearing in the critical literature: "tenderness is to be a private and
sexual thing, without any of the political overtones we have become accustomed
to in recent novels. "2 This remark fails to appreciate what Lawrence means by
'tenderness' and misses the significance of what Lawrence is attempting to
achieve. As I will argue and seek to demonstrate here, tenderness (essentially
Lawrence's term for desire) is productive of social reality and sexuality far from
being a private and apolitical matter is very much of social and political import.
As Bataille says: "The world of lovers .. lis I .. no less true than that of politics" 3
- in fact, it is one and the same world. We should not, therefore, fall into the
error of thinking that Lady Chatterley's Lover is any the less a politically
significant and engaged novel than the earlier works concerned with power,
simply because it deals primarily with sensual pleasure. If this 'obscene miracle' of
a book eroticizes Nietzsche's philosophical project, the central objective remains
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the same (revaluation of all values) and it constitutes a radically experimental
development of Lawrence's own earlier fiction. The concern is still to challenge
customary constraints applied to the active powers of the body and to reconnect
man woman with those forces and flows outside the gate, but without this time
making the mistake of The Plumed Serpent and "surrendering to the archaic
phantasms that had infiltrated our speech acts, our hearts and our deepest, most
unconscious desires, functioning as the most sinister kind of fifth column". 4
Ultimately, then, I wish to argue that Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover,
concerned as it is with examining the workings of desire within industrial
capitalism and with the strange becomings of its central characters, IS a
'schizoanalysis' of the kind fully theorized by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-
Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. It therefore makes sense and proves of great
value to carefully relate the above novel to these works and to discuss it in the
philosophical terms which they provide. Obviously there are differences between
Lawrence and Deleuze and Guattari, but in all three we find before us those
'philosophical physicians' whom Nietzsche anticipated; i.e., those who muster the
courage to push thinking to its limits and risk the proposition that: "what was at
stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all 'truth' but something else. Let
us say, health, future, growth, power, life. "5
In other words, what Lawrence attempts in Lady Chatterley's Lover and what
Deleuze and Guattari attempt in their work, is to "listen to the voice of the
healthy body" which alone speaks "the meaning of the earth". b An incisive reading
of Lady Chatterley's Lover is one that has in turn listened to this voice echoing
within the text; the voice which affirms the body's own experience directed
against all that is egoic and celebratory of all that belongs to impersonal joy. For
joy is one of the most important words in the vocabulary of desire. Thus whilst
there is horror and death in Lady Chatterley's Lover, there is also much gaiety
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and, indeed, as Bataille correctly claims: "It would be inexcusable to speak of
eroticism without saying essentially that it centres on joy. A joy, moreover, that
is excessive" 7 and which takes place beyond good and evil. However, let us note
in closing, that we are not suggesting that joy is the great be-all and end-all; nor
that laughter is the great solution to the problems presented by the modern
world. As Lawrence writes in The First Lady Chatterley (FLC): "the world was
so full of cant and spurious emotions, the most decent thing one could do was
mock it all. One must be able to laugh at everything. At the same time, one
cannot laugh everything away" (FLC, pp.211-12). And thus the politics of desire
also retains the right to make war as well as love.
Lii. From Pollyanalyticsf to Schizoanalysis.
As conceded above, there are differences between Lawrence's work and that of
Deleuze and Guattari, but there are enough points of contact and similarity to
allow us to legitimately move freely from pollyanalytics to schizoanalysis; perhaps
the most important of these being the shared hostility to Freud's work, not least
of all his understanding of desire. Lawrence claims to be grateful to Freud for
insisting on an element of sex in all human relations; "thankful that Freud pulled
us somewhat to earth. "9 And yet, for Lawrence as for Deleuze and Guattari,
Freudian analysis is ultimately unacceptable, founded as it is upon reactive
interpretations, bourgeois fantasies and motifs, love of ego, and a false
materialism. The above are not content to see sex reduced to the level of the
'dirty little secret' and desire constrained within oedipal mythology. Nor are they
prepared to accept the reduction of the entire world to a series of representations
formed by the consciousness of a rational human subject. For Lawrence, Deleuze,
and Guattari, the oedipal and the egoic are precisely what must be overcome and
they fight against them ferociously and unceasingly in their works with every
weapon at their disposal.
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Thus, whilst as Frank Kermode argues, Freud and Lawrence "were in a sense
talking about the same thing, an epochal sickness with deep roots in the past and
... a malfunction of sexual relationships within the culture" 10, Lawrence soon
parts company from Freud and evolves an essentially different (and opposed)
project. For Lawrence, again as for Deleuze and Guattari, Freud does not go far
enough; he is seen to be constantly retreating from the radical implications of his
own theories and such conservative timidity is the reason that he fails to reach
the unconscious that he intially sets off in search of with such courage; this and
the fact that he does not know how to approach or handle the body, fearing the
flesh in its naked materiality.
Because he has no real appreciation of the body and its active forces, Freud's
unconscious is little more than a negative projection of consciousness itself, and it
means that his understanding of sexuality is also formed by the reactive forces of
rational consciousness and bad conscience. Deleuze and Guattari are keen to stress
that Lawrence has a more accurate and profound evaluation of sexuality than
Freud; one that is 'cosmo-illogical' rather than 'psycho-logical'. They write: "we
admit that any comparison of sexuality with cosmic phenomena such as 'electrical
storms' ... in the end appears to us more adequate than the reduction of sexuality
to the pitiful little familialist secret ... even from the viewpoint of the famous
scientificity. "11
What is particularly remarkable about Lawrence's reading of Freud, however, is
how unusual it was for its time. As Anne Fernihough reminds us; "Freud was
more commonly seen by his own contemporaries to have subverted, not
reinforced, this rationalist tradition." 12 That is to say, more commonly seen as a
great liberator, not as someone who sets out to posit an ideal ego as the ultimate
coercive and imperialistic force of occupation. Lawrence reacts with horror to the
formula that reads 'where id was, there ego shall be', seeing in this the
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declaration of the mind's ambition to triumph over and murder the body; "a
subjection of the spontaneous sources of living to the 'psychic mechanical law'." 13
Deleuze and Guattari agree; Freud offers a reactive and tyrannical model of the
human 'psyche', from which he draws conservative political and social conclusions
in works such as Civilization and Its Discontents (see chapters two and three).
Today, perhaps to a greater extent than ever before, psychological categories and
political categories continue to reinforce one another. As Nietzsche predicted (and
feared), the state has entered the soul in terrifying and previously unimaginable
new ways and thus needs to be engaged on a micro-political level. Marcuse
writes:
"The traditional border lines between psychology on the one side and
political and social philosophy on the other have been made obsolete by the
condition of man in the present era: formerly autonomous and identifiable
psychical processes are being absorbed by the function of the individual in the
state - by his public existence. Psychological problems therefore turn into
political problems. "14
There is therefore no longer a public/private dichotomy or distinction to be made
and "private disorder reflects more directly than before the disorder of the
whole." 15 This is something which Deleuze and Guattari also stress in their work,
as they seek to demonstrate how "almost all personal and private problems ...
have social, political, and economic sources'T" and how, on the other hand, the
desires and drives which work through the individual also infect and invest social
reality, producing subjects and cultures alike. Schizoanalysis exposes time and
again "the influence of the unconscious on the conscious, the role of the
preconceptual and nonconceptual in the conceptual, the presence of the irrational
... at the very core of the rational." 17 If we have become only too expert when it
comes to examining the mechanical functions and reactive forces of consciousness
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and then mistaking these for life in its entirety, schizoanalysis is a means by
which we can begin to understand a little better the active forces that belong to
the economy of desire mentioned above; those forces which we saw in chapters
two and three branded by moralists and rationalists as 'evil' and monstrous (the
forces of the Old Adam in his phallic glory and the New Eve in her cunt-
triumph). If in this thesis we argue for the affirmation of these forces, it is
because they alone have the potential to transform man (making lovers of us all)
and bringing about the revaluation of values: And it is not only that they
transpose the feeling of values;
"the lover is more valuable, is stronger .... His
whole economy is richer than before, more powerful, more complete than in those
who do not love. The lover becomes a squanderer: he is rich enough for it. Now
he dares, becomes an adventurer, becomes an ass in magnanimity and innocence
.. , this happy idiot grows wings and new capabilities" . IX
As we shall see in part Il.ii., Mellors - the lover - provides a perfect illustration
of this; via tenderness making the leap into the Fourth Dimension of bliss and the
'peace that comes of fucking', as well as back into the social world of existence.
And we shall see also how he becomes, as a lover, a world-creator. as opposed to
those who cannot love, merely bully with their will-worked benevolence, who
become at last world-destroyers and life-haters. Today. to paraphrase Marcuse.
the political fight is a fight waged by lovers for life itself - and this is a politics
of desire.
Liii, Towards a Politics of Desire.
We ask the wrong question if we ask the metaphysical question what is desire?
For this demands a metaphysical response which cannot legitimately be supplied,
as desire has no fixed essence to be identified as such. Better, then, to ask how
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does desire work (i.e., what effects does it have)? Here we can answer by saying
that desire brings into touch "things which are otherwise incommensurable" 19 and
functions primarily as a "strange current of interchange that flows between men
and men, and men and women, and men and things."2o Crucially, this constant
current of interflow is beyond the control of the ego; or, at least, it should be,
even though decadents such as Clifford Chatterley invariably attempt to force the
flow of desire via the ego, frightened as they are of all that isn't fixed and so
cannot be known; of all that flows external to themselves. This fear convinces
them to deny the evidence of their own senses and to believe that because they
can build bridges across the greatest of rivers everything can thus be held in
place and stabilized: "When water is planked over so that it can be walked upon
... truly, he is not believed who says 'Everything is in flux'. "21 Only now, in this
time of modern European nihilism, our bridges are falling down and our 'eternal
values' have likewise collapsed. Like it or not, we are obliged to once more sink
or swim within those rivers of desire which we thought we had integrated so
perfectly into our industrial sewerage systems: "solar rivers, pathological rivers,
rivers of sex, madness, literature, and plague which refuse to slumber wretchedly
in their banks. "22
We wish, then, to think of desire in terms of all kinds of flows; but perhaps
above all in terms of sexual and social flows and the intimate relation between
them. The politics of desire, certainly as developed by Lawrence and later in the
work of Deleuze and Guattari, stresses how "beneath the conscious investments of
economic, political, religious etc. formations, there are unconscious sexual
investments that attest to the way in which desire is present in the social field". 23
But we need to be careful here. For whilst the question of sexuality is central to
Lady Chatterley's Lover as to Lawrence's work in general, he does not posit,
unlike Wilhelm Reich, for example, sexuality at the core of his cultural and
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political thinking. For unlike Freud and his followers, Lawrence does not argue
that all is sex. In fact, Lawrence is at pains to point out in fantasia and other
works, that whilst an element of sex can be said to enter all human activity, this
does not mean everything can or should be reduced to sex: "And a sexual motive
is not to be attributed to all human activities. "24 The politics of desire is not,
therefore, simply another form of sex radicalism. It is far more subtle and much
further reaching than this; just as desire is more than just the flow of sex alone.
incorporating as it does a creative (or what Lawrence terms 'religious') impulse
that is distinct from the sexual urge though related to it.
It is this creative impulse, which, Lawrence argues. is the world-forming drive,
which not only does psychoanalysis deny. or obscure by its reducing all to sex.
but which the reactive forces of corporate-media capitalism also seek to suppress.
For whilst capitalism is perfectly content to eroticize society and oblige us to
accept and believe in sex as the great truth of ourselves (as Foucault has
demonstrated), it is not comfortable with the unregulated expression of the
creative impulse; i.e., that drive which is iibersexusl and an urge towards "the
great unison of manhood in some passionate purpose. "25
What Lawrence argues is that after the act of coition, the blood of both parties is
made new and there arises a subsequent desire to make the whole world anew.
Thus. as we shall see, no sooner has Mellors fucked Connie Chatterley than his
desire switches from a sexual desire for the woman, to a social desire to find
male comrades with whom to fight the forces of industrial-capital and with whom
he can found a new, non-slavish, community. Lawrence asks: "Is this new craving
for polarized communion with others, this craving for a new vision, is it sexual,
like the original craving for the woman?"26 and answers in the negative. insisting
that the "meeting of many in one great passionate purpose is not sex, and should
never be confused with sex. It is a great motion in the opposite direction.v-?
176
Thus for Lawrence, and again contra the sex radicals, just as sex is not the great
be-all and end-all of human existence, nor is 'sexual liberation' the great solution
to our social, political, and cultural crisis of values. So keen is Lawrence to
emphasize his difference from those who would argue otherwise, that he says if
sex were ever accepted as the prime or exclusive motive in life, then the world
would drift "into despair and anarchy". 28 If we are to avoid this, then the sexual
motive has to be subordinated to the greater creative purpose. This does not
mean denial, however, and the politics of desire emphasizes that we cannot afford
to ignore sex as a vital concern. It is crucial that we get our sexual life
established on a new basis; a non-oedipalized basis. If we do not accomplish this
then any attempt to create a new social order via a politics of desire is doomed to
fail: "no great purposive passion can endure long unless it is established upon the
fulfilment in the vast majority of individuals of the sexual passion. "29 For sex,
as Lawrence argues, is our deepest consciousness and a 'democracy of touch' -
our main concern in this chapter - will only be initiated by those phallically
conscious men and cunt-aware women who have risen out of the blood and into
the new flesh as sexually transformed and fulfilled beings. In other words, the
democracy of touch will be fucked into existence between man and woman both; a
libidinal culture of desire (or, as Nietzsche would say, culture as physis). If sex
as an end in itself leads to disaster, it remains the case on the other hand that:
"ideal purpose which has no roots in the deep sea of passional sex is a greater
disaster still" 30, leading to the barren sterility of modern business and political
life.
If the reactive distortion and commercial manipulation of our sex is an issue,
perhaps the greater problem is the frustration of man's creative and social
instinct. For when man experiences the denial of this latter drive. then "he feels
lost. and is lost. "31 And what is nihilism at last other than man losing his way
from and to himself?
177
But if man is lost and 'alienated' from himself, still more is he cut off from
others as our civilization perfects itself ideally via its technology and vibrates with
a kind of 'anti-desire' that results in "physical recoil from every other living
thing and every form of physical existence. "32 Man makes a mistaken retreat into
the isolation of his own ego, falling further and further out of touch and into the
world of representation and the simulacrum. Deleuze and Guattari know that the
first and most important task of schizoanalysis is that of: "tirelessly taking apart
egos and their presuppositions; liberating the pre-personal singularities they
enclose and repress". 33 But, importantly, this can only be done on a collective
level, as Lawrence also recognized:
"for it is only when we can get a man to fall
back into his own true relation to other men, and to women, that we can give him
an opportunity to be himself. So long as men are inwardly dominated by their
isolation, their own absoluteness, which is after all but a picture or an idea,
nothing is possible but insanity more or less pronounced. Men must get back into
touch. And to do so they must forfeit their vanity and the noli me tangere of
their own absoluteness: also they must utterly break the present great picture of
a normal humanity: shatter that mirror in which we all live grimacing: and fall
again into true relatedness. "34
Essentially, the above sets the agenda for schizoanalysis and the politics of desire.
In Lady Chatterley's Lover, Lawrence shows how Clifford Chatterley fails to do
any of the above and thus ends in a state of degraded and infantile lunacy.
Although his failure is instructive, we are not here concerned with Clifford's case.
Rather, it is the positive-becornings of the lovers, Connie and Mellors, which we
wish to examine in Part II; to see how they do manage to fall into 'true
relatedness'. Following, in Part III, we shall go on to see how the lovers are
carried by desire towards a new tomorrow and an ever-greater network of
relations; how their tale hints at a 'revolution of desire' which promises a new
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social body (without organs) which Lawrence terms, as we have seen, a
democracy of touch: "neither an ideal society, nor the result of an anticipated
historical development. Instead, it is immanent 'here and now', present in the
bonds that exist between people ... the aim of the politics of desire is to intensify
these bonds". 35
I.iv. The Body.
All of philosophy to date has been, says Nietzsche, a misunderstanding of the
body. This would be regrettable enough if the above misunderstanding had
resulted merely in a stupid and unnecessary amount of suffering imposed on the
body (most obviously but not exclusively in its sexual aspect), but it has also had
a far wider significance and effect. Precisely because contempt has been taught for
the body and for the earth: "All questions of politics, the ordering of society,
education, have been falsified down to their foundations". 36
The body, then, is never exclusively a question of biology. Not only does the
body not exist outside of history, but, perhaps more importantly, history does
not exist outside of bodies. Thus a concern with how the active forces of the
body have been 'tamed', 'silenced', and 'exploited' via a great many distinct
regimes (and how the body constructs resistances) obliges us to simultaneously
produce a political analysis. Radical political theorists are today not those who
instruct on seizing the power of the state, but on how to regenerate the body and
revive the passionate instincts, proliferating the number of resistances. If, as
argued in chapter one, nihilism is the logical outcome of what Nietzsche identifies
as a 'pathological condition', and sexual decadence is related to this, then perhaps
sexual regeneration may prove vital to the eventual overcoming of nihilism. Thus
to rethink the question of the body is imperative and is precisely what many
post-Nietzschean writers (including Lawrence) have attempted to do,
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transforming philosophy in the process.
In Lady Chatterley's Lover the suggestion IS given that we must return to the
body and seek there other (active) forces and a different form of consciousness.
If we are to establish a democracy of touch, then we will need to change the way
we think, speak, and understand the world; including ourselves as part of - and
not apart from - the world: "There are many ways of knowing, there are many
sorts of knowledge", writes Lawrence. "But the two ways of knowing, for man,
are knowing in terms of apartness, which is mental, rational, scientific, and
knowing in terms of togetherness, which is religious and poetic." 37 He continues:
"When the great crusade against sex and the body started in full blast with Plato,
it was a crusade for 'ideals' and for the 'spiritual' knowledge in apartness." 38
What Connie and Mellors attempt is to know in togetherness; accepting that the
most vital knowledge comes, as Tommy Dukes (a minor but important character
in the novel) puts it; '''out of the whole corpus of the consciousness, out of your
belly and penis [or vaginal as much as out of your brain or mind'" (LCL, p.37).
This, of course, is what Nietzsche refers to in Zarathustra as the 'greater
intelligence' of the body. 39 When man 'falls' he does so not into 'sin', but into
abstraction and apartness; i.e., he falls out of touch and into the isolation of his
own ego a la Clifford Chatterley. Lawrence, following Nietzsche, puts the blame
for this on Socrates, Plato, and Christ, and he continually rages against a life
lived outside of the flow of desire and which denies the body and the body's
instincts; because such a life invariably becomes hateful and destructive of the
physical world. It is this anti-physical will to negation which so shocks and
depresses Connie as she drives through the mining districts of industrial England;
"it was as if dismalness had soaked through and through everything, the utter
negation of natural beauty, the utter negation of the gladness of life ... the utter
death of the human intuitive faculty was appalling" (LCL, p.152).
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It is such despair that forces Connie to do two things: firstly, seek out refuge in
the arms of her lover, Mellors, a man in whom the 'intuitive faculty' was
relatively unmaimed (certainly in comparison to her husband); and, secondly, set
out on a quest to 'get back' her own body, hope residing in the mystery and
complexity of the resurrected flesh. In fact, so convinced is Connie of this latter
point that she imagines a whole future not just for herself, but for all men and
women, based upon the body; a future contra Clifford's 'spiritual' life hereafter
and a time of: '''amazing physical awarenesses! and marvellous delicate contacts,
touches, between men and women ... with quite different sorts of consciousness
from ours: silent, and intuitive, and physical like perfume'" (JTLl, p.244).
Of course, such men and women of the future will be transformed beings; over
and beyond their old humanity as defined and characterized by moral-rationalism.
And perhaps equally obvious is that the first such 'over-human' men and women
(as well as those higher human types who hint towards them) will be feared and
hunted down by civilized modern man. Thus it is that we see Mellors, for
example, forced out of his job, his home, and his community; regarded by the
local people as "more monstrous and shocking than a murderer like Crippen"
(LCL, p.267).40 This is not due to his sexual relationship with Connie per se, but
more because of the fact that neither he nor Connie show any signs of guilt or
shame even when the affair has become public; on the contrary, they find a
source of pride and strength in their illicit lovemaking. It is the forming of a new
sensibility (a new innocence) being beyond good and evil which is so intolerable;
for it threatens to overturn 2,500 years of Christian morality,which, as Nietzsche
says, has "taught deprecation, neglect, or tormenting of the body and men to
torment and deprecate themselves on account of the drives that fill them". 41 It is
because of this that, even today, we still do not know what a body can do or is
capable of; still cannot accept that the organism with which we have overcoded
the body's forces is simply an invention and imposition of reactive consciousness.
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Constructing a new form of consciousness and a 'body without organs' is one of
the central concerns of Lady Chatterley's Lover and this chapter. We shall
illustrate how Connie attempts to achieve this in Part II.i., but let us offer a few
brief theoretical remarks here first on this operation.
The orgamsm, as indicated above, is an ideal imposition of the mind itself; an
ideally organ-ized body that Lawrence refers to in his writing as the 'corpse-
body'. The task that schizoanalysis sets itself is to dis-organ-ize the organism
and to build a body without organs; delivering man from all his automatic
reactions. Such a breakthrough can only be reached via a breaking down and a
breaking open. But this is not accomplished with tricks and nor does it have
anything to do with the modern pornographic desire to expose the body, which is
a self-conscious "flaunting of the body in its non-physical, merely optical
aspect+? and which indicates simply how undesirable we have become to one
another. The less individuals receive and transmit the flow of desire, the more
desperately, according to Lawrence, do they expose their corpse-bodies, but
without ever reaching their true nakedness (for they have none); in or out of her
knickers makes very little difference to the desirability of the modern woman:
"She's a finished off ego, an assertive conscious entity, cut off like a doll from
any mystery. And her nudity is about as interesting as a doli's". 43 Connie's
greatest achievement is reaching her nakedness and reclaiming her mystery. And
she does this by opening herself up to the flows of desire and allowing these to
dissolve the organism and ideal self she was.
But it is important not be misunderstood here: the body without organs does not
exist prior to the organism and so cannot simply be returned to; nor is it
something we can own. Further, as Deleuze and Guattari say: It It is not at all a
notion or a concept but a practice: a set of practices. "44 In other words, the body
without organs is a work in progress; something one must create. All three major
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characters in Lady Chatterley's Lover understand this and all three attempt to
construct for themselves bodies without organs. But whereas Connie successfully
achieves a body without organs full of gaiety and dance, Clifford manages only to
build a body without organs that belongs to that "dreary parade of sucked dry,
catatonicized, vitrified, sewn up bodies"45 that Deleuze and Guattari describe. And
the reason that Clifford botches the job is because he refuses to surrender his
ego. Ultimately, Clifford's real concern is to experiment with the disintegration of
his physical self and increase his knowledge of sensation. Unlike his wife, Clifford
closes himself off from the flow of desire that would put him physically into
touch with others and the world and plugs himself instead as business-machine
into the flow of capital. His is not a self-overcoming, so much as a willed self-
destruction, and he constructs a body without organs over which only radio
waves and the ecstasy of disintegration can pass: he becomes an untouchable with
a heart as "'numb as a potato'" and a penis that '''never lifts his head up'" (LCL,
p.39), as he recoils from the physical further and further into abstraction and
towards death. This is why Clifford's story has no positive interest to us; for, as
Deleuze and Guattari stress: "Dismantling the organism has never meant killing
yourself; but rather opening the body to connections't+" and the nourishing
creative flow of desire.
Thus when building a body without organs one must be sensitive, intelligent, and,
above all, cautious. In an important passage Deleuze and Guattari write: "You
have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn ... and you have
to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to
respond to the dominant reality. - You don't reach the body without organs, and
its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying. "47 Nor indeed by disintegrating
into a squalid mess of obscenity cl la Clifford Chatterley. Breakdowns must always
be transformed into breakthroughs, and if one is to fail in building a body
without organs, better to fail due to being overly cautious than reckless, for:
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"Staying stratified - organized, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can
happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or
suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever. "48 The
worst that can happen, in other words, is that what begins as a line of flight
turns back upon itself as something cancerous and oppressive and carries us still
further into nihilism.
I.v. Towards a Philosophy of Becoming.
As is perhaps clear, a politics of desire rests upon a philosophy of becoming; the
latter understood not as an unfolding of any essence in a process that terminates
in the formation of an ideal self, but rather as something which involves "the
affirmation of the positivity of difference, meant as a multiple and constant
process of transformation. "49 A genuine becoming IS always, therefore, a
becoming-other. And it is always an unwilled process; an opening up to the
strange forces of desire, not a question of filtering these through the ego and
attempting to know them as conscious sensation, or even of experiencing the
process of becoming in one's imagination. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that:
"A becoming is not a correspondence between relations .. . neither is it a
resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification .... To become is not
to progress or regress along a series. Above all, becoming does not occur in the
imagination. "50 It is important to realize therefore that becoming is a real process
and that the very special becomings we shall examine here are real events at the
molecular level.
Lawrence's fiction is particularly amenable to a reading in terms of a philosophy
of becoming as Deleuze and Guattari recognize, declaring Lawrence to be "another
of those writers who leave us troubled and filled with admiration, because they
are able to tie their writings to real and unheard of becomings. "51 But what
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makes the philosophy of becoming quintessentially Nietzschean is that it is
counter traditional ontology thought in terms of fixed 'being', and wholly anti-
Christian; as Christian theology and morality is also founded upon a notion of an
essential and eternal self (the 'immortal soul'). As Deleuze and Guattari write:
"Theology is very strict on the following point: there are no werewolves, human
beings cannot become animal. That is because there is no transformation of
essential forms; they are inalienable and only entertain relations of analogy." 52
But Nietzschean philosophy does not worry about Christian law, happily
concerning itself with the non-human and inhuman aspects of the human being,
and whilst well aware that the latter cannot become animal at the molar level of
reality, nevertheless insists that there is "a demonic reality of the becoming-
animal of the human being. "53
Thus, suddenly, the supposedly 'occult' aspects of Nietzsche's and Lawrence's
project of revaluation no longer seem quite so outlandish. Ultimately, becoming is
as much a 'black art' as it is a gay science or radical ontology, and if it is
designed to upset theologians, so too does it disconcert and irritate those secular
priests the psychoanalysts. For, like Christianity, psychoanalysis understands
very little of the nature of becomings; refusing to admit the fact that a man or
woman can in a very real sense transmutate and wishing only to deal with the
human, all too human. Schizoanalysis, on the other hand, fully recognizes that
our 'thisness' at a sub-atomic level is not a question of the personal, but of
"longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed
particles" 54, that men and women are no longer identifiable in human term s, but
exist rather as a chaos of non-subjectified effects and what Lawrence calls
'vibrations' .
When thought in terms of will to power, being is always a process of becoming.
Of course, the question that arises is: to what end do all these becomings move?
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Deleuze and Guattari seem to be uncertain here; for, on the one hand, they insist
that "a line of becoming has neither beginning or end, departure nor arrival,
origin nor destination'P>, whilst, on the other hand, they suggest that there is a
becoming towards which all other becomings rush - what they term a 'becoming-
imperceptible': "The imperceptible is the inherent of becoming, its cosmic
formula. "56 At this point the philosophy of becoming again resembles an 'occult'
teaching of some kind, into which one can only be initiated via an experience in
intensity. If it can be 'explained' or 'interpreted' at all, it can only be done so by
relating it to Lawrence's thinking on the fourth dimension, which is itself far
from clear and bordering on the mystical. The fourth dimension is the place
wherein we arrive after travelling in intensity, according to Lawrence; "the realm
of calm delight, it is the other kingdom of bliss"57 and here we "accomplish
perfection'P" and have our greatest experience of being. Mellors and Connie reach
this transcendent state via their relationship with one another and by surrendering
to desire. But also, crucially, by affirming themselves as creatures of flesh and
blood who belong to time and space. For, according to Lawrence, like a rose,
man blossoms in the fourth dimension, but has to have his roots firmly planted
and fed in the realm of existence. He writes:
"The clue to all existence is being. But
you can't have being without existence ... Being is not ideal, as Plato would have
it: nor spiritual. It is a transcendental form of existence, and is as much material
as existence is. Only the matter suddenly enters the fourth dimension. "59
- Or, as Deleuze and Guattari say, becomes-imperceptible. It is not a question of
vanishing, but of establishing a new relationship with the cosmos, and can be
accomplished by man, bird, beast, or flower: "It is into this perfected relation
that every straightline curves'v? and towards which every becoming moves.
Part II: Schizoanalysis: Of Breakdowns, Breakthroughs, and Becomings.
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II.i. The Case of Lady Chatterley: The Becoming of the New Eve.
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that Connie is not so much broken down, as
stripped naked": stripped not only of her social status (for desire does not
recognize her 'Ladyship') but also of her very humanity as defined in the
rational-moral tradition. And thus she reaches what Lawrence terms her 'ultimate
nakedness' and by which he means the state in which she is free of all shame and
bad conscience concerning her body and all its secret openings, flows, forces and
desires. Only when released from her white-faced personal self characterized by
fear (her oedipalized subjectivity which some feminist commentators would
mistakenly have her cling onto), does Connie become the New Eve and enter into
the fourth dimensional realm of bliss, innocence and imperceptibility.
But this she achieves not by denying her womanhood and sexual difference from
the man, but, rather, by affirming it and rejoicing in the fact that she is the:
'''Best bit 0' cunt left on earth'" (LeL, p.177). And, importantly, as we shall see,
Connie learns also to submit before the knowledge of her absolute dependence
upon the man; just as Mellors in turn is obliged to recognize that he needs her
for his fulfilment and perfection. Individually the lovers may well exist as ready-
made personalities, but only when united into what Lawrence calls the 'phallic
body' do they become at last who they are in a greater (non-personal or egoic)
sense. Thus sex does offer a vital clue to being within Lawrence's ontology; if
Connie is transformed via the intrusion of the phallus into her body (via both
vagina and anus). so too is Mellors transformed by his experience of 'cunt'.
Michael Squires says in his 1994 introduction to the novel, that Connie's cries at
the point of orgasm "yield at last a 'life exclamation', an affirmation'< and this is
indeed so. But he is mistaken to suggest that these cries have 'human significance'
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or some kind of anthropomorphic value; rather, they simply echo the 'peep! peep!'
of the tiny chick that Connie balances in the palm of her hand (LCL, p. 116) and
demonstrate that she has learned how to make "weird, wordless cries, like the
animals" (K, p.333).
Squires is wrong also to suggest that Connie achieves this becoming-animal
simply by opening herself up to the "unknown, unexpected, unleashed forces that
roil unconquerable in the self." 3 On the contrary, it is by opening herself up to
the forces that belong to that which is external and other to the self (forces
partly destructive, partly regenerative) that Connie is transfigured. And central to
this is, for Lawrence, the heterosexual coition and a genuine letting go of self
within the flood of non-self induced orgasm."
This is why Squires is mistaken too when he informs us that throughout the
process of physical awakening and sexual becoming, Connie retains her 'personal
integrity'. For whilst, as we argued in Part I.v., it is vital to retain small amounts
of subjectivity, the essential point is surely that in a very real sense the above is
precisely what to a fateful (though not fatal) degree Connie surrenders and
overcomes. In becoming-animal, becoming-elemental, becoming-woman (i.e.,
sexed and embodied), she becomes so much more than merely human in the
sexless and abstract-ideal. And as for the nature of her 'integrity', it is anything
but 'personal' (a word which Lawrence himself frequently uses in his texts, but
always pejoratively); rather, it is a 'fertile integrity' (cf. Mellors's 'virile
integrity'), i.e., a (pro- )creative sexual integrity founded upon difference and
becoming, not unity of self and identity. Ultimately, 'personal integrity' can be
nothing other than the sterile "integrity of the mind" (LCL, p. 31) which Clifford
and his intellectual Cambridge friends believe in defending.
Let us step back for a moment at this point: for it IS important to avoid
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confusion here. When we say that the forces Squires identifies are entirely outside
of Connie's self, we mean only her known-conscious self (i.e., external to her
ego). This is not to deny that they were undoubtedly present within Connie's
body and Lawrence makes clear that they are responsible for a growing
restlessness that was "taking possession of her like a madness" (LCL, p.20).
Naturally, Connie is at least semi-aware of her condition: "Vaguely, she knew that
she was going to pieces in some way." (ibid.) But, if disturbing to Connie,
Lawrence makes clear that this is not, in his view, necessarily a bad thing, nor a
process to be halted or reversed. Echoing Scott Fitzgerald in The Crack Up,
Lawrence affirms that life itself is a process of breaking down and it is only via
such that one can achieve a breakthrough to a new life. Nietzsche also stresses
that iibergehen procedes via untergehen; i.e., those who would overcome must
first be prepared to undergo a trial of some kind in which they sacrifice from the
old self. But, to reiterate our earlier conclusion, the crack up or breakdown is
not an end In itself; deterritorialization is a process, not a goal. And
reterritorializations are a vital part of that process; not as goals reached or ends
in themselves, but as temporary - though vital - arrests and formations en route.
It is not just physically that Connie is aware of herself going to pieces, she also
experiences nihilism as a breakdown of values and beliefs: "All the great words, it
seemed to Connie, were cancelled for her generation" (LCL, p.62). As this
process increases in velocity Connie feels her life become more and more dream-
like, less and less real, with no substance "to her or anything - no touch, no
contact" (LCL, p.18), just empty signs and hollow men and women. This
simulacrum of reality is challenged, however, when Connie chances upon Mellors
washing himself; this is a great moment of revelation for her, a "visionary
experience" which makes itself felt "in the middle of her body" (LCL, p.66). It is
not that Mellors is particularly well-built, or even young and good-looking, but
he has a creature's pure singularity; "the warm, white flame of a single life
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revealing itself in contours that one might touch: a body!" (ibid.) In fact, the
nature of Connie's visionary experience is of the kind craved for by Lou in St.
Mawr and which we discussed briefly last chapter; a glimpse of the physically
present animal-man.
When, following this secret encounter, Connie stands naked before her full-length
bedroom mirror to gaze upon her own body, she is horrified to see that, in
contrast, her flesh lacks any beauty or mystery; that there is nothing to wonder
at or yearn to touch. Her body: "was going meaningless, going dull and opaque,
so much insignificant substance. It made her feel immensely depressed, and
hopeless ... She was old, old at twenty-seven, with no gleam and sparkle in the
flesh" (LCL, p.70). Instinctively, Connie realizes that it has been the life that she
has been leading at Wragby which is in a large part to blame; the sexless life of
'personal integrity' that leaves the body wretched and frustrated in its desire to
be in touch with other bodies and the physical world: "The mental life! Suddenly
she hated it with a rushing fury, the swindle!" (ibid., p.71).
She is contemptuous of the ideas expressed by two of Clifford's 'feminist' friends
(Lady Bennerton and Olive), who argue for the 'immunization' of women against
the sickness that is pregnancy and the future breeding of babies in bottles, to
ensure that they need no longer be 'dragged down' by their reproductive
'functions', and will thus be 'liberated': '''So long as you can forget your body,
you are happy ... So if civilization is any good, it has to help us forget our
bodies, and then time passes happily, without our knowing it'" (LCL, pp.74-5).
But what sort of sleep-walking 'happiness' is this? It is, of course, the happiness
longed for by the last man (or, in this case, the last woman), living in his (or
her) brave new world; a civilization that wants to deny the experiences of the
body (for these may bring pain and inconvenience) and live as exclusively as it
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can do at the level of the asexual 'spirit'. It is a form of civilization that Connie
instinctively feels in active opposition to and she becomes one whom Freud
would brand as a 'discontent'. At first, realizing the necessity of her opposition
to the social order she is very much a part of (as her title indicates), frightens
her: "She was ... afraid of the horrible power of society and its commandments
which she had broken" (FLC, p.155) and yet she cannot help but feel herself
"dynamically an enemy of society" (ibid.) and refuses to apologise for this, or
surrender to any sense of guilt. Consciously, she knows that our civilized
industrial order is 'insane' and instinctively she wishes to flee from "the insanity
of the whole civilized species" (LeL, p.110).
Does Connie's discontent and her becoming a woman of desire make her into a
'revolutionary' however? Deleuze and Guattari would undoubtedly answer 'yes' to
this question, and they would do so because, for them: "Desire does not want
'revolution' ... it is revolutionary in its own right. "5 Thus, to very slightly
paraphrase what they argue in order to relate it to our study here;
"desire does not threaten a society because it is a desire to sleep with the
(gamekeeper], but because it is revolutionary. And that does not at all mean that
desire is something other than sexuality, but that sexuality and love do not live in
the bedroom[s] of [Wragby], they dream instead of wide-open spaces, and cause
strange flows to circulate that do not let themselves be stocked within an
established order." 6
Connie decides she has to break out from her old life and cut herself loose from
the reactive forces of civilization that hold her in place: "She had been fastened by
a rope, and jagging and snarring like a boat at its moorings" (LCL, p. 86). But
once loose and adrift, Connie does not simply float through life without aim.
Rather: "She seemed to get into the current of her proper destiny" (ibid.) via a
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listening to her blood and the greater intelligence of the body. If sailing against
the tide, she has no thoughts of scuppering the little boat of herself; rather, she
wants to find new seas and new lands (not sink and drown). However, she cannot
achieve this alone; desire is a collective and social affair which at the very least
joins together two things, two people. If securing her own freedom and
constructing her own body without organs is to be achieved she needs to come
back into touch with others. And sex, says Lawrence is the deepest form of
touch. Thus Connie seeks out and takes in Mellors a lover.
But at first things do not seem to go well between them. During their first two
sexual encounters, Connie remains bound within her egoic isolation: "And she
knew partly it was her own fault. She willed herself into this separateness. Now
perhaps she was condemned to it" (LCL, P.126). However, during their third
encounter there is a significant breakthrough. Now, for the first time, she
experiences an orgasm which has not been worked from her own will; une petite
marte, rather than merely un petit mal. And this 'little death' is the death of the
old Connie and marks the beginning of her becoming-woman and the New Eve:
"Connie went slowly home, realising the depth of the other thing in her. Another
self was alive in her, burning molten and soft and sensitive in her womb and
bowels" (ibid., p.135). In the earlier second version of the novel, Lawrence makes
clear that this other self refers not to the embryo conceived, but to the woman
Connie is to become, by adding: "Why had no one warned her of the possibility
of metamorphoses, or metempsychoses, the strange terror and power and
incalculability of it all?" (JTU, p.135).7
This other self is new not so much in its passion, as in its willingness to abandon
willing and submit before that which it is not and those powers external to and
greater than itself. Lawrence tells us that Connie had always feared adoration:
"For it left her helpless. She feared it still. For if she adored him too much, then
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she would lose herself, become effaced. And she did not want to be effaced. A
slave, like a savage woman. She must not become a slave" (LCL, p.135).
So, even in the midst of her 'awakening', Connie allows a certain willed resistance
to remain in place. Ultimately, however, Connie does not want to see the triumph
of the will: "It was known and barren, birthless", and she accepts adoration as
her treasure, sinking into "the new bath of life" (ibid., p.136).
The ideas of submission and adoration, touched on in chapter two, will be
discussed in relation to the democracy of touch later. Here, let us examine how
they relate to a philosophy of becoming.
Connie does not want to be 'effaced' we are told. Yet in having to surrender the
personal self this is precisely what she must be, as, at times, she knows. There is
an interesting passage on 'faciality' and the question of losing one's face in The
First Lady Chatterley: Connie asks Clifford if he doesn't think that "'it is rather a
pity that we never see anything of people but their faces?'" (FLC, p.29). When
Clifford replies that it is the face alone which reveals the personality, Connie then
asks: "'Mayn't there be something else besides the personality'"'' - meaning of
course - '''Mightn't the body have a life of its own - perhaps truer than the
personality?'" (ibid.) Clifford is deeply irritated. For talk of the body is
'dangerous ground' for those such as Clifford who would live in triumph over and
denial of the physical reality of man. But Connie discovers "a new vague idea to
ponder: the body, living a pure, untouched life of its own, apart from the face
with all its complexities and frustrations and vulgarity!" (ibid.)
Deleuze and Guattari theorize the above in their work: "If the face is a politics,
dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings, an entire
becoming-clandestine. "8 Thus we see the proto-Connie of The First Lady
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Chatterley retire to her bedroom one evening and: "put a thick veil over her face,
like a Mohammedan woman ... And thus she stood naked before her mirror and
looked at her slow, golden-skinned, silent body" (FLC, p.30). This Connie
becomes after all the 'savage woman' that the later Connie half-fears, half-wants
to become; the non-western, non-Christian, alien woman (even her skin is golden
coloured in this scene, non-white). Connie becomes-minoritarian and, for a
moment, escapes the tyranny of the face. But does she also become a slave?
Many feminist commentators fear so and see this taking up of the veil and self-
effacement in entirely negative terms; concerned as they are primarily with
'personal' freedom and 'individual' rights; not with impersonal fulfilment via the
surrendering of one's individuality. However, I would argue that Connie does not
become a slave - in fact, just the reverse. For as Lawrence writes, the modern
slave is not she who escapes the face (i.e., the self she has been given), rather:
"The modern slave is [she] who does not receive [her] powers from the unseen,
and give reverence, but who thinks [she] is [her] own little boss. Only a slave
would take the trouble to shout: I am free! That is to say, to shout in the face of
the open heavens. In the face of men, and their institutions and prisons, yes -
yes! But in the face of the open heavens I would be ashamed to talk about
freedom. I have no life, no real power, unless it will come to me. And I
accomplish nothing, not even my own fulfilled existence, unless I go forth,
delicately, desirous, and find the mating of my desire". 9
And this requires submission: not of the woman to the man (nor of the man to
the woman); but of the personal to the impersonal; the egoic to the cosmic; the
human to the daimonic. Before these forces men and women must learn
submission and reverence; forces symbolized in Lady Chatterley's Lover by the
phallus, as Connie comes to appreciate: "Vaguely, she realised for the first time
in her life what the phallus meant, and her heart seemed to enter anew, wide
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world" (JTLJ, pp.236-7).lO
The slave revolt in morals begins, arguably, as a revolt against the phallus; the
free man and woman (free of fear, free of shame, and free of self-contempt) is
happy to submit before the phallus and accept it as a bridge to the future. When
the 'phallic wonder' is dead in us, we become wretched, Lawrence argues; and he
means that without such an experience of wonder we can have no understanding
of the beauty in things as things. Only when the phallic wonder is healthy and
strong can man come into living touch with the physical world and transcend the
subject/object divide which usually serves to sever us from the latter and
frustrate our desire to actively participate in the mystery of life. By daring to
acknowledge the phallus as she does, Connie slowly learns how to respond to and
come into touch with not only the body of her lover, but with animals, trees,
rain, moonlight and even the most seemingly mundane of everyday objects (such
as the kettle in Mellors's cottage), all of which sparkle with a fresh glamour and
delight.
Connie is thus obliged to accept that which Kate had also to accept in The Plumed
Serpent (as we saw last chapter); the need to surrender any abstract notion of an
independent and autonomous self and concede that an achieved wholeness is
perfected between the two (and the two in relation to the many); i.e., is a sexual
and social accomplishment. Desire is never about the one or that lonely
grammatical fiction of the 'I', and a politics of desire is always in opposition to
liberalism and capitalism in as much as the latter are based on the politics of the
ideal individual and the economics of the self (isolation, egoism, and greed
mistaken for freedom and happiness).
Becoming is never straightforward however, and thus it is that even after her
experience with Mellors in the woods, Connie slips back into her wilful personal
mode, so that when she and he next fuck she is struck by the absurdity of the
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sex act: "Cold and derisive her queer female mind stood apart" (LCL, p.172);
i.e., Connie makes the error of surrendering a moment of sheer intensity and of
translating experience into mere representation. As Lawrence would say, she gets
her sex into her head (see chapter one). Not until she is fucked once more by the
seemingly ever-virile Mellors, does she dare to again let go of herself within the
flood of desire. Finally, when fucked for a third time in succession: "Her whole
self quivered unconscious and alive, like plasm" (ibid., p.173) and she rises full
now of scorn and contempt not for the body of her lover, but for the ideas of
her husband. Thus when Clifford quotes to her from one of "the latest scientific-
religious books" (ibid., p.233) that he is reading, that the universe is physically
contracting on the one hand and spiritually ascending on the other, Connie is
startlingly Nietzschean in response, saying of the author: "'It only means he's a
physical failure on the earth, so he wants to make the whole universe a physical
failure"', adding; '''the life of the body is a greater reality than the life of the
mind: when the body is really wakened to life" (ibid., p.234). Clifford looks at
her, once more, with astonishment and disgust: "'The life of the body''', he says,
"'is just the life of the animals. '" Connie replies: '''that's better than the life of
professorial corpses'" (ibid.), as she thinks of her own body and how she has
danced naked in the rain with it, rejoicing with the "sound healthy selfishness that
issues from a mighty soul" and a "beautiful, victorious, refreshing body" .11
The above narcissistic JOY - beyond all immature autoeroticism and which may
"contain the germ of a different reality principle"12 - is made complete once
Connie passes through the final stage of her 'initiation' into phallic wonder; the
'night of sensual passion', as Lawence calls it. Not surprisingly to readers of the
earlier novels, this involves an act of anal sex as a transgressive and transforming
means of consummation and becoming: "the reckless, shameless sensuality shook
her to her foundations, stripped her to the very last, and made a different woman
of her .... She felt, now, she had come to the real bed-rock of her nature, and
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was essentially shameless. She was her sensual self, naked and unashamed" (LCL,
pp.246-7).
As we have seen in chapters one and three, the overcoming of shame and bad
conscience regarding one's physical self is crucial to the project of revaluation;
above all men and women must liberate the mind from its "old grovelling fear of
the body and the body's potencies." 13 Connie accepts and affirms herself in full
and, like her Lawrencean sister Kate, in The Plumed Serpent, allows the snake to
coil in peace about her ankle as she rises as the New Eve: naked, innocent, joyful,
and defiant.
II.ii. The Case of Lady Chatterley's Lover: The Becoming of the Old Adam.
In terms of becoming, Mellors is perhaps the least interesting of the central
characters in Lady Chatterley's Lover. For although he too is 'broken open', his
most profound transformation occurs between the three versions of the novel;
Mellors is in effect the becoming of Oliver Parkin, which, as we shall see, is a
becoming-woman and a becoming- hors c/asse (as well as a becoming apolitical at
a molar, party-belonging level). Mellors is also the overcoming of Parkin, as the
latter proves too limited for the role of advocate which Lawrence demands of
him, as Nietzsche of Zarathustra.
Mellors makes a dramatic first entrance in chapter five of Lady Chatterley's Lover
and somewhat frightens Connie as he emerges from the woods. His red-face and
red-hair indicate he is very much a son of the Old Adam (the man of red earth).
A man very different to her husband Clifford - but also very different from the
man that he had once been; i.e., Oliver Parkin, as conceived by Lawrence in the
earlier two versions of the novel. Even between the Parkin of The First Lady
Chatterley (henceforth PI) and the Parkin of John Thomas and Lady Jane
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(henceforth P2), there are crucial differences. Here we shall indicate some of these
as we trace the becoming-Mellors of Oliver Parkin. It is a process which tells us
something of import about Lawrence's changing thinking to do with politics,
revolution, class, and the best strategies for engaging with and surviving in the
modern world.
Towards the end of John Thomas and Lady Jane, Connie writes in a letter to P2:
"I was afraid you were just going to deteriorate into a socialist or a fascist, or
something dreary and political" (JTLl, p.369). It is as if she were remembering
what had happened to her lover in The First Lady Chatterley: for this is precisely
what happens to PI, who ends by becoming a worker in a steel plant and
secretary of the local communist league. PI disappoints Connie by revealing
himself to be as firmly class-conscious and class-entrenched as her husband
Clifford is self-conscious and ego-bound. Fortunately for Connie, P2 does not fall
back into political asceticism and sentimental militancy; on the contrary, he
transmutates into the superior figure of Mellors.
There were two major problems presented by the semi-literate figure of PI:
Firstly, he does not and cannot form a fully satisfactory lover for Connie; and,
secondly, he does not and cannot form a fully satisfactory advocate for Lawrence.
At times Lawrence does make a rather half-hearted and unconvincing attempt to
suggest that PI is a 'natural aristocrat', and yet clearly he is no Birkin or Aaron,
Somers or Ramon. Connie sadly resigns herself to the fact that "culturally, he
was of another race" (FLC, p.82) from herself; even she fears him and his class,
for "perhaps they were the destroyers of her class?" (ibid., p.93). And, indeed,
as would-be communist revolutionary PI is the destroyer of Connie's class and he
admits that his intention is to make the upper-classes "'climb down an' be like
other folks'" - even if he sees no need to kill them; "'except maybe a few" (ibid.,
p.237).
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In some ways, PI doesn't interest us at all with his dreary political ambitions and
posturings. And yet, in other ways, he is more interesting as a character than
either P2 or Mellors, precisely because he seems believable as an uneducated
working-class man during the mid-1920's; as readers we respect his refusal to
become simply her Ladyship's lover, or Lawrence's mouthpiece. PI IS
undoubtedly a bore; but he is no fool and neither has he allowed the 'false
consciousness' so often subscribed to by his class to blind him to the reality of
work: '''Do you think a man loves draggin' his guts out all day long .. ?'" (ibid.,
p.223) he asks Connie, naively unaware that some men (many men) do. His
desire, then, has not been perverted into a desire for his own oppression within
an industrial wage-system: "'But I'm a slave, doomed an' damned an' I know it'"
(FLC, p.224) he confesses with bitterness, his only hope residing in the collapse
or destruction of capitalism: ""appen the bloody show'll smash up. It would if I
could make it!'" (ibid.)
Of course, PI's anger and resentment is an understandable by-product of placing
him within an economic system based upon profit via exploitation of labour
(something we have seen Nietzsche fail to address in his thinking). When tied to a
politics of revenge, such anger and resentment is undoubtedly a dangerous
revolutionary force. However, ressentiment is something that is best overcome -
not politicized. It is hopeless and mistaken holding out for socialist 'smash up',
for either they don't come, or, worse, they do happen, but result in more
slavery, more stupidity, and a huge increase in the bullying power of the modern
state machine. Those men who genuinely wish to extricate themselves from the
present system need to stand aside from it and come away from the herd; not get
involved in mass movements and seek party-political solutions. Certainly this has
been our conclusion so far in this study.
However, if PI is politically naive and personally stubborn, he is to be admired
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for showing an awareness that any solution will have to be at some level a
collective and not simply individual one. PI is not wrong to express sympathy for
his fellow men; merely mistaken in thinking that his sympathy should take the
political form that he seeks to give it.
Essentially, this is where P2 is an overcoming of PI: for he is far less prone to
allow his sympathy get the better of him and is not prepared to sacrifice his own
integrity in the name of 'class solidarity'. There are, he knows, other ways,
better ways, of showing sympathy with his fellows than becoming secretary of the
communist league and calling for bloody revolution. If PI cannot let go of the
molar political struggle - and he admits: "'It's something as I've hold of, an' I
can't let go'" (FLC, pp.239-40) - P2 decides instead to keep his hands placed
firmly round the body of the woman and go with the flow of transformative
desire.
P2 is much closer to the man Mellors he will become, than to Pl. Much more
aware of his own uniqueness and difference from other men, whilst not denying
the vital need to remain in touch with others. This awareness relates very much
to the fact that P2 overcomes PI and moves towards becoming-Mellors via a
becoming-woman. Throughout John Thomas and Lady Jane, P2 is described as
and admits to being like a woman in his sensitivity, his consciousness, and his
movements. And the production of a molecular woman within the molar male
subject is something that Connie encourages in her lover. For Connie can see that
it means a greater awareness of his own singularity and will thus assist in
liberating him from his restricted and restrictive class-consciousness. Further,
becoming-woman leads to the forming of a more intuitive intelligence; a greater
appreciation of the near-at-hand, for his own body, for a tactile understanding of
the world and the beauty of the world. Thus it is that the development of what
Lawrence calls 'phallic consciousness' is closely related to the becoming-woman of
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the molar male subject.
However, although P2 concedes that he needs to abide by the molecular woman
within himself, the idea is not one he is happy or comfortable with. In fact, he
speaks of his becoming-woman with "intense bitterness" and the notion is
"terribly humiliating to him" (]TL], pp.332-33). But this is because P2 does not
have a very good understanding of the process; he confuses becoming-woman at
the molecular level with a loss of manliness at the molar level. Connie is rightly
angry with his stupidity regarding himself and regarding the process of
becoming-woman, or minoritarian. She knows that the process does not in the
least involve a loss of manliness; merely a loss of the stupidity and unimaginative
insentience that is all too often mistaken for and confused with being a man. As
Lawrence writes: a man can become woman and still retain "the finest maleness,
once it is put to the test." 14
P2's becoming-woman, encouraged by Connie, obliges him to become more of an
outsider; for woman is the gateway to otherness within phallogocentric culture.
Specifically, P2 makes the move outside of social class, effecting a becoming-
hors-cJasse. Michael Squires says in his introduction to Lady Chatterley's Lover
that "class differences wither in the fires of physical attraction'v> and partly this
is so. But in a very real sense by the time of writing the third and final version
of his novel, Lawrence has already decided that such differences no longer exist
within modernity.
Keith Sagar writes; "the class problems which had been so inescapable between
Connie and Parkin disappear because Mellors is given all the credentials of a
'gentleman', including an education and culture which ... enables him to move
freely through all classes." 16 And certainly it is the case that Connie finds Mellors
unlike a working man (whilst retaining something in common with the local
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people). But Sagar is wrong to suggest Mellors represents a bourgeoisification of
Parkin; the former is not a 'gentleman' and in fact we are told that he explicitly
rejects an opportunity to move into the ranks of the middle class. Further, he
does not move freely through all classes (in as much as they remain), but outside
of them altogether.
"The lower classes of unlearned men are now our only hope. The learned and
cultivated classes must be abandoned" 17 says Nietzsche, and initially Connie acts
in the spirit of this, turning instinctively away from the men of her own class and
towards the working man Oliver Parkin. But it does not take her very long to
discover that this doesn't form a viable option; that if Nietzsche is right in the
second proposition, he is wrong nevertheless in the first. Hope, if it lies
anywhere, as Connie discovers, lies only with the few individual men and women
who can manage to move outside of social class. For if persons of Clifford's class
are passionless and out of touch, then the working class are limited in another
manner: "narrow in outlook, in prejudice, and narrow in intelligence. "18 This
again makes a prison. says Lawrence, who thereby arrives at the conclusion that
one can ultimately belong to no class if one wishes to be free.
The bridging of the gulf between classes via tenderness was Lawrence's original
goal when he began to write the story of Lady Chatterley and her lover. But quite
simply. the first version of the novel fails to resolve the problem of how this can
be achieved. The class gulf that is firmly established between Connie and PI
remains unbridged. Thus Lawrence rewrites the novel and attempts to rethink the
class issue. In John Thomas and Lady Jane we are suddenly informed:
"There was no longer any such thing as class. The world was one vast proletariat.
Everything else had gone. The true working class was gone, as much as the
honourable bourgeoisie. or the proud aristocracy. Bolshevist or fascist. the world
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was proletariat, a vast homogeneous proletariat made up the whole of humanity"
(JTLJ, p.293).
In other words, the whole of human society was - in a word used frequently by
Lawrence at this time - 'robot'. If he was prepared to still acknowledge that "the
homogeneity of the proletariat was divided between haves and have nots, owners
and wage earners, capitalists and workers" (JTLJ, p.293), Lawrence now
repeatedly argued that it was no longer helpful to think politically in terms of
opposing classes. Such a view finds support in the thinking of Deleuze and
Guattari. In chapter ten of Anti-Oedipus, they write that there is only one class
within the capitalist socius; though - contra Lawrence - they claim this should be
thought of not as one huge proletariat, but rather as one vast bourgeoisie.
Whatever we decide to call this robot-mass, the key point is surely that it
represents the negation of all genuine social order as exists in pre-capitalist and
pre-modern society, and as Nietzsche wishes to see reinstated within a post-
modern political culture. When all forms of status and caste have been decoded
by the anarcho-nihilistic forces of capitalism, the end result is a non-society
wherein the only distinction between people rests on how much money they own
and/or earn. Slavery in the old, despotic sense, at least implies the existence of
masters. But within capitalism there is instituted; "an unrivalled slavery, an
unprecedented subjugation: there are no longer any masters, but only slaves
commanding other slaves ... The bourgeoisie sets the example ... more utterly
enslaved than the lowest of slaves, he is the first servant of the ravenous
machine" .19
Deleuze and Guattari continue (and again can be seen to offer support for
Lawrence's analysis):
"It will be said that there IS nonetheless a class that rules
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and a class that is ruled ... the distinction between the flow of finance and the
flow of income in wages. But this is only partially true, since capitalism is born
of the conjunction of the two in the differential relations and integrates them both
in the continually expanded reproduction of its limits. "20
Thus it is that Clifford, for example, doesn't really rule; he is no real master,
merely another robot himself. Connie is right to say to him: '''You don't rule,
don't flatter yourself! You have only got more than your share of the money
You only bully with your money" (LCL, pp.I93-4). In fact, the whole of
Clifford's class is now robot-degenerate and impotent (not just him personally)
and so must be abandoned, as Nietzsche rightly says. But, unfortunately, so too
is the whole of Parkin's class robot and rotten through with the money-disease:
"Connie thought how extremely like all the rest of the classes the lower classes
sounded. Just the same thing over again ... There was only one class nowadays
... the only difference was how much you'd got, and how much you wanted"
(LCL, p.I05). Realising this, i.e., that class is essentially a redundant notion to
think in terms of, helps free Connie from her old fears and prejudices; she
concludes that the only people who really matter for her are those "few
individuals who have not been proletarianized" (JTLJ, p.294). As Deleuze and
Guattari say: "the theoretical opposition is not between two classes ... Ibut I
between the class and those outside the class. Between the servants of the regime,
and those who sabotage it or its cogs and wheels. "21
Thus a politics of desire is fought not by class warriors such as PI, but by those
nomads such as P2 and Mellors, who do not belong or fit in - and who do not
want to belong or fit in. These discontents and deviants are not so much declasse
as Ies hors-classe (the latter term having an affinity to both hors-caste (outcast)
and hors-le-Ioi (outlaw)). It is with these men and women hope for the future
lies; they, if anyone, will establish the democracy of touch. By daring to become-
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woman and become-outsider, P2 avoids the fate of PI and moves toward
becoming the phallic man Mellors whom we can now return to and examine his
attempt to form a politics of desire.
We know now that Mellors is a man in the process of becoming-woman and one
who moves on the outside. As an outsider he is marked as if with the mark of
Cain and feared as if truly a son of the Old Adam. But Cain - from the Greek
kainos - means 'newness', and thus although Mellors is a transgressor of moral
and social laws, so too is he a new man beyond good and evil; innocent in the
radical Nietzschean sense. Thus Lawrence tells us that Mellors has: "No sense of
wrong or sin: he was troubled by no conscience in that respect" (LCL, p.120).
Mellors - the shameless one - is broken open between his desire for Connie on
the one hand and his dread of society on the other. He knows from experience
that his affair with her ladyship will inevitably bring him back into contact and
conflict with the latter; for just as a man alone can never finally withdraw into
privacy, nor can lovers find sanctuary in a world of their own creation: "The
world allows no hermits" (ibid., p.ll9) and couples do not fuck in isolation.
Sensing her lover's post-coital angst, Connie says cheerfully '''It's just love'"
(ibid., p.ll8), but Mellors knows that love is never just something on its own; it
means life and all the complications and entanglements of life, and, in away, he
regrets being thrown back into the struggle once more: '''I thought I'd done with
it all. Now I've begun again'" (ibid.). Coming into touch means opening oneself up
to suffering as well as pleasure and by taking Connie as his mate so too does
Mellors consciously bring on himself a "new cycle of pain and doom" (ibid.,
p.119). But, crucially, Mellors also knows that it has to be thus - if he is to live
and become a little human again then there can be no splendid isolation: "'There's
no keeping clear. And if you do keep clear, you might as well die. So if I've got
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to be broken open again, I have'" (ibid., p. 118).
In fact, as soon as Mellors emerges from an illicit piece of fucking with Connie,
he begins to offer a critique of society; convinced that if he is to protect their
love then he will have to engage with the world of the mechanical and greedy.
Mellors wants to see a new order of tenderness and this is due, according to
Lawrence, to the fact that a sexually fulfilling contact alters the very composition
of the blood and gives rise to a new post-coital social urge: "Men, being
themselves made new after the act of coition, wish to make the world anew"22;
i.e., the will to power in the lover craves a new affirmative and collective activity:
"That is, for a new polarized connection with other beings, other men. "23 This is
why desire is of great social and political import; once he is broken open once
more and alive within the flow of desire, Mellors longs for wider comradeship:
"Oh, if only there were other men to be with, to fight that sparkling-electric
Thing outside there, to preserve the tenderness of life ... and the natural riches
of desire" (LCL, p.120), he thinks to himself. For alone he knows there is little
or nothing he can do to defeat the 'vast evil thing' (Mammon); even he will not be
able to protect himself and Connie for very long from the overwhelming forces of
"the insentient iron world" (ibid, p.119).
But where can he find comrades? PI of course turned to members of what he
identified as his own class and to the communist party, but Mellors doesn't have
this option, existing outside of class and molar politics. He knows that the
working people (even the communists) are as hopeless as the degenerate middle
and upper classes, all glorying in the great social machine: '''All the lot. Their
spunk's gone dead'" (ibid., p.2l7). During his bleakest moments he finds some
solace in the fact that if modern man continues along his present path, he will end
by killing himself in a grand suicidal auto da fe. But Mellors cannot help also
having hopes for a (transhuman) mankind to come. For whilst he may at some
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level be at war with society, he still wishes to retain his "deep peace with mankind
. .. preserving [his] peace of soul which is peace with the living, struggling real
mankind'<+, i.e., the non-slavish mankind assembled upon active forces. This,
ultimately, is all Mellors can do; keep his peace of soul and abide by the little
forked flame fucked into being between himself and Connie. As much as he may
like to personally '''wipe the machines off the face of the earth again, and end the
industrial era absolutely, like a black mistake"', he realizes he can't '''an' nobody
can'" (LCL, p.220), so he had best hold his peace and try and live his own life as
best he can, waiting, perhaps, like Lilly tells Aaron to wait, for another to come
along with whom he, and he and Connie, can form a new society.
This society we are calling here, after Lawrence, a democracy of touch. And we
are essentially in agreement with Mellors that such a society will grow out of a
new economy of bodies and their pleasures and from a warmth of heart between
men and women: "'I believe if men could fuck with warm hearts, and the women
take it warm-heartedly, everything would come all right'" (LCL, p.206).
Admittedly, as a piece of 'political philosophy' - if it is this at all - this appears
vacuous and banal. Can anyone seriously be expected to believe that it is possible
not only to fuck one's way into bliss, but into new social and cultural
arrangements as well? It is certainly the very last hope and one can detect a
certain despair here. And yet, as Connie says, if there is to be a future at all for
man there will have to be established a new touch between bodies and the
development of a new sensibility which she calls 'tenderness'. Mellors picks up
this term and employs it in his own thinking, agreeing with Connie that what is
most needed is "'that natural physical tenderness, which is the best, even between
men; in a proper manly way'" (ibid., p.277).
We should note, however, that this tenderness of touch is also a tenderness of
strength; not weakness, and it bears little relation to the Christian ideal of love.
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If Mellors is warm hearted in his fucking, so too is he passionate with anger
against the Clifford Chatterleys of this world; not full of charity, forgiveness, or
the rancid milk of human kindness.
Let us close this study as Lawrence closes the novel; i.e., with the letter from
Mellors to Connie which sets out in further detail his vision of the world to
come. In one of the most important passages, Mellors argues that the majority of
people would be sound and healthy:
"'If you could only tell them that living and spending aren't the same thing! ... If
only they were educated to live instead of earn and spend ... if they could dance
and hop and skip and swagger and be handsome, they could do with very little
cash .... They ought to be naked and handsome, all of them, and to move and be
handsome, and to sing in a mass and dance the old group dances, and carve the
stools they sit on, and embroider their own emblems. Then they wouldn't need
money. And that's the way to solve the industrial problem: train the people to be
able to live and live in handsomeness without needing to spend .... They should
be alive and frisky, and acknowledge the great god Pan. He's the only god for the
masses, forever. The few can go in for higher cults if they like. But let the mass
be forever pagan'" (LeL, pp.299-300).
The above is an extraordinary passage, incorporating at it does many of
Lawrence's own concerns - cultural, political, and religious - and serves as a
useful summary of his philosophy. It also, of course, returns us to many of the
themes of this thesis; including, for example, the notion of a god who can save us
(in this case Pan). As with the closing of The Rainbow, Lawrence offers us in the
above passage a vision of "individual and communal regeneration in which the
inhabitants of the contemporary industrial world are transformed into free,
fulfilled and joyful beings". 25 And, crucially, the vision in as much as it
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anticipates a general transformation of society as a whole, can be said to be
'democratic' .
Of course, as we shall discuss shortly in III.i., Lawrence's understanding of
democracy and his use of the term is particular. And, indeed, for many
commentators there is nothing at all democratic about the above vision; on the
contrary, they find it suggestive of something politically sinister, full as it is of
the volkisch imagery that the Nazis were to employ and exploit so successfully.
Admittedly, the communal singing and dancing, the handicrafts, the neo-
pagamsm, and the obvious privileging of the physical over the intellectual, do
make one think not only of Ramon's plumed serpent experiment, but of the
'strength through joy' programmes of the Third Reich.
Thomas Mann is said to have once described national socialism as: "an attempt to
take over the world in the name of thatched roofs, folk dances, and solstice
celebrations'S? and critics of Lawrence are quick to latch onto such (rather lazy if
mildly amusing) characterizations and apply them to his political thought. But,
just as when Heidegger, for example, refers to Black Forest farmhouses in his
work he "in no way means that we should or could go back to building such
houses" 27, nor does Lawrence ever mean to suggest we could go back to a pre-
industrial, pre-modern Yolksgcmeinscheit (any more than Nietzsche thought there
could be a return made to ancient Greek culture). However, Lawrence, like
Heidegger and Nietzsche, does hold out some hope for a future based upon
another becoming for man (or, another revealing, a different will to power). Each
dares to philosophically experiment and poetically explore; each dares to demand
and advocate the impossible; each dares to dream, believing the answer to the
question raised by Andre Breton in the first Surrealist manifesto - "Cannot the
dream also be applied to the solution of the fundamental problems of life?"28 - to
be a profound Yes.
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Of course, even dreams can, if we are not careful, dangerously mutate into
nightmares and totalitarian utopias cl la Fourier et a/. But Lawrence and Nietzsche
are saved from such fascist dreaming by their anti-idealism and by their thinking
in terms of desire, difference, and becoming. Thus if Mellors wants people to
sing, this is surely different and preferable to wanting them to sieg heil; if he
wants them to dance, this is because he dreads the thought of them marching in
step; if he wants them to be naked and handsome, this is so they need never
again be dressed in ugly uniforms. And by acknowledging Pan rather than the
new idol of the state, people are saved from all manner of stupidity and able to
affirm cultural and religious pluralism, as well as their own lives in the flesh as
lived on the earth and within time. The vision, then, set out by Mellors in his
letter to Connie, is of value; he gives us the first glimpse of a democracy of
touch behind which lies not fascist idealism, but the "inexhaustible vitality of a
common physical life." 29
Part III: Postanalysis: Towards a Democracy of Touch.
Ul.i. Opening Remarks on the Mystery of Touch and Lawrence's Notion of
Democracy.
Mellors doesn't actually use the expression 'democracy of touch'; it is in fact a
coinage belonging to Tommy Dukes, who is of the view that '''our civilization is
going to fall. It's going down the bottomless pit, down the chasm. And believe
me, the only bridge across the chasm will be the phallus!'" (LCL, p.75). This
'bridge' will lead us to a new social phase in which there will be 'genuine' men and
women beyond the '''mechanical and intellectual experiments" (ibid.) in decadence
that modern men and women have become. This new social phase Dukes calls the
'democracy of touch', and he contrasts it with the liberal-capitalist 'democracy of
pocket'. Connie is intrigued by Dukes and his talk of the 'resurrection of the
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body' and the democracy of touch: "She didn't at all know what the latter meant,
but it comforted her; as meaningless things may do" (ibid., pp.75-6). But is it
simply a meaningless (if comforting) notion? And if not, what then does it mean
and how can we use it theoretically in relation to other radical political notions?
These are the questions I hope to address below.
Clearly, for Dukes himself the democracy of touch is just another piece of fanciful
talk; this is his limitation as an impotent intellectual. But equally clear is the fact
that Lawrence wants us to explore and develop the notion further as readers; to
invest it with concrete meaning and put it to work as a productive idea. He
himself also uses the phrase and expands upon it outside of Lady Chatterley's
Lover, in both his poetry and essays and we shall shortly draw upon these in our
attempt to substantiate the mystery of touch. Firstly, however, let us see what is
said of the democracy of touch in the earlier versions of the novel.
In The First Lady Chatterley, it is not Tommy Dukes, but Duncan Forbes, who
speaks of a democracy of touch; suggesting that what is needed in the future is
not a soviet style communism (as Parkin wishes to see established), but:
"'Contact! Some sort of passionate human contact ... a new relationship between
men: really not caring about money, really caring for life, and the flow with one
another'" (FLC, pp.242-3).
By John Thomas and Lady Jane, however, Dukes has taken upon himself the role
of advocate for the mystery of touch. He says: "'We've never had proper human
contact - we've never been civilized enough. We're not civilized enough even now,
to be able to touch one another ... The next civilization will be based on the
inspiration of touch'" (JTLJ, pp.64-5).1 And, according to Dukes, this will be the
very antithesis of our modern knowledge-based scientific-industrial civilization;
the democracy of touch will allow for the opening into existence of a whole new
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field of consciousness and a new innocence, and present day man will either be
swept away or "'properly used in the next phase'" (ibid., p. 65) as material by a
new breed of men born of active desire.
"'I don't get your democracy of touch, you know,' said Olive in her casual, brutal
way; 'touch what? '" (ibid., p. 66). Of course, the answer is touch one another and
all things as things; touch life and be touched by it. As Lawrence says, by touch
he means: "The touch of the feet on the earth, the touch of the fingers on a tree,
on a creature, the touch of hands and breasts, the touch of the whole body to
body, and the interpenetration of passionate love: it is life itself, and in touch, we
are all alive" (ibid., p.114): out of touch, we are merely walking corpses. To
Olive and her kind, this is simply getting 'mystical', but as Dukes knows in
attempting to substantiate and articulate the mystery of touch he is attempting to
climb back down Pisgah; i.e., to come back down to earth, not lyrically ascend
into the clouds, nor transcend into mysticism.
And just as this is not mysticism, nor is it an ideal materialism; but, rather, a
genuine libidinal materialism of the kind that the ancient Greeks and Etruscans
founded their cultures upon; the democracy of touch is an attempt to reactivate
the idea of culture as physis (see chapter one). As to whether or not such
cultures were 'democracies', that's another question.
In The First Lady Chatterley, Duncan Forbes stresses that coming into touch
socially will have to be achieved via a democracy of some description: "'I've hated
democracy since the War. But now I see I'm wrong calling for an aristocracy.
What we want is a flow of life from one to another - to release some natural flow
in us that urges to be released '" (FLC, p. 243). It is difficult not to believe that
this is Lawrence speaking directly here in his own text (as he was prone to do);
Lawrence seemingly confessing his error in the power trilogy of insisting on the
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need to smash democracy and establish a radical new order, based on broadly
Nietzschean lines. But, as always, we need to be subtle in our reading and
exercise caution before claiming that this late development in Lawrence's thinking
marks a significant break with his earlier thought. In fact, I would argue that
Lawrence's use of the term 'democracy' is as 'idiosyncratic' as Nietzsche's use of
the term 'innocence' and needs to be carefully interrogated if one is to avoid
confusion.
However, this IS not to imply that Lawrence doesn't seek to clarify and
reinterpret his earlier thinking on the question of what is the best social and
political form, and in John Thomas and Lady Jane he goes still further than above
in admitting past error on this question. Thus when Jack Strangeways - another
of Clifford's unattractive friends - is described as "a neo-conservative and a neo-
aristocrat and everything that was anti-democratic" (JTLJ, p.61), just like many
young intellectuals after the War including Lawrence himself, we are told that:
"This bored Constance. Even in Clifford, when he kept saying democracy was a
dead dog, most people should be put back into slavery, there should be a small
and ruthless armed aristocracy, and so on, she felt it was mere stupidity, really
ineffectuality" (ibid., pp.61-2). Lawrence clearly wants us as readers to share
Connie's 'boredom' with such impotent talk and ineffectual political posturing;
wants us to question what type of will it is that motivates Clifford and company
and, indeed, what type of will it is at work within his own (and by extension
Nietzsche's) desire for a new political elite.
However, whilst Lawrence is daring in this manner to open up his previous
political views to interrogation, he is most certainly not abandoning them entirely.
Rather, he is seeking to make his position distinct from those who would
vulgarize and brutalize his (and Nietzsche's) thinking with their own slavish
reactivity and resentment (i.e., those who would 'fascisize' his thought). That
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Lawrence still holds to an essentially non-democratic notion of democracy (i.e.,
illiberal and not founded upon the 'enlightened' ideals of the French Revolution),
should not be doubted. As Frank Kermode rightly says: "Despite the change m
tone, the basic diagram of Lawrence's beliefs is unaltered. "2
Arguably, it is in his poetry where Lawrence makes his understanding of
democracy clearest: in contrast to ideal or 'robot democracy' in which "nobody is
willing to serve" 3, Lawrence posits 'real democracy' based upon service and
submission. For Lawrence maintains that there are those who have either "never
fallen from life", or who have managed to resurrect back into life and that those
who recognise the "clean flame of life" in these rare men and women should
submit before them in "homage and pure passion of service">, for only via
service will this second class be restored into fulfilled being themselves and cease
to be robot.
It becomes clear then, that when Lawrence says the world is moving towards a
new democracy (of touch), he does not mean: "a democracy of idea or ideal, nor
property, / nor even the emotion of brotherhood." 5 Rather, he means a
democracy with which we suggest below even Nietzsche would be comfortable.
Firstly, however, let us explore the democracy of touch in relation to other
writers and thinkers with whom Lawrence shares a certain affinity.
lII.ii. An American Vision: Walt Whitman's Democracy of the Open Road m
Relation to Lawrence's Democracy of Touch.
Whilst there are divisions between men within a democracy of touch, we should
think of these primarily as based upon difference in 'soul'; not relating to cash
distinctions as within a 'democracy of the pocket'. It is Lawrence's hope that
within his democracy men will have pride in themselves and their strengths and
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abilities and realise that if they have their bodies they lack nothing. In the
democracy of touch, all men and woman learn how not only to be naked and
handsome, but to walk naked and light. Lawrence writes: "If we are to keep our
backs unbroken, we must deposit all property on the ground and learn to walk
without it. We must stand aside. And when many men stand aside, they stand in
a new world .... This is the Democracy, the new order. "6
And this is not only the democracy of touch, but also the democracy of the open
road according to Lawrence's reading of Whitman, in which he examines the
above vision of an open road in relation to his own thinking on the question of
politics; subtly developing the former in line with the latter. For whilst Lawrence
accepts Whitman's notion of the open road as "a great new doctrine" and perhaps
even "the bravest doctrine man has ever proposed to himself=". still he has
problems with certain aspects of it. In order to indicate what these are, let us
make clear first of all what the doctrine of the open road involves: Essentially, it
involves a journey in intensity; a journey not dissimilar to the one undertaken by
the Deleuzian schizo-nomad. A journey:
"Exposed to full contact. On two slow
feet. Meeting whoever comes down the open road. In company with those that
drift in the same measure along the same way. Towards no goal. Always the open
road.
Having no direction even. Only the soul remaining true to herself in her going.
Meeting all the other wayfarers along the road. And how? How meet them, and
how pass? With sympathy says Whitman. "8
It is here - at the point in which Whitman introduces a notion of 'sympathy' into
his doctrine - that Lawrence balks; for he feels, not unreasonably, that Whitman
thereby funks the radical nature of his idea by confusing it with Christian charity
and the poisonous ideal of pity. Unable to move beyond good and evil, Whitman
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confuses the open road with the highroad of love. But Lawrence insists: "The
highroad of love is no open road. It is a narrow, tight way, where the soul walks
hemmed in between compulsions. "9 And ultimately, we know precisely where the
highway of love is taking us: "The highway of love ends at the foot of the
Cross"!", that is, in self-sacrifice, suffering, and death.
Lawrence is in little doubt that if Whitman's ethic of sympathy and his vision of
the open road is to be salvaged, it must be disengaged from Christian and
socialist moralism and coupled instead to his own creed of phallic tenderness.
When this is done, then sympathy, as a form of compassion, is understood
correctly in terms of touch and a meeting within the flow of desire. It does not
have anything to do with merging into oneness via an ideal identification with
those who suffer, or self-sacrifice, as Whitman continued to mistakenly believe;
and, indeed, as Parkin in The First Lady Chatterley believed.
Essentially, Lawrence's post-moral sympathy is related to Nietzsche's notion of
'benevolence' as developed in Human, All Too Human (see: vol. I., 2.49), and it
involves 'good naturedness' and a 'politeness of the heart', but not pity; traits
which Nietzsche argues are vital in the construction of a genume (phallic-
libidinous) culture (of touch). Once Lawrence has 'demoralized' the ethic of
sympathy, he is happy to accept and affirm Whitman's teaching of the open road
as a vital contribution to the development of a democracy of touch and
tenderness: "The true democracy, where soul meets soul ... and Iis I passed by or
greeted according to the soul's dictate." 11 And thus the democracy of touch
becomes finally a glad recognition of souls; "and a gladder worship of great and
greater souls, because they are the only riches." 1 2
IIl.iii. On a Woodpath: Heideggerean Aspects of the Democracy of Touch.
If, as Blanchot says, courage consists in daring to flee along the open road
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"rather than live tranquilly and hypocritically in false refuges" 13, so too does it
involve sometimes straying off the above road and wandering instead along what
Heidegger calls 'woodpaths' (Holzwege). To be on a woodpath means in everyday
German to be on the wrong track (to be confused and lost). Heidegger, however,
does not quite mean this when he uses the term; and certainly he does not regard
woodpaths negatively as dead-ends, or ways that lead nowhere. Rather:
"woodpaths always lead somewhere - but where they lead cannot be predicted or
controlled. They force us to plunge into unknown territory, and often to retrace
our steps." 14 So, at the risk of getting lost, let us briefly explore a wood path and
see where it takes us.
By retracing our steps somewhat, we return to the idea of a democracy of touch
as one firmly rooted in the body and in the earth; it is an organic notion of
culture as physis. Rootedness and organicism may have very little to do with
Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic and machinic thinking, but they are important
notions in Lawrence's work and in Heidegger's philosophy. Ultimately, the
democracy of touch cannot be fully understood without giving reference to these
notions and without acknowledging that it has a closer relation at last to the
nineteenth century Volkisch German tradition than it does to the anarcho-
surrealism of radical French thought in the twentieth century. Thus whilst the
democracy of touch does involve fleeing and travelling along the open road, so
too does it involve dwelling.
There seems to be a contradiction here: between fleeing and dwelling; nomadism
and rootedness. But actually, when we start to think both notions carefully, we
discover that there is no contradiction, or paradox. For the journey along the
open road is in intensity, not space. The trip is real, but is one made within the
fourth dimension, not necessarily in the realm of actual existence. Deleuze
constantly attempts to stress this fact; "the nomad is not necessarily one who
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moves: some voyages take place in situ" 15; i.e., if nomads move in order to
evade the codes and fixed ideals of settled peoples, this does not mean they are
migrants forever wandering the face of the earth, nor that they do not, in their
own way, dwell. For to dwell (Wohnen), in the philosophical sense developed by
Heidegger, does not mean to be static and to stay put: "When we speak of
dwelling we ... think of an activity that man performs alongside many other
activities ... We do not merely dwell - that would be virtual inactivity - we
practice a profession, we do business, we travel and find shelter on the way, now
here, now there." 16
In other words - and to reiterate - we travel and we dwell in the fourth
dimension, but we live all the while in this world too. To say that we dwell within
the fourth dimension is perhaps still to leave the question of wherein this
dimension we dwell. The answer is that man dwells within language and desire and
thus the tremendous importance of developing a language of the feelings, as
Lawrence attempts to develop in Lady Chatterley's Lover, so that we may thereby
be able to touch one another with our words. Thus too the importance of
responding to and moving within the flow of desire: "It is desire which keeps the
whole world living to me, keeps me in the flow, connected", writes Lawrence,
continuing: "It is my flow of desire that makes me move as the birds and animals
move ... In a kind of accomplished innocence, not shut out of the natural
paradise." 17
And so, as we suggested last chapter, it is possible for man to regain and dwell
within paradise; even if the thought of paradise has become for most men today
merely an 'inadequate fiction'. But this dwelling in paradise is not to reside in a
state of lazy contentment, such as the last man longs for. Rather, it is to
experience the peace that comes of fucking and which follows victory in war. This
peace and fulfilment is the positive 'freedom' Heidegger refers to in his work and
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which Nietzsche also promotes: "To free actually means to spare ... and takes
place when we leave something in its essence, when we return it specifically to its
essential being". 18 This is illustrated in Lady Chatterley's Lover by Connie and
Mellors, who 'free' one another in precisely this manner; the phallic body which
they constitute between them does not compromise the integrity of either, nor
does it bridge the pathos of distance between them as differently sexed creatures.
Each finds peace and freedom within this sanctuary of tenderness and desire;
peace as mortals who have intitiated their own being within the process of
becoming and as those who preserve the fourfold under the sky, on the earth,
and before the gods.
IIl.iv. Closing Remarks on Nietzsche and the Democracy of Touch.
The question to be asked at last is to what extent Lawrence's democracy of touch
is compatible with Nietzsche's own political philosophy and project of revaluation.
It is, of course, easy to find in Nietzsche's writings statements which appear to
support almost any perspective or argument; his aphorisms invite us as readers
to occupy them and invest them with our own interpretations and forces.
However, I do not feel that one has in some way to abuse the generosity of
Nietzsche's texts, or bring shame upon him as a thinker, in claiming that
Lawrence's notion of a democracy of touch is profoundly in keeping with the
spirit of the above. It is not just that the democracy of touch is rooted in the
body and nature, that it is based upon an aristocratic division of men into greater
and lesser souls, or that it is vehemently opposed to the scientific-industrial
modern age of liberalism and capitalism. It is also the fact that there are radical
and positive aspects to the democracy of touch which resonate closely with the
ideas Nietzsche puts forth in his mid-period work in particular. For example, in
the poem Future States Lawrence claims that:
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"Once men touch one another, then the modern industrial
form of machine civilization will melt away
and universalism and cosmopolitanism will cease ...
and there will be a vivid recoil into separateness;
many vivid small states, like a kaleidoscope ...
and all the differences given expression." 19
Such pluralism is consistently supported in Nietzsche's writings; he would have
been one of the first to attack the cant ideal of a 'global village' and seen that the
'new world order' (or California uber al/es) threatens to become a monstrous
super-state serving the interests of corporate-media capital and in which the
great movement is towards a mass-standardized identity behind an illusion of
'multi-cultural' and 'individual' freedom.
When Lawrence in a related poem entitled Future War, claims that the recoil into
genuine multiplicity and difference will alone guarantee a meaningful peace, he can
once again find support for such a view in Nietzsche. For Lawrence's desire for
peace is not a 'rational' one based upon what Nietzsche calls the "liberal-optimistic
world-view'r". rather it is the desire for peace that comes from difference and
from touch; a non-Christian longing for peace which Nietzsche - so often thought
of simply as the advocate of war and struggle - himself speaks of with hope: the
peace that is hard fought for and won by the brave and courageous; the peace
that comes on that 'great day' when:
"a nation distinguished for wars and victories
and for the highest development of military discipline and thinking .. , will cry of
its own free will 'we shall shatter the sword' ... and demolish its entire military
machine down to its last foundations. To disarm while being the best armed, out
of an elevation of sensibility - that is the way to realpeace",21
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Later, in the same work, Nietzsche concedes that even democratic institutions as
they are presently understood and operated, are valuable as "quarantine
arrangements to combat that ancient pestilence, lust for tyranny: as such they are
very useful and very boring." 22 But ultimately, Nietzsche wants to see the
overcoming of such a reactive and limited (and boring!) notion of democracy; i.e.,
to see a democracy of fear give way to one of exuberance and strength which,
like the democracy of touch, will: "create and guarantee as much independence as
possible; independence of opinion, of mode of life and of employment. "23 Such a
democracy yet to come is in stark contrast to the modern ideal: "That which now
calls itself democracy differs from older forms of government solely in that it
drives with new horses: the streets are still the same old streets, and the wheels
are likewise the same old wheels. "24
That is, the wheels of the moral-rational state machine which grinds man ever-
smaller, ever more alike, ever closer to the level of the last man; that is the
streets are the same ones that Connie found so hideous and depressing, lined with
row after row of scab-like houses of the kind which, when Zarathustra saw
similar constructions, caused him to ask: "'What do these houses mean? ... Did a
silly child perhaps take them out of its toy-box? ... And these sitting-rooms and
bedrooms: are men able to go in and out of them?"'25
Zarathustra wants what Connie wants and Nietzsche wants what Lawrence wants:
new houses and new streets; houses which are also dwelling places, streets which
are also open roads. And they want too new social, economic, political, and
cultural arrangements, in which the "three great enemies of independence in the
above threefold sense"26 have been abolished as classes of men: these enemies
being the indigent (i.e., the resentment-ridden poor and envious); the party-
political ascetics and militants who call for revolution and lust for revenge (eg.,
communists such as PI); and the rich who have lost touch and all understanding
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of the aristocratic motto Noblesse Oblige (eg., those like Sir Clifford Chatterley).
Thus, to conclude, we may say that Lawrence's democracy of touch is very much
a model that Nietzsche would have approved of - and, in fact, anticipated in
several ways. If it is a vision of a possible future, nevertheless it does involve a
return to forgotten forces and past values; our task being to reactivate these in
some manner and then construct new forms on the basis of them under the
determining conditions and within the context of the present. The project of
establishing a democracy of touch ties then closely to that of the revaluation; it is
a call, ultimately, to:
"reestablish the great relations which the grand idealists with
their underlying pessimism ... destroyed for us: Buddha, Plato, Jesus, they were
all utter pessimists as regards life, teaching that the only happiness lay in
abstracting oneself from life, the daily, yearly, seasonal life of birth and death
and fruition, and in the 'immutable' or eternal spirit. But now, after almost 3000
years ... we realise that such abstraction is neither bliss nor liberation, but
nullity. It brings dull inertia. And the great saviours and teachers only cut us off
from life. "27
And thus the politics of desire expands into a 'reckoning' (auseinandersetzung) at
last with the 'great saviours and teachers'; which means for us in the West, above
all, a reckoning with Christ: the Crucified.
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Chapter V: The Escaped Cock: Revaluation and
Resurrection: the Politics of Desire Part II.
Part I: Versus the Crucified.
I.i. Nietzsche as Anti-Christ.
In an early note from the Nachlass material Nietzsche writes: "Even mockery,
cynicism and hostility toward Christianity have run their course ... A considerate
and seemly abstention seems to me to be the only appropriate attitude". I And yet
by the end of his intellectual career Nietzsche has publically styled himself as the
'Anti-Christ', and is only too full of mockery, cynicism, and, above all, hostility
toward Christianity, which he now regards as "the extremist thinkable form of
corruption ... the one great curse, the one intrinsic depravity ... the one
immortal blemish of mankind"?
Daniel Breazeale notes with regard to this increase in hostility over the years that
it suggests Nietzsche's later, more negative appraisal of Christianity, is "based
upon a more profound analysis of religion in general and Christianity in
particular, rather than being in any sense a vestige of adolescent rebellion." 3 And
certainly, if one traces the development of Nietzsche'S attitude towards the
Church throughout the course of his work, this is revealed to be the case. To
trace such a development is to discover why Nietzsche is not simply being crassly
reductive in declaring his entire philosophical project can be understood in the
formula Dionysus versus the Crucified, nor simply being melodramatic to declare
himself the Anti-Christ. Of course, to trace such a development in any detail is
outside the scope of this thesis, limited as it is in length. However, we can and
must make a few brief remarks on Nietzsche and his complex relation to
Christianity.
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Whilst Nietzsche is keen to retrospectively persuade us that he was already a
crypto-anti-Christ in The Birth of Tragedy, the fact is that it is not really until
Human, All Too Human that his attitude towards Christianity begins to decisively
harden. For Nietzsche begins to realise that one cannot simply turn one's back
upon a phenomenon such as Christian-nihilism. Ultimately, one has also to attack
and offer an affirmative attempt at destruction (i.e., an active negation of the
negative), expressing new feelings and new drives as they come to dominance
within the will to power: "We negate and must negate because something in us
wants to live and affirm". 4
However, the overcoming of old ideals and beliefs, does not mean their complete
denial; Nietzsche is not one to dispute his own Christian inheritance and moral
background, no matter how great his hostility for the Crucified. As he confesses
in The Gay Science (V.377), if he is one of those who has outgrown Christianity
and who now feels adverse to it, this is "precisely because we have grown out of
it" .5 Nietzsche attempts to be as 'uncompromisingly upright' in his opposition to
Christianity, as his forefathers were in their loyalty to the faith.
In fact, Hollingdale suggests in the introduction to his translation of Zarathustra,
that in this work all of Nietzsche's ideas are an unconscious return of his youthful
Christian (specifically Lutheran) beliefs, if now "transformed and distorted almost
beyond recognition. "6 Certainly the work is written in a quasi-biblical style and
there is to be found a surprisingly positive portrayal of Jesus, in whose honesty
and integrity Zarathustra expresses confidence, arguing that the latter would
have, had he lived, recognized the error of his moral teachings and retracted
them accordingly:
'''Truly, too early died that Hebrew whom the preachers of slow death honour:
and that he died too early has since been a fatality for many. ...
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Had he only remained in the desert and far from the good and just! Perhaps he
would have learned to love the earth - and laughter as well!
Believe it my brothers! He died too early; he himself would have recanted his
teaching had he lived to my age! He was noble enough to recant!
But he was still immature. The youth loves immaturely and immaturely too he
hates men and the earth. "'7
This remarkable passage, in which Jesus is described as 'noble' and condemned
only on the grounds of 'irnmaturity'", is hugely important to our study here,
essentially forming a foreword to Lawrence's The Escaped Cock, which it
anticipates. For, as we shall see, what Lawrence attempts in this tale is to imagine
a resurrected and mature Jesus living a full life on earth and in the flesh, who
explicitly does retract his earlier teachings and renounce his mission.
Ultimately, Nietzsche and Lawrence cannot resist making an attempt (like William
Blake and others) to save Jesus from the Christians. Deleuze comments: "A
certain number of 'visionaries' have opposed Christ as an amorous person to
Christianity as a mortuary enterprise. Not that they have an overtly
accommodating attitude towards Christ, but they do feel the need to avoid
confusing him with Christianity. "9 This project of redeeming the Redeemer is not
merely a theological one. Rather, Nietzsche and Lawrence hope that by 'saving'
Jesus via a reinterpretation of his life and death, they may be able to secure and
guarantee the entire human future, which they believe to be under threat from the
sublime poison of morality. For Nietzsche in particular, it is imperative to
unmask Christian teaching and reveal it as a form of anarcho-nihilism. That is to
say, he wishes to meet the challenge of the Crucified at a political and cultural
level, as well as on an ethical and religious level. In the works following
Zarathustra, this becomes far more evident. Thus in Beyond Good and Evil,
Nietzsche is convinced of the fact that the above struggle must be intensified; for
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if, on the one hand, we have inestimable benefits to thank Christianity for, on the
other hand it has been responsible for the "corruption of the European race" 10
via its revaluation of all antique values and its preserving (and deification) of that
which and those who should be allowed to perish. The will within Christianity to
make of man the most "sublime abortion" 11 forces Nietzsche to conclude that it
has been the most terrible of events: "without any exaggeration ... the real
catastrophe in the history of the health of Europen man." 12
Having identified Christianity primarily in terms of sickness (a moral plague), the
Genealogy of Morals offers a critical and clinical diagnosis of the above via the
construction of a symptomatology t resscntiment, bad conscience etc.) and an
aetiology (the tracing of its causes in terms of forces: the genealogical method).
Nietzsche also offers us a prognosis (Christian morality will overcome itself) and
a course of treatment (the revaluation). It is not without good reason, therefore,
that Nietzsche thinks of himself as a 'physician of culture'. And nor is it merely
coincidental that the man who died rises as a healer, carrying a cock under his
arm a la Aesculapius.U The man who died as Aesculapius determines to heal the
soul of man which has been "voluntarily split within itself" 14 in a diabolical
process of "secret self-violation" .15 When asked by one of his former disciples
why he carries the bird, the man who died replies: "'I am a healer ... and the bird
have virtue'" (EC, p.S73). Undoubtedly the virtue of the cock is the virtue of life
as active power and affirmative will; it is the Orphic bird of resurrection and
fertility, symbolizing a different ideal to the ascetic ideal of self-division and self-
denial. The crowing of the cock is a call for man to renounce his renunciation of
worldly pleasures.
We cannot conclude this section without mentioning Nietzsche's most sustained
polemic against Christianity and the figure of the Crucified: The Anti-Christ. Here
too his real opponent is not Jesus, but that "genius of hatred" 16 Saint Paul.
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Deleuze writes:
"In Nietzsche, there is the great opposition between Christ and St.
Paul: Christ the softest, most amorous of the decadents, a kind of Buddha who
frees us from the domination of priests and the idea of fault, punishment,
reward, judgement, death ... this bearer of glad tidings is doubled by the black
Saint Paul, who keeps Christ on the Cross, ceaselessly leading him back to it,
making him rise from the dead, displacing the centre of gravity toward eternal
life, and inventing a new type of priest even more terrible than its
predecessors. "17
It is in their longing for judgement and retribution that those who call themselves
'Christians' (already a misunderstanding as Nietzsche says) are at their most
unevangelic. But if Nietzsche did not consider Jesus as one full of ressentiment
and the will to revenge, he does describe Jesus in The Anti-Christ as a decadent;
also an 'idiot' and a case of 'retarded puberty'; a 'holy anarchist' and one
suffering from a profound fear of being touched.
Of all these charges made against Jesus (repeated by Lawrence in his own work),
it is the latter which most interests us here; the notion of touch being so central
to a politics of desire as conceived in this thesis. Nietzsche argues that due to his
"morbid susceptibility of the sense of being touched" 18, Jesus shrank from every
form of physical contact and developed an "instinctive hatred of every reality"
coupled to a "profound discontent with the actual'T? world. In other words,
Christ's retreat into idealism and symbolism is a consequence of his "extreme
capacity for suffering and irritation". 20 His not wanting to be touched (noli me
tangere) is due to his feeling every contact too acutely. This is well illustrated by
Lawrence in The Escaped Cock. Even towards the end of the tale, when the man
who died wants more than anything to experience the touch of tenderness and
form a sexual relationship with the woman of Isis, he is deeply troubled and
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hesitant: "And inwardly, he was tremulous, thinking: 'Dare I come into touch'"
(EC, p.585). The problem is that the man who died equates touch with
compulsion and a violation of his intrinsic solitude (see p.574 of the tale). What
he has to learn is that there are forms of contact which heal and liberate, and his
relation with the priestess teaches him this. But it is not easy to come into living
touch and it requires courage: "I have dared to let them lay hands on me and put
me to death. But dare I come into this tender touch of life? Oh this is harder -"
(EC, pp.585-6). Finally, however, the man who died does find the required
courage, deciding that touch is the great atonement that puts one into vivid
contact with all the world and lies beyond prayer; that touch is the great
fulfilment for man; '''if I am naked enough for this contact, I have not died in
vain'" (ibid., p.591).
The man who died thus finds the delight of physical love and the peace that comes
of fucking; his only sorrow being that his Father kept the secret of tenderness
and desire hidden from him for so long. But Christ as St. Paul would conceive of
him, is forever denied such fulfilment in the flesh; he is left to find what
satisfaction he can via a life of inner experience and sensation; completely out of
touch with other men and women. Inhabiting the 'kingdom of heaven' which lies
within as a condition of the heart, may result in blessedness understood as the
absence of any contact or conflict, but it cannot lead to bliss as we defined it last
chapter in terms of desire. And if Christ's understanding of life based exclusively
upon inner truths, with "everything pertaining to nature, time, space, history"
simply seen as "signs or occasion for metaphor'S! makes him into the greatest of
all symbolists, so too does it make him a case of "retarded puberty'<-. as
Nietzsche memorably puts it, and by which he means to imply Christ lacks any
adult desires (for sexual contact, for friendship, for work and active engagement
in the social world), or complex and conflicting feelings. Michael Tanner correctly
writes: "Christ didn't suffer from his passions, because he didn't have any, at any
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rate not the ones that usually accompany adulthood. "23 Adding: "to cultivate
inwardness and nothing more, as Christ did, is to avoid life in an absolute ...
ultimately perverse fashion. "24 Again, this is what the man who died realises to
his acute shame; that what he was ultimately offering was not live love, but,
rather, the corpse of love. And what he asked for in return was a disembodied,
abstract love full of death and betrayal (see EC, p.S94).
To conclude then, we may say in agreement with Nietzsche that Christianity
teaches one profound misunderstanding above all others: a misunderstanding of
the body. And Christ's phobia has thus been interpreted as a sign of 'purity'; i.e.,
a sickness has been mistaken for holiness; a childish self-obsession for innocent
wonder. The result has been to turn making sick and making infantile into the
"true hidden objective of the Church's whole system of salvation procedures. "25
The symbol of Christ Crucified is thus the symbol of "the most subterranean
conspiracy there has ever been - a conspiracy against health, beauty, well-
constitutedness, bravery, intellect'S" and adulthood.
But if Christianity is a revolt against everything natural, so too IS it a revolt
against the social order and culture. as we have indicated. That is, a revolt
against all forms of hierarchy. caste, privilege, distinction etc. It is for this
reason that Nietzsche brands it as 'anarcho-nihilistic' and accuses Christ of being
"a holy anarchist who roused up the lowly, the outcasts and 'sinners', the
chandala within Judaism. to oppose the ruling order". 27 Jesus was therefore not
just an 'idiot' on Nietzsche's reading, but also a political criminal ("in so far as
political criminals were possible in an absurdly unpolitical society'<"). Perhaps not
a particularly successful political criminal - he was, after all, captured, convicted,
and executed by the Roman authorities, and that would have been the end of his
revolt in morals if it had not been for a far more astute and politically capable
figure: we refer of course to the apostle Paul. For Paul it was who latched on to
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the fact that it is not the life and practice of Jesus that really matters; but his
martyrdom and death. Unable to make little if any political capital out of the
former, via an ingenious interpretation and exploitation of the latter Paul finds a
way to "sum up everything down-trodden, everything in secret revolt, the entire
heritage of anarchist agitation in the Empire into a tremendous power." 29
Nowhere is this hidden power-spirit within Christianity and the lusting for
political revenge more in evidence that in the final book of the Bible: the
Revelation of St. John of Patmos. And nowhere is this work better analysed than
in Lawrence's study: Apocalypse.
I.ii. Lawrence as Apocalypsist.
"Remember I think Christ was profoundly, disastrously wrong." 30
"Jesus becomes more unsympatisch to me, the longer I live: crosses and nails and
tears and all that stuff! I think he showed us into a nice cul de sac. "31
"I agree with you, in a sense, I am with the Anti-Christ ... "32
These three brief extracts from Lawrence's letters tell us a good deal about his
relationship to Christianity; a relationship which, like Nietzsche's, is marked by an
increasing hostility over the years. His analysis of Christianity is in so many
important respects identical to Nietzsche's own that we needn't here spend time
tracing its development. Rather, we can concentrate our attention on what
Lawrence has to say in his final work, Apocalypse: a text in which "Lawrence
takes up Nietzsche's initiative by taking John of Patmos as his target, and no
longer St. Paul. Many things change or are supplemented from one initiative to
another, and even what they have in common gains in strength and novelty." 33
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The essential argument of Lawrence's Apocalypse is that it is only in Revelation
that we can hear the unmodulated voice of "popular religion as distinct from
thoughtful religion.v+' It is a voice that informs the Christianity not of Jesus, but
of Paul and John the Divine. If the former opens the way for the possibility of a
noble "Christianity of tenderness", this is closed down by the "Christianity of
self'-glorification'<> on behalf of the 'meek' and 'humble', as developed by the
latter saints, who, as Deleuze says, succeed in grafting onto Christ "a monstrous
ego".36 The almost Stoical teachings of Jesus, meant for the individual, are
substituted by a base philosophy aimed at the masses ("Platonism for the people",
as Nietzsche calls it37): "And we must confess, it is hideous. Self-righteousness,
self-conceit, self-importance, and secret envy underlie it all. "38
One of the central lies upon which this Christianity of the 'middling masses' is
constructed, is the lie of personal immortality. This, along with the deceit of
equality of all souls in the sight of God, serves only to flatter those "little bigots
and three-quarter madmen<? who imagine themselves to be the great measure
and meaning of all things and whom Paul knew needed to be seduced if a victory
over Rome and Roman values was to be achieved. Via these and other such lies,
Christianity "persuaded over to its side everything ill-constituted, rebellious-
minded, under-privileged, all the dross and refuse of mankind". 40
Nietzsche and Lawrence both deny and loathe the thought of personal
immortality. In The Will To Power (166), for example, Nietzsche writes: "nothing
was further from him rJesus 1 than the stupid nonsense of ... an eternal personal
survival. What he fights against is exaggerated inflation of the 'person"'. 41 It is
fear, of course, as well as egoism, which sits behind this willingness to believe in
the immortal I. Lawrence writes in The Escaped Cock: "It was fear, the ultimate
fear of death, that made men go mad ... For men and women alike were mad with
the egoistic fear of their own nothingness" (EC, p. 574). But the Church plays on
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and manipulates this fear; the symbol of God on the Cross explicitly promises
divine immortality to all those who accept Christ as their saviour: "Everything
that suffers, everything that hangs on the Cross is divine ... We all hang on the
Cross, consequently, we are divine"42; this is the absurd logic of the Crucified.
The Cross becomes not only the symbol of "the murdered Phallus" (FLC, p.lS7),
but also the symbol of the glorified ego. The enemy is not so much Jesus nailed
to the Cross, as all those who would keep him there and find their own triumph
and eternal self-preservation in the symbol of the martyred God. The last book
of the Bible is their book; a book of lies and resscntiment, full of the "vast anti-
will of the masses"43 (or the 'will to nothingness' as Nietzsche calls it). And yet:
"When we come to read it critically and seriously, we realise that the Apocalypse
reveals a profoundly important Christian doctrine ... perhaps the most effectual
doctrine in the Bible. That is, it has had a greater effect on second rate people
throughout the Christian ages, than any other book of the Bible. "44
And this is because, argues Lawrence, if on the one hand it contains a will to the
destruction of "all mastery, all lordship and all human splendour+>. so too does
it reveal a "strange will to a strange kind of power". 46 This may be a wholly
negative and negating power - the reactive power of the mass and of bullying
authority - but it is important we acknowledge it, for it is a will to power and it
is the dominant will within modern society, both religiously and politically.
Power: this remains the great problem that always returns to us. To understand
the puzzle of Revelation we must begin to understand the power-urge expressed
therein. For Lawrence, with this strange and disturbing book "there crept into
the New Testament the grand Christian enemy, the Power-spirit. "47 And this was
as inevitable as the kiss from Judas: "Why? Becaue the nature of man demands it,
and will always demand it. "48 Why? Because the nature of man is will to power
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and not will to impotence. But, unfortunately, the will to power 'sanctified' within
Revelation is a frustrated and perverted thing; a negative will composed of
predominantly reactive forces. John of Patmos does not know how or what it is
to affirm; he can only negate. His is a slave's conception of power; i.e., not the
power of creation, but only of judgement and damnation; the power that belongs
not to the living, but to the dead. Deleuze is not wrong to describe Revelation as
a "book of zombies. "49
And yet, even when it is power at its most ugly and reactive, still one is glad in
some manner to see some notion of power (other than the so-called 'power of
love') raise its head at last in the Bible. For as Lawrence says, the nature of man
demands such; that is, the collective nature of man. For perhaps, when he is
alone, a man can be a Christian, but: "When he is with other men, instantly
distinctions occur, and levels are formed. . .. As soon as two or three men come
together ... then power comes into being". so
If Lawrence is pleased to see the return of what is repressed throughout the rest
of the Bible, namely, power, he is even happier to see a reactivation of a pagan
element; if massively distorted by and buried under Jewish and Christian strata.
The Apocalypse of St. John is, in its wanting to judge and punish, in its call for
destruction of the natural world, and in its almost limitless lust for revenge,
essentially Jewish, and as Deleuze points out "it is not difficult to demonstrate the
Jewish sources of the Apocalypse at every point". 51 But what interests Lawrence
is the resurfacing from time to time of pre- and non-Judaic elements. Paul
chooses to suppress pagan sources as far as possible; to disconnect Christianity
from its religious background, and he exercises great skill and enthusiasm in
doing so. But John reactivates and redirects pagan symbols and myths for his
own end, and this excites Lawrence who, "with all his horror of the Apocalypse",
nevertheless pushes on with his study of the work "experiencing an obscure
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sympathy, even a kind of admiration for this book". 52
But let there be no confusion here: although the Apocalypse of St. John does
contain some hint of the true and positive power-spirit via its reactivated
paganism, the use to which John puts this - namely, the destruction not just of
Rome, but of the entire cosmos - is horrible and repellent, resounding as it does
with "the dangerous snarl of the frustrated, suppressed collective self, the
frustrated power-spirit in man, vengeful. "53 John does not simply want to seize
the power of the Roman Empire for himself, but to destroy such power and
replace it with a wholly negative form of power (a sort of anti-power) that is
both anti-social and almost anti-human: a final power belonging to the last men;
i.e., the community of saints and saved brethren. As Nietzsche notes; "in Rome,
the Jew was looked upon as convicted of hatred against the whole of mankind" .54
Not surprisingly, therefore, Lawrence "soon recovers all his distrust and horror
for John of Patmos'Y, contemptuous of the will to revenge and self-glorification
and the will to forever have the final word. But the question we must ask is: Is
Christ himself blameless? That is, can we simply accuse Paul and John of
constructing between them a faith based upon the promise (threat) of a new
Jerusalem that violently distorts the Gospel of Love as taught by Jesus, or does
Christ himself bear a degree of responsibility for the emergence and eventual
victory of the Crucified? Perhaps his ideal and bodiless love was bound to issue in
John's hatred just as it inevitably invited betrayal? Ultimately, Lawrence is
brought to this conclusion. Thus for all his attempts to save Jesus and distinguish
the bringer of glad tidings from the emaciated figure on the Cross, Lawrence
acknowledges that the real problem begins with Christ's love itself; i.e., that
which we have already seen to have been deathly and full of compulsion. It is this
alone which permits a wholly negative religion to be built upon a noble and
positive message of tenderness. Ultimately, writes Lawrence, Jesus and John are
"two sides of the same medal. "56
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Above all, Jesus is profoundly and disastrously mistaken in his one-sided
insistence on love and in his perverse inner-absorption. He succeeds in giving an
impossible ideal for the ideal individual, but, by refusing to think of real men as
social beings and in effectively abandoning any concern with power and politics
(thereby surrendering such to the State and those individuals like John up against
the reality of the State), he was, argues Lawrence, hugely naive and irresponsible:
"Jesus saw the individual only, and considered only the individual. He left it to
John of Patmos ... to formulate the Christian vision of the Christian State. John
did it in Apocalypse. It entails the destruction of the whole world, and the reign
of saints in ultimate bodiless glory." 57
The Apocalypse shows us the Crucified in relation to Rome, the world, and the
cosmos: "It shows him in mad hostility to all of them, having, in the end, to will
the destruction of them all. "58 It is the other side of Chist's love, and it means
suicide and murder en masse. Arguably, it is towards this time of fatal nihilism
and world-destruction that we move today. This is why Mara Kalnins is right to
say in her 1995 introduction to Lawrence's study that the latter remains far from
simply being "an esoteric enquiry into an obscure book of the Bible, with which
few people nowadays are familiar".59 It is, like John's Revelation itself, a vitally
important "book to conjure with. "60
It is also, despite its apocalyptic theme, a joyful message of hope for the future;
"one last glad tiding", as Deleuze says."! For it expresses Lawrence's belief that
man can, if he so wishes, find a way to come back into touch and reestablish the
living connections which he has spent the last 2,500 years denying or attempting
to break. Lawrence's final work challenges us to "institute, find, or recover a
maximum of connections'<- and to revalue values. But whilst we need to
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proliferate all manner of relations, we must, warns Lawrence, also break those
false bonds; particularly those which tie us to capital: "According to Lawrence's
critique, money, like love, must be reproached not for being a flow, but for being
a false connection that mints subjects and objects'v-' and in this way keeps us
separated off from the world around us.
To conclude, then, we may say that Lawrence's Apocalypse is a passionate call for
man to rediscover an essentially cosmic-religious (God-free) way of living.
Rejecting the promise of "petty little personal salvation, petty morality'P", he
expresses his "immense yearning to be ... back in the far-off world before man
became 'afraid'. We want to be freed from our tight little automatic 'universe', to
go back to the great living cosmos of the 'unenlightened' pagansl'<> Lawrence is
not being sentimental or reactionary here; for he is not naively advocating a
creeping back into old shells; the old certainties, beliefs, forms, and connections
are broken, or of little or no use to us. Lawrence is acutely aware of the fact
that: "We can never recover an aid vision, once it hs been supplanted. "66 But
what we can attempt to do is "discover a new vision in harmony with the
memories of old, far-off, far-off experience that lie within us. "67 This is surely,
in part at least, precisely what Nietzsche attempts within his Dionysian
philosophy. What he and Lawrence tell us is that whilst God may be dead, we are
not - and neither is the cosmos, even if we have fallen out of touch with the
latter and into sterile and automatic egoism. By coming out of responsive
connection with the sun and stars (as well as other cosmic bodies), we have made
an essentially tragic excursion into the void of pure abstraction. Lawrence insists
on the vital correspondence between ourselves and the heavens; in fact, he
argues: "We and the cosmos are one. The cosmos is the vast living body, of
which we are still parts. "68 And this, he claims, is literally true, as men knew in
the past (and will do again). If to the modern mind this sounds like mystical
nonsense, "that is merely because we are fools."69 Our task today, then, is to
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develop new forms of consciousness and new feelings, and to not only 'get back'
our bodies, but to get back into relation with the cosmos: "and it can't be done
by a trick. The great range of responses that have fallen dead in us have to come
to life again. It has taken 2000 years to kill them. Who knows how long it will
take to bring them to life?"?" The revaluation of all values is a project of
generations and one of the key words remains the word of the unborn day:
Resurrection.
Part II: Remarks on Lawrence's The Escaped Cock in Relation to Death, Sex, and
the Resurrection into Touch.
We saw last chapter Tommy Dukes call for two things: firstly, a democracy of
touch; secondly, the resurrection of the body. Only, it was argued, once the
latter has been achieved will we be able to set about the building of the former.
So it is that the resurrection of the body remains our central concern here. But
which body? Whose body? Last chapter we formulated an answer to the first of
these questions in terms of the phallic body (or what Deleuze and Guattari term,
after Artaud, the body without organs); contrasting this with the metaphysical
organism, or ideal corpse-body. We then related the building of such a body to
the becomings within active desire of Constance Chatterley and her lover, Oliver
Mellors. Here, however, it will be in relation to the man who died and his
resurrection, his becoming, in relation to the Priestess of Isis.
The Escaped Cock is Lawrence's revaluation of the death and rebirth of Jesus.'
He provides a brief summary of the first part of the tale himself in a letter:
"I wrote a story of the resurrection; where Jesus gets up and feels very sick
about everything, and can't stand the old crowd any more - so cuts out - and as
he heals up, he begins to find out what an astonishing place the phenomenal world
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IS, far more marvellous than any salvation or heaven - and thanks his lucky stars
that he needn't have a 'mission' any more. "2
It is in the second part of the tale, however, where Lawrence attempts something
far more daring and philosophically profound; namely, the transformation via
desire and sexual contact with a pagan priestess of the newly risen man who died
into a potent and affirmative man of flesh, as well as the man-god assemblage
Osiris (Dionysus); i.e., an altogether different form to the Christ-figure he had
been. The man who died gets back his body via a surrender of his old
identity/subjectivity and by losing the face of Christ. In other words, not only
does the man who died come down off the Cross and surrender the Crown of
Thorns, so too does he rise into anonymity and forgetfulness (these belonging to
innocence) .
Lawrence is enabled and encouraged to attempt such a bold and overt revaluation
of Christian teaching by his reading of Nietzsche, of pre-Socratic philosophy, and
a wide range of works on religious mythology. For via the above, Lawrence had
available to him "an older tradition of resurrection symbolism which had none of
Christianity's bitterness against the earth and fear of the flesh. Christ is
subsumed in the larger tradition of torn and regenerated fertility gods." 3
The lesson which Lawrence hopes to teach via his attempt to put the man who
died back into religious context and offer a glimpse of an older, pre-Christian,
'phallic' religion, is simple: each man must be willing to die and then resurrect
into a new life having been dipped in oblivion. Unfortunately, this remains as
difficult to accept today as it has always been.
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Accepted or not by the majority, it is a lesson reflected in the work of other
post-Nietzschean thinkers. Thus, for example, when Lawrence says in verse:
"Sing the song of death, 0 sing it! / for without the song of death, the song of
life / becomes pointless and silly'l", we cannot help but be reminded of
Heidegger's insistence in Being and Time on the importance of Dasein facing up to
its own mortality. George Steiner conveniently sums this point up:
"Dasein can come to grasp its own wholeness and meaningfulness ... only when it
faces its 'no-longer-being-there' (sein Nicht-mehr-dasein) .... Dasein ... has
access to the meaning of being because, and only because, that being is finite.
Authentic being is, therefore, a being-to wards-death, a Scin-zum-tode ".5
We first approach and gain an experience of death via the death of others and via
the death of our gods. However, no matter how profound our understanding of
the death of others is, each one of us must ultimately experience our own death:
Each one of us must, as Lawrence would say, prepare his or her own 'ship of
death'." To quote from Steiner's reading of Heidegger once more:
"an authentic death has to be striven for. A true being-towards-the-end is one
which labours consciously towards fulfilment and refuses inertia; it is one which
seeks an ontological grasp of its own finitude rather than taking refuge in the
banal conventionality of general biological extinction. "7
Central of course to this taking upon oneself an authentic death in which the
nearness of nothingness is acknowledged and one concedes the need to be made
nothing, is the notion of Angst. Angst is a facing up to the fact that one's being
rests upon non-being and the waters of oblivion. And it is vital: "those who
would rob us of this anxiety - be they priests, physicians, mystics or rationalist
quacks - by transforming it into either fear or genteel indifference, alienate us
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from life itself. Or, more exactly, they insulate us from a fundamental source of
freedom. "8 For freedom, ultimately, is the freedom to die many deaths in one's
own way and to rise anew, transformed like the phoenix, from out of death back
into life and the greater health.
Essentially, this analysis of death found in both Lawrence and Heidegger, is a
pessimistic and tragic one; but it is not romantic, nor "all too typical of Teutonic
death-obsessions and portentious fatality. "9 Those critics and commentators who
dismiss it as such are often the same ones who miss its full philosophical
significance; i.e., without finitude there can be no freedom or active life. As
Steiner correctly points out, this conclusion means we have arrived "at the
antipodes to Plato." 10
The problem is, as we have said, most men even when seemingly full of the
courage for death, lack the desire to resurrect once more into the flesh; i.e., they
lack the greater courage for life (and thus fail the existential test of Nietzsche's
eternal recurrence: see BI.i.). Thus, thinking back to Sir Clifford Chatterley, we
find a man prepared to make the descent for king and country into a man-made
hell (i.e., the trenches of the Great War) and therein undergo a death experience,
but lacking the affirmative will to then make the ascent into a new post-decadent
(and overhuman) life; to achieve the resurrection of the body and an "immortality
of the flesh" (FLC, p.66).
In fact, such a resurrection and such an immortality holds no interest to those
such as Clifford Chatterley: what they lust after is something else entirely; "the
private and egoistic resurrection of sprit, into the ideal eternity" (JTLJ, p.70). It
is this personal salvation they value; not the vision of life and death imagined by
Tommy Dukes wherein men rise up again "'with new flesh on their spirits, and
new feelings in the flesh, and a new fire to erect the phallus" (ibid.). But it is this
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latter 'immortality' which is achieved by both Dionysus and the man who died,
who by dying 'authentically' amid the flames of a fire-death, are able to rise into
the unborn day.
Clifford, like all the decadent-idealists related to him from Plato down, wants
merely to explore the death that is within him; just as he toys with his sex in
order to experience the thrill of disintegrative sensation and arrive at a new piece
of knowledge. Not for one moment does he want to let go of his precious ego or
his assertive (but non-affirmative) will. If he wants to know of death, so too does
he wish to secure himself forever in an ideal self. Thus the immortality of the
flesh desired by Dukes means nothing to Clifford. Such immortality is, as he
rightly points out in objection, "merely temporal" (ibid.), and thus, to him,
worthless and meaningless. For Clifford cannot conceive of valuing, loving, and
affirming the temporal nature of existence; cannot begin to appreciate the very
timeliness of time and its passing, or that: "Even eternity is in rhythms" (JTLJ,
p.70). Ultimately, Clifford belongs to one of the damned; i.e., he is one of those
unhappy souls "that cannot die and become silent / but must ever struggle on to
assert themselves.") I Unhappy because: "No man unless he has died, and /
learned to be alone / will ever come into touch." 12 Unhappy because he cannot
bring himself to love fate, but is one of those eaten up with having to care about
what will become of him "and who dare not die for fear they should be nothing at
all" .13
Here then, described in snippets of Lawrencean verse, is Clifford Chatterley: the
nihilist obsessed with preserving his own vacuous ego and emotional emptiness.
Death, the thing he wishes to know of but avoid, is the only cure for him and
men like him; men, indeed, like Jesus who are entirely closed off and self-
absorbed, concerned only with their own inner-sensations and entirely out of
touch with the world external to themselves. Men with bodies over which nothing
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can pass, desire cannot flow. When Christ cries out upon his Cross: 'Father, why
hast thou abandoned me?' one does not doubt his pain and confusion; for
understanding nothing of why he has been brought to the Cross, nor does he
understand why he must die upon it. Doesn't understand, that is, that no one,
not even God, "can put back a human life into connection with the living cosmos /
once the connection has been broken / and the person has become fatally self-
centred. "14 Death alone in such circumstances can serve; death not only as that
which results in disintegration, but also transfiguration (i.e., death as a process
and not a goal, or consummation). Let us be clear on this point, if there is a
negative representation of death ("death conceived as a judgement which denies,
restricts and condemns"), so too is there a positive experience of death ("death
experienced as transportation, a flight, a dissolution and passage, true
becorningvj->: a heat-death and a fire-death.
This is such a vital point, that we are obliged to discuss it further. The first
negative image of death - death as a terminal fact which comes at the end of life -
is of little interest to us here, even though it is and remains the predominant
image of death "formed from the restricted point of view of the ego" 16, and
accepted by most people to be death per se. What we are keen to develop here is
the latter; i.e., the death that Nietzsche in his Dionysian philosophy, Lawrence in
his last poems and late fictional and prose work, and Deleuze in his philosophy of
difference, are all interested in: a death which is, as Keith Ansell-Pearson
recognizes: "exemplified in, but not restricted to, the death of the gods" 17 and
which takes place endlessly in a wide variety of ways. Similarly, when gods are
reborn they rise in many different ways and there is a multiplicity of
interpretations possible of any resurrection. Deleuze, whilst recognizing that there
are many forces capable of seizing hold of Christ's story, insists that "we are still
waiting for the forces or the power which will carry this death to its highest
point and make it into something more than an apparent and abstract death." 18
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But one would argue that in The Escaped Cock Lawrence supplies such forces or
power; that he gives us here an interpretation not only in an active and
affirmative sense, but in the profound sense that Nietzsche means by the term;
i.e., not merely a development of uninterrupted symbol with which, according to
Deleuze, the dialectic invariably confuses interpretation. Lawrence's interpretation
is arguably not only philosophically more developed than Paul's, but it is also
truer both to the spirit of the Gospels and to the great pagan tradition out of
which Christianity in part grew. Were his story of the man who died to be
accepted and taught, it could possibly serve not only as an important foundation
for a wider revaluation of values, but also, ironically, as a means by which the
Church could itself achieve a resurrection and new becoming. However, as it is
the Church of the Crucified prefers to go on either funking or deliberately
distorting the story of Jesus, preventing us from knowing him as we may still
perhaps one day know him; i.e., as a bringer of glad tidings and a "wonderful
initiator into death for rebirth". 19
Essentially, then, all three of the above (Nietzsche, Lawrence, and Deleuze) are
each in their own way attempting to enter an element of difference into death,
thereby engineering a revaluation of the latter by breaking up its homogeneity and
unity. If Deleuze is most commonly associated with this project, he is anticipated
nevertheless by both Nietzsche and Lawrence; the former demanding that we
rethink our relation to the dead world of matter, understanding our own 'return
to the inanimate' as a reconcilation with what is actual and a chance to perfect
ourselves once more.
Death, then, signals change or transformation; it is not the opposite of life, or
the end of life, but its true womb. Consummatum est does not mean 'all is
finished', as Jesus thought, rather: "It means: the step is taken."20 That is, the
step into death, but not the final step; for there is still another step - in fact, a
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whole series of other steps - to be taken beyond the tomb and back into the flesh
and new life. But not all men can take this step. Some, like Clifford Chatterley,
are crippled in one way or another. Some like to remain on the Cross from which
they can look down upon life and curse it: the Crucified. Some like to remain in
the tomb, swathed and shrouded in bandages like an Egyptian mummy; they lack
the strength or the desire to roll away the rock from the mouth of the cave, and
besides, it's comfortable in the tomb, and safe. These latter are the last men that
Nietzsche so despises. Between them - the crippled, the Crucified, and the
cowardly - they constitute the vast majority of men today: herd humanity.
What hope is there, one might ask, for a resurrection of the body when it is
negated by the dead weight of a whole legion of zombies and kept nailed to a
cross, or wrapped in a tomb? Seemingly little. And yet some, like Connie,
maintain faith in the possibility: "'The human body is only just coming to real
life''', she gaily informs Clifford: "'With the Greeks it gave a lovely flicker, then
Plato and Aristotle killed it, and Jesus finished it off. But now the body is coming
really to life, is really rising from the tomb. And it will be a lovely, lovely life in
the lovely universe, the life of the human body'" (LCL, pp.234-5). What
Lawrence attempts in The Escaped Cock is to show that she is right: and if Jesus
is the one who finished the body off with his fatal sayings and teachings, as
Connie claims, then he has to be the one to bring it back to life. The really rather
terrible story of Christ remains for us modern Europeans central to our self-
understanding. The Christian era ends not merely with Jesus hanging limply on
the Cross, but with the prolonged half-death of all men: we have all been
crucified in one way or another: "No doubt the death was necessary. It is the
long, slow death of society which parallels the quick death of Jesus and the other
dying gods", writes Lawrence, who continues with the warning: "It is death none
the less, and will end in the annihilation of the human race ... unless there is a
change, a resurrection, and a return to the cosmos. "21
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Tommy Dukes understands this; he is painfully aware of how the men of his
generation (including himself), having survived the death of God and the Great
War, are "struggling for the life that should be theirs" (JTLJ, p.68). A life they
are denied, trapped still as they are within the old ideals, conventions, and
organisms: "Their bodies were the old tormented bodies which had died, but
which had not yet come to life again. The spirit was struggling into new life, a
resurrection. But the body was not yet filled with new blood and fire" (JTLJ,
pp.68-9).
In Christian terms, Lawrence is arguing that now is the period betwen Good
Friday and Easter Sunday; i.e., the time in the tomb, suspended between life and
death. Nietzsche calls this the time of 'incomplete nihilism'; a strange, dim, grey
era of uncertainty and confusion. The great and very real danger is that men will
fail to find the resources to take them beyond this stage and over themselves, as
every caterpillar must if she is to leave the chrysalis as a creature transformed
and reborn: "perhaps they would never ascend really into life. They would remain
the shadowy, almost incorporeal beings of the era between the rolling open of the
tomb, and the ascending into the firmament of a new body" (ibid., p. 69).
But, on the other hand, perhaps it will be the case that the man who died will
show a few men the way forward, via his leap into the tide of new life and the
unresolved wonder thereof: the future is uncertain. What is for sure, is that we
have experienced death in the negative sense for too long; and for too long have
we allowed ourselves to be bullied into accepting that only once we had enveloped
"the world in a vast unison of death"ZZ could there be achieved the goal of
'universal salvation'. Now we begin to realize that it is impossible to all die the
same death once and for all, because death is a multiple phenomenon and each
man must be allowed and encouraged to die many times in many different ways if
ever he is to live.
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Of course, this is not to say that we can simply move from one understanding of
death to another overnight. Death in its reactive representation must first be fully
understood by those few who can "go through the final pain" of such knowledge
and accept the "bitter necessity to understand the death that has been" .23 When
these initiators pass clear and transform death into something gay and joyous (a
veritable festival of death), then, finally, perhaps we may all leave the old idea of
death behind. Dionysus is one such Lord of Death; and so too the man who died.
We may conclude our thoughts on death by saying that it is not that one is
necessarily reborn from one's time in the tomb a 'better' person, but one usually
emerges a different person; often a more profound type as Nietzsche says, or,
with reference to the case of Jesus, more mature. And this is so even when the
sign of one's new profundity is a new-found delight in things of the surface; the
sign of one's maturity is a certain playfulness. One becomes, in a word, more
'Greek', as Nietzche understands the latter: Christ is crucified as a Jew, but the
man who died resurrects as a Hellenic type.24 Thus we witness him coming into
awareness of the 'phenomenal' world and learning how to affirm life "at the
surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance". 2S For the first time, the man
who died learns how to see the world with eyes full of wonder, like the child, for
'''there is more child in the man than in the youth, and less melancholy: he has a
better understanding of life and death. "'26 An understanding based upon a notion
of difference and an affirmation of such: "Strange is the phenomenal world
And life bubbles so variously. Why should I ever have wanted it to bubble all
alike?" (EC, p.572).
If the man who died discovers wonder, so too does he find courage: the courage
which is needed "to survive and flourish in the face of life, which by definition
bears with it an enormous quantum of pain" 27, as well as joy. Courage also to
come into touch; sexually with a woman and socially with his fellow men. We
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shall discuss the latter connection In part III. iii of this chapter, but let me
immediately state my view that those who argue that in The Escaped Cock
Lawrence is only concerned with "personal regeneration" 28, and not attempting to
offer an important cultural critique, or serious socio-historical reinterpretation,
are profoundly mistaken. As we have argued throughout this thesis, Lawrence's
political concerns, like Nietzsche's, are not merely an eccentric and insignificant
"branch of his ideas about religion" .29 They are, on the contrary, central to his
work and remain of relevance to many of the present debates within political and
cultural theory. Having reiterated this, let us now examine the erotic aspect of
the man who died and his resurrection.
In the First Lady Chatterley, Connie asks Clifford: "'Do you think it was right
for Jesus to say to woman: 'Go, and sin no more'? After all, he was only a man!
... Not a woman himself!'" (FLC, p.l33). Clifford is amused, but irritated by the
question. Connie continues: "'Supposing the woman had said: 'Come thou, and sin
with me!' Wouldn't it have been better, do you think?'" (ibid.). Clifford replies
that Jesus wouldn't have gone - and probably he is right. But the man who died
does go unto woman; does give in to the temptations of the flesh and surrender
himself up to desire at last. And his going unto woman is the ultimate and most
crucial stage of his resurrection as a man uncrucified; the means by which he
overcomes his fear, his pain, the last traces of his old self and loses the "sour
smell of entropic decay" 30, i.e., the stink of death and the tomb.
By gomg unto woman, the man who died learns that there are many ways of
entering into holy communion; many ways of serving and showing one's love for
God, without having to be nailed to a cross. He realizes that the only 'sin' lies not
in knowledge of sex, or the active engagement in carnal pleasures, but in "turning
away from the world, from chance, from the truth of bodies+.U And he realizes
that sexual abstinence is a form of greed and vanity; a withholding of that which
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should be shared. One must give and take of the self, whilst not giving oneself
away or holding oneself back entirely (see EC, p.565 where the man who died
tries to make this clear to Mary Magdalene).
Like Connie Chatterley, the man who died also discovers his nakedness. Although
stripped of clothes when put on the Cross, he was never really naked - merely
exposed. For without having a body, only a face, naked he could not be. The
woman of Isis helps him attain a living body replete with its own forces, its own
beauty, and its own nakedness; a body without organs and without any facial
overcoding. She gives him physical and sexual significance, awakening in him "an
awareness of physical touch (touch of bodies, hands, moist lips)". 32
His wounds are sealed, and yet he is fully opened for the first time to the flow of
desire; i.e., opened to all those strange forces external to himself, thereby
allowing various intensities to pass across his body. Between the arms and legs of
the woman of Isis he loses his old interiority, and in combination with her he
forms a "circuit of intensities between male and female energy'T' (what Lawrence
calls the 'phallic body'). It is at this point that the lovers "lose themselves in
sweet, shared slime"34 and achieve a state of bliss; a form of joy that is immanent
to desire and related to the jouissance of the greater day, not the plaisir of the
common day, as understood by the slave and promised by the prostitute, whose
pleasure is always "suffused by anxiety, shame, and guilt." 35
The priestess of Isis washes away the nausea and the tiredness of the man who
died, not with tears, but with the secretions of her vagina; he is bathed and oiled
by the woman, so that by the end of the tale he has rid himself, as we have said,
of the odour of death and the ghostly anaemic look of Christ; the 'pale Galilean' is
finally conquered. The skin of the man who died takes on a little colour, as well
as the smell of the woman's scent, which, we are told, is like the "essence of
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roses" (EC, p.600); i.e., the beautiful perfume of love and life.
Ultimately, the man who died rises into virile manhood and sovereignty; into his
lordship. He has not escaped death, so much as left behind him the fear and
anguish of death, as well as that which is most often coupled to these things,
namely, the ressentiment directed towards a life which is mortal and lived within
time. By giving us a Jesus who does not ascend unto Heaven in a cloud - and
who does not want to ascend thus; a Jesus who rises in the flesh and
acknowledges his Father as the Flesh (and not the Spirit or Logos), Lawrence
gives us an important and radical new vision of Christ and of ourselves. The
question remains: can we accept this vision of the man who died and of ourselves
as risen lord? We have shown ourselves capable of accepting Christ on the Cross,
Christ in the Tomb, Christ ascending to Heaven with a puff of smoke, Christ as a
"unity of love and reactive life". 36 But Christ risen in the flesh and in touch with
the physical world, Christ who promises us not salvation, but "the unknown joy,
the unknown happiness" and communion with the "unknown God" 39, this Christ
we still seem wary of and even hostile to. However, let us not conclude on a sour
note. For while we may be certain that the reign of the negative has not yet
moved towards completion, still in The Escaped Cock Lawrence gives us hope for
the future: "Tomorrow is another day" (EC, p.600).
Part III: Political and Ethical Considerations.
UI.i. The Man Who Died and the Eternal Recurrence.
"If the eternal return speaks of death and rebirth ... what kind of death belongs
to the eternal return? A heat-death or a fire-death?" 1 Whilst the answer to this
question is undoubtedly both, here we will be stressing the latter as we examine
the death and resurrection of the man who died in relation to Nietzsche's great
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teaching of recurrence. This is not to deny, however, that for most men the
eternal return seems to threaten only the crushing return and certainty of the
former; it would hardly function as a cultivating idea or existential test if this
were not the case, and this is clearly a vital aspect of Nietzsche's thought-
experiment .
But there are other men, if lesser in number, who find the courage to pass the
test of the eternal recurrence and uncover its secret, thereby finding themselves
initiated into a different faith. For these men, wise in the way of the circle, the
phoenix always rises in gleaming new feathers and the eternal return of death
"does not mean that one undergoes the same death again and again", for the death
belonging to the eternal return "is a plural one assuming multiple disguises". 2
Likewise, one is not born and reborn into an identical life again and again; the
same (das Gleich) is not a fixed essence and does not refer to a content in and of
itself; "but rather must be taken to refer to the act of returning irevenir; itself."3
We leave the tomb as the man who died leaves it: transformed and in the process
all the while of becoming-other. As Klossowski argues, the eternal return is, in
a sense, Nietzsche's version of the transmigration of souls (metempsychosis)." In
as much as this doctrine does allow for the construction of a conception of
identity, it is one that is "compatible with embodied experience and historicity ...
constructed and reconstructed ... by means of engaging with the world." 5
Essentially then, the eternal return forms a Dionysian ethic of repetition and the
difference engendered by it. It is the culminating thought of Nietzsche's
philosophy of becoming, incorporating but profoundly developing his earlier
related formulations of living dangerously and loving fate. It is, of course, a
post-moral and as such anti-Christian ethic par excellence in as much as it rejects
judgement in favour of an affirmation of innocence and 'dead certainty' in favour
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of chance. Appropriately, this ethic is introduced into Nietzsche's text by a demon
(see The Gay Science, IV.341; a passage which remains central to an
understanding of the eternal recurrence).
It is a teaching which is also well illustrated in theory and practice in Lawrence's
The Escaped Cock. For if the man who died is portrayed as one who learns how
to embrace a woman, so too is he shown as one who manages to think the
thought of recurrence and ultimately to "crave nothing more fervently than this
ultimate eternal confirmation and seal. "6 And this because the man who died
resurrects into a way of living that makes such a thought not only bearable, but
beautiful. But this does not come easily; at first, just after awakening from his
death-sleep, he is still very much full of pain and nausea; "the sickness of
unspeakable disillusion" (EC, p.SS7). In an important passage, Lawrence writes:
"He could move if he wanted: he knew that. But he had no want. Who would
want to come back from the dead? A deep, deep nausea stirred in him, at the
premonition of movement. He resented the fact of ... the moving back into
consciousness. He had not wished it. He had wanted to stay outside, in the place
where even memory is stone dead.
But now something had returned him ... and in the return he lay overcome with a
sense of nausea" (EC, p.SS6 - my emphasis added).
Clearly the demon has crept after the man who died, crept into his tomb and into
his 'loneliest loneliness', and whispered to him the thought of recurrence. And
this thought almost crushes him with nausea and it seems at first as if the man
who died will fail the test of the eternal return, for he doesn't want to be
returned to a world which put him to death and caused him so much suffering.
"To be back! To be back again, after all that!" (EC, p.SS7), he thinks to himself,
and he is shocked to discover that after all the horror he has experienced, the
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night to which he returns is still the same night, and the day the same day; i.e.,
that his personal death has not signalled the end of the world. The latter returns:
"the same as ever ... thronging with greenness, a nightingale winsomely,
wistfully, coaxingly calling ... the natural world of morning and evening, for ever
undying" (EC, pp.S57-8).
But it is the song of the nightingale which awakens within him a new feeling
beneath his nausea; "a resolution of which he was not even aware" (EC, p.S58). A
determination to live and to affirm the thought of the eternal return. Gradually,
the man who died realizes that blessed is the soul that listens to the voice of its
demon; for it becomes, as the Greeks knew, eudaimon, or joyful. And so he
leaves his tomb and, a little later, encounters the escaped cock; another bird full
of active life. Like the singing of the nightingale, the crowing of the cock awakens
in the man who died the courage to accept the return of his own life and to "see
as beautiful what is necessary in things" _7 That is, to see as beautiful the will to
power in things and thus acknowledge life as a process of becoming and
overcoming (of struggle). And, importantly, as something lived and experienced
within time; it is crucial, if one is to embrace the teaching of recurrence as a
'divine idea', that one overcome any lingering resentment towards time and its
passing. For what is willed by the lover of fate is "not the literal contents of the
moment but the very momentariness of the moment: that is, time's desire and
time's perishing. "8 This does not mean offering a weary and hopeless resignation
to the fact of one's own mortality and a positing of death as the final reality or
truth of being; rather, it means finding the courage to offer a positive affirmation
so that at the end of one's own life one will be able to say: '''Was that life? Well
then! Once more!"? Such courage, Zarathustra teaches us, destroys the negative
ideal of death and transforms the latter into a line of flight.
Of course, even Zarathustra, like the man who died, has to struggle hard to
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overcome his own initial nausea at the thought of recurrence; to become the
singer of the intoxicated song and one who knows that paradise is here and now,
thereby becoming one with time and the event, affirming life as an economy of
the whole. Prior to his collapse and subsequent convalescence, Zarathustra was
unable to do this; unable, for example, to accept that even the little man recurs
eternally.
The man who died likewise has trouble overcoming his disgust for the fact that
the slave of the lesser day must also be returned. Even when accepting the food
and shelter offered him by the peasant and his wife, he can't help seeing them as
"limited, meagre in life, without any splendour of gesture" (EC, p.S60). But he is
able at least to accept that "they were what they were, slow inevitable parts of the
natural world" (ibid.) and that it was not his mission, nor anyone else's duty, to
'save' them. However, his acceptance of the existence and eternal return of the
slave-class and those poor in life, also convinces the man who died of the
absolute necessity of rule and the need to abandon all ideal illusions concerning
the 'equality of souls'. If there is not mastery, he now realizes, and an acceptance
on behalf of the noble and strong in life of their obligation to rule, then the slave
will assume authority and lead the world toward ever-greater tyranny and,
finally, the abyss of anarcho-nihilism: "It was the life of the little day, the life of
little people. And the man who died said to himself: Unless we encompass it in
the greater day, and set the little life in the circle of the greater life, all is
disaster" (ibid., p.S89).
Whilst we shall follow this point up in more detail in part III.iii., let me stress
here that to overlook this political aspect of the theory of eternal return is to
miss an essential import of the teaching as Nietzsche conceives of it. All things,
all forces, all men - great and small, active and reactive, sovereign and slave -
return. This is not to say we should think of the eternal recurrence as
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Zarathustra's animals mistakenly think of it; i.e., as a cycle of the identical being
endlessly repeated like an ever-turning wheel of existence. For, as we have seen,
there is undoubtedly an element of selection and cultivation within the theory and,
ultimately, what returns is difference. However, we should equally be wary of
those readings in which negative wills and/or reactive forces are entirely
eliminated and only that which actively affirms is returned. To put it simply, the
slave cannot be interpreted out of history any more than he can be crushed out of
existence (the last man doesn't fail the test of the eternal return, for he fails to
acknowledge any such test; the whispering of demons means nothing to him), or
lifted up to heaven via the salvation procedures of Christ. He belongs to the earth
and must be accepted as belonging thus and accommodated (ruled) accordingly.
If this is an unpleasant truth, nevertheless it is one that the man who died
accepts; just as he accepts the joy of living in the moment and of looking upon
life without any ill-will. He knows that in saying yes to this joy, so too does he
say yes to everything, including all woe and unpleasantness, for, as Zarathustra
says: "'All things are chained and entwined together, all things are in love'" .10
The eternal return does not just promise happiness, then, and there are harsh
implications of this Dionysian creed, which is why one has to become hard in
order to accept it and not simply free of ressentiment. As a tragic affirmation of
pain and all that is problematic in our existence, it stands in contrast to a
Christianity which seeks to escape from such things and thereby negate this
world, this life, as it is. No doubt Nietzsche was in part attracted to the idea of
eternal recurrence because it closes the gates on any hopes of an escape from
reality "by denying the very possibility of transcending the past for an existence
outside of history, whether projected into an afterlife, into a utopian future, or
even into an image of what might have been, had the past been different." II
There can be no doubt that those who remam trapped within the tomb of
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incomplete nihilism and regard the flesh as lacking in value due to its transience,
will shudder at the thought of the eternal return and be quick to dismiss it as a
form of lunacy. We have already seen Clifford Chatterley reject the 'immortality
of the flesh' put forward by Dukes, precisely on the grounds that, in the face of
death, the body doesn't matter: "'Admitting the obvious fact of dust to dust'"
(lTLl, p. 71), as the former puts it. Clifford only understands heat and not fire;
"the death 'of' being and the being 'of' death'<? and has no inkling of how to
transform "the undifferentiated black-nothingness of the death drive Iinto J the
differentiated fire-death of the eternal return." 13 Instead he longs for a spiritual
immortality as "the ultimate consolation of an alienated existence" .14 Dukes does
have an idea of how to stop death masquerading as a biological fact from
operating as a force of repression and does oppose the preachers of death by
reclaiming eternity for this fair earth. He declares: "'ultimately, to me there is
one body: the body of men and animals and the earth! And if this body is capable
of newness, then that is my resurrection'" (lTLl, p.71). In other words, Dukes
wants to see the continuous rebirth of life on earth; "not as mere repetition but
as willed and wanted re-creation." 15
Death, then, to reiterate, has no 'isness'; no ontological stability, or unity. And
time too is something that flows; there is no chronological fixity and whilst the
present moment may give the impression that it can be pin-pointed, it is always a
process and a passing away. Lawrence writes: "Life, the ever-present, knows no
finality ... the perfect rose is only a running flame, emerging and flowing off, and
never m any sense at rest, static, finished. Herein lies its transcendent
loveliness. "16 And herein lies the loveliness of man and all things, beauty resting
on the fact that being is becoming; i.e., that being is manifest in the nowness of
every moment and is not fixed eternally. If we can accept this, then we can think
the thought of eternal recurrence. But alas, as we have said, most men do not
want to stop believing "in being as something distinct from and opposed to
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becoming" or to start believing "in the being of becoming itself." 17 For most
men, the experience of duration and continuity proves that there is stability and
fixity. For most men, beauty does not lie within time, but external to it; the
immortal flowers of heaven never-fading which so horrify Lawrence, are precisely
what they long for and the transcendent loveliness of the actual rose means
nothing to them, seeing here as they do only death and decay.
Before his death and subsequent resurrection, the man who died belonged to this
majority of men; he too thought he could ignore and slander the world of things
and their becoming (their transient and transcendent loveliness). But after he rises
back into the flesh, he realizes that there is nothing more than what exists in the
moment and is able to share Lawrence's own desire: "Don't give me the infinite
or the eternal ... Give me ... the incandescence and coldness of the incarnate
moment: the moment, the quick of all change and haste and opposition: the
moment, the immediate present, the Now. "18 It is this alone which matters - for
it is this alone which 'is'. It is the source, the issue, the creative quick of time
itself; that from out of which, into which, and through which the future and past
both stream. Whilst for most men the mystery and the beauty of the pure
present remains undiscovered and unrecognized, the man who died realizes that
the memory of his past life lived and the promise of an ideal life to come, mean
nothing in comparison to the blossoming reality of the moment. For what are the
past and the future at last other than crystallized abstractions from the present,
as Lawrence argues, both of which take us away from the immediate life of the
present.
The Escaped Cock is rich in passages that suggest this new way of thinking. In
fact, arguably, the whole tale is one of the moment and its celebration as fire and
life; the latter seeming now to the man who died as more compulsive than the
destiny of death: "The doom of death was a shadow to the raging destiny of life,
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the determined surge of life" (BC, p.S63). Sadly, it is this shadow which is cast
by the Cross of the Crucified, which still falls over the modern world. We have
all lived for so long within the shade that even some of the healthiest are
possessed by the same spirit of revenge which "animates the desire of the
despisers of the body and the preachers of death" .19 Deliverance from this spirit
is Zarathustra's greatest wish for mankind and his teaching of the eternal return
is directed towards liberating the will from its negative conception of time "which
posits a seriality of past, present, and future events"20 and which has crippled
our consciousness cruelly, making us feel powerless before time's passing and
thus desirous of revenge. Lawrence argues that in contrast to the above model of
time, we should reactivate a pagan conception of time as moving in cycles which
"allows for a complete change of the state of mind, at any moment. One cycle
finished, we can drop or rise to another level, and be in a new world at once. "21
Our present time-consciousness which leads us wearily along an eternal
straightline, is another cross for us to bear, and thus belongs to what Nietzsche
calls the spirit of gravity. When a man finds the thought of the eternal return to
be the 'greatest weight' (das grosste Schwergewicht), rather than a liberating
experience that allows him to take flight, then we can assume he is possessed by
the spirit of gravity. Like Zarathustra, he must seek the exorcism of such a spirit
and learn to put down those things that genuinely bend his back and make of him
no more than a pack-animal. It is not life that is a burden, but the death-forces
and the duties imposed upon him by a moral-rational subjectivity; these and a bad
conscience are what genuinely weigh him down.
III. ii. The Man Who Died as Overman and Uberchrist.
Who could embrace and affirm the teaching of the eternal return? Only perhaps a
man who, in some sense, was more than human or beyond the human: an
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overman.I? Only one who had passed clear of death and reactivity and resurrected
into a new life free of all bad spirits. Zarathustra is one such and the man who
died is another.
But if the teaching of the eternal return demands the emergence of an overman,
there can be no doubt that, paradoxically, in order to become transhuman one
must first become more and not less of a man (or woman); i.e., one must
discover one's wholeness or integrity, as symbolized by the rebirth of Osiris-
Dionysus.
Critics who insist that the overman is not simply a progression of any type or
level of humanity existing presently, are not wrong. The overman is not merely
the highest of all possible higher men, one agrees with Deleuze here: "The
overman and the higher man differ in nature, both in the instances which produce
them and in the goals that they attain. "23 Thus the overman is not the realization
or determination of human essence. However, one would also wish to challenge,
or at least carefully interrogate, the view that "the overman seems to correspond
to the possibility of an ecstatic break away from humanity". 24 For the man who
died certainly does not make or seek any such transcendent break; on the
contrary, he makes a 'counter-ecstatic' return to the mortal flesh and overcomes
his ideal identity - his 'Christhood' - by recovering the virile integrity of his
physical manhood. For Lawrence, the key to living an active and ethical life lies
"in remaining inside your own skin, and living inside your own skin, and not
pretending you're any bigger than you are. "25 To surpass himself, man does not
become more ideal (more hu-man), but less so; more animal, complete with guts
and genitals and all those things which the idealists hope to see shrivel away.
One would argue that this is what Nietzsche also wishes to see. Indeed, for
Nietzsche, it will mark a genuinely positive achievement when man learns how to
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become whole again, rather than an ideal assemblage of human-like qualities, or a
mere simulacrum: "Painted with fifty-blotches on face and limbs"26 and written
over with countless empty signs. It is thus vital that the man who died realize
that he is more than a mere salvation-machine, or Christ-figure, as his disciples
and followers (,Christians') would have him be. His first priority is to recover his
manhood and his mortality and overcome his past as ideal-divinity and God upon
the Cross. More than wishing simply to become- Ubermenscb. the man who died
sets out on a process of becoming-Oberchrist (and, indeed, anti-Christ). Again
and again he insists that his triumph is that he is not dead, has not been swept up
to heaven, but has been reborn into the flesh upon the earth as man-alive. His
'mission' now is to heal and to become whole.
The first thing that the man who died does as part of this process is to renounce
his universal concern with the souls of all men, in order that he may concretely
care for his own soul; "'now I can go about my own business, into my own single
life'" (EC, p.564). He recognizes that the desire he had to bring about the
salvation of all men whilst disregarding his own physical well-being and needs,
was itself a sign of decadence, just as Zarathustra accepts that "his own desire for
a transfiguration of humanity into an overhumanity reflects his own sickness and
morbid, dissatisfied condition. "27 As we have seen, Zarathustra and the man who
died both learn to overcome their nausea at the reality of man and accept him for
what he is. Both also learn that their own task is to take care of and create
themselves. This does not involve or lead to the kind of self-obsession that Jesus
suffered from before his death; the self is not conceived as something to
discover, dwell upon, confess, liberate, or preserve - but create and continually
work upon. This ancient Greek conception, reactivated by Nietzsche and
Lawrence, is not only different to the Christian idea or ethic of the self, but,
according to Foucault, "diametrically opposed. "28
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The man who died, having adopted this Greek ethic of the self, begins also to
take an active concern with his appearance: "Therefore he cut his hair and his
beard ... And he bought himself shoes, and the right mantle" (EC, p.571). But
more than simply wanting to dress sharply, the man who died wants to physically
heal and become strong; to rise in touch with the flesh he himself denied and lent
to torture (the Crucifixion) and metaphysical cannibalism (the Eucharist). At the
climax of the tale, the priestess of Isis helps him achieve this: "What was torn
becomes a new flesh, what was a wound is full of fresh life" (ibid., p.593). She
takes the death out of him and all the old fear and ressentiment, so that
"gradually warmth began to take the place of cold terror, and he felt: I am going
to be flushed warm again, I am going to be whole! I shall be warm like the
morning - I shall be a man" (ibid., p.595). And, indeed, finally: "he felt the blaze
of his manhood and power rise up in his loins, magnificent" (ibid., p.596). This -
the phallic erection - is the symbol of his wholeness and recovered life.
To reiterate: as Christ the Redeemer, Jesus was something less than a man, not
more; a kind of castrato. His becoming- Uberchrist sets free the non-personal and
inhuman forces and flows of life and liberates him as a sexual being of the kind
problematized within the Judea-Christian tradition. "'I am risen!'" (EC, p.596)
becomes the cry of triumph of not only the man who died, but of all those who
have been reborn into the new flesh and rediscovered the body's potencies, whilst
accepting its limits.
This feeling of power, of power's inrush and increase, results in great joy for the
man who died; a joy great enough to enable him to affirm the eternal recurrence
unconditionally. As man-alive and risen lord, he feels himself so well disposed
toward life and so full of blazing indomitable power, that he is able to say yes to
life in its totality and to desire nothing more than the eternal resurrection of the
flesh. Confident and joyous, the man who died shines out like a star and provides
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a new practice. Like his brother Zarathustra, he abandons any thoughts of
preaching or teaching, having realized that whilst one profits from hearing the
song of the nightingale, one profits from a philosopher "only insofar as he can be
an example ... But this example must be supplied by his outward life". 29 This
takes both Zarathustra and the man who died some time to learn; but that they
do learn it is an important part of their respective (but in many ways parallel
becomings). As Daniel Conway writes: "Zarathustra's exemplification of
Ubermenschlichkeit thus transfers the onus of authority from his discourse to his
practices in the world. Here Nietzsche's insight echoes that of Plato and Aristotle;
to be a virtuous exemplar is to promote the virtue of others. "30
It is not that Zarathustra or the man who died say to those who look to them 'do
as I do', or 'model your life on mine'; for neither ultimately wishes for followers
of zombie-like disciples. On the contrary, they wish for living companions and
friends who are masters over themselves in their own right and own fashion. The
greatest and final lesson that Zarathustra and the man who died wish to teach is
'lose me and find yourselves'. 31
Having spoken so far of the becoming- Uberchrist of the man who died in terms
of a new practice of self, let us now examine the above from a slightly more
'clinical' perspective; for what enables the man who died to get back his body and
affirm a new ethic is the fact that he attains the 'greater health' that Nietzsche
writes of. When naked before the priestess, the man who died is revealed as
painfully thin and frail, still very much full of death. And yet, miraculously, he
heals (or, rather, is healed by the touch of the woman) and comes into a new kind
of well-being; "an irresistable and delicate health that stems from what he has
seen and heard of things too big for him, while nonetheless giving him the
becomings that a dominant and substantial health would render impossible. "32
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In other words, the new health of the man who died is not the good health of the
bourgeois who desires above all else to preserve himself. Such dreary and
functional good health is merely a limitation and a blockage placed upon the life-
forces imprisoned within man. Better death, says Deleuze , than the health we have
been given and are continually told by the 'health authorities' we should look
after.
Like a great artist or true philosopher, the man who died "returns from what he
has seen and heard with bloodshot eyes and pierced eardrums'T' and with an
emaciated body full of nausea and full of holes. And yet still he returns with a
deeper vitality and a greater health than with which he began his journey.
Zarathustra says he has seen the greatest and smallest of men naked and that they
were revealed as "still all-too-similar to one another" in their nakedness.H Yet
we are forced to wonder whether Zarathustra would recognize a body full of the
greater health if he were to see one; for Zarathustra understands the body and its
nakedness badly (as we saw last chapter). One certainly doubts that he would
have been able to see in the man who died what the woman of Isis sees in him
and his body: "a true Priestess, she saw the other kind of beauty in it, the sheer
stillness of the deeper life" (EC,. p.582).
In fact, Zarathustra makes several remarks which reveal his poor understanding
of the nakedness of the overman. For example, he thinks that it is within "the
burning sun of wisdom in which the overman joyfully bathes his nakednesst''V
But this, as Lawrence shows and as the man who died learns, is not the case.
Initially worried that the priestess will not be able to prove equal to the death
within him because she lacks his understanding and knowledge of death, the man
who died realizes as he bathes his nakedness in her sacred oils and the secretions
of her vagina, that it doesn't require wisdom or knowledge, but the touch of
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tenderness and the warmth of desire: "It doesn't need understanding. It needs
newness" (EC, p.595).
The woman is not a philosopher in any sense such as Zarathustra would
recognize; she acts and has her beauty from another consciousness ('cunt
awareness' as Lawrence calls it in his Lady Chatterley writings). The man who
died can only watch in awe as she performs her sacred mysteries which remain
beyond him and his understanding: "How sensitive and softly alive she is! How
alive she is, with a life so different from mine!" (EC, p.592). Zarathustra has
never looked upon a woman thus; nor received from such a healing touch of
passion and desire. Knowing not of woman, nor sexual fulfilment, Zarathustra
remains a far more limited and far less interesting character than the man who
died. Until he finds the woman with whom he can 'mingle his body' and
overcomes the greed of his virginity, he will not make the move from knowing-
in-apartness to creating in touch.
The man who died, we may say in conclusion, learns three things: to love, to
laugh, and to dance. As Christ, he did not love sufficiently; otherwise, as
Zarathustra says "he would not have been so angry that he was not loved"36 and
he would not have demanded such an ideal and uncompromising love "with
hardness, with madness, with fearful outbursts against those who denied it". 37
The man who died acknowledges this and accepts the folly of attempting to
"embrace multitudes" whilst having "never truly embraced even one" (EC, p.565).
But learning how to love in a new manner is only one stage of his self-
overcoming; this self-serious man has also to learn how to laugh and to dance.
The man who died achieves the latter by refusing the burden of the Cross and
living in happy defiance of the spirit of gravity. And this shepherd of souls
achieves the former by biting of the head of the black snake as depicted by
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Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Of the Vision and the Riddle. By biting off
and spitting out the head of this serpent of bad conscience, the shepherd stands:
"No longer shepherd, no longer human - a transformed being ... laughing! Never
yet on earth had any man laughed as he laughed!" 38 At what does this
Uberschetcr and Obermensch laugh? At all things; but perhaps most of all at his
own former seriousness and bleating moral righteousness. Having learned how to
laugh, the man who died now feels deep shame that he once preached that blessed
are they that weep and mourn; cursed are they that laugh.
Becoming a man who is able to laugh, enables the man who died to leave all
solemnity and will to vengeance to the authorities of Church and State; i.e., to
Jewish priests and Roman judges who exist only to condemn life, love, and
laughter. But by becoming-gay and insouciant the man who died doesn't cease to
be any the less an opponent to these authorities; and, in fact, if they disliked his
seriousness they despise his light-heartedness still more. For as Nietzsche notes,
what really enrages the slave at last is "half-stoical and smiling unconcern with
the seriousness of faith"39 and the importance of law and order. Thus it is, for
example, that we observe the hostile reaction of his former disciples when the
man who died meets them along the open road, disguised, and teases them with
both his questions of them and his answers to their questions of him. The man
who died knows now that "a dangerous phenomenon in the world is a man of
narrow belief" (EC, p.S73) who knows not how to laugh.
If the man who died understandably wishes to have little contact with those
uncompromising men and women who cannot laugh, he realizes also that he wants
to avoid those who have heavy feet as well as hard hearts; i.e., those who cannot
dance and who mistakenly believe "that to affirm means to bear, to assume, to
endure an ordeal, or to take on a burden", rather than to "set free that which
lives. "40 Lawrence illustrates this by showing us the man who died assist in the
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escaped cock's quest for freedom and fulfilment: '''I must toss this bird into the
seethe of phenomena, for he must ride his wave'" (EC, p.572), i.e., the bird must
find his roost to rule so that his singularity takes on splendour "polished by the
lure" of the hens he takes to his body (ibid., p.574). This is vital: love, laughter,
dance and play all demand community; our singularity only shines out and has
meanmg within a community of touch or some kind of vital social and cultural
context. Self-stylization and self-overcoming takes place within a wide world of
otherness. This, finally, is the greatest realization of the man who died; that he
rises and must rise as a man implicated within a network of power and politics.
III. iii. The Man Who Died as Risen Lord.
"Rise as the Lord. No longer the man of Sorrows. The Crucified uncrucified. The
Crown of Thorns removed, and the tongues of fire round the brows. "41
We have seen that the man who died overcomes his nausea at having to accept the
fact that the slave of the lesser day returns eternally; seen also that he realizes
that this necessitates the need for rule. And so the question of power and politics
returns to us once more.
Nietzsche argues in the Genealogy (III. IS) that true aristocrats belong to a
solitary species of man and thus instinctively dislike organization(s) and feel ill at
ease in groups, irritated at having to deal with the affairs of the lesser day. They
are "accustomed to living on mountains - to seeing the wretched ephemeral
chatter of politics"42 beneath them. But, just as they must overcome their nausea
at the thought of the slave's eternal return, so too must they overcome this
irritation and discomfort. For in order to be masters they have to learn how to
rule over others and not merely over themselves. Eventually, such men as
Zarathustra and the man who died have to descend from their mountain tops
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(climb down Pisgah). if ever they wish to enter into the 'promised land' (i.e .. a
fulfilled life on earth) and not merely glimpse it from afar. Further. they have to
realize that they will not be allowed the false security of a mountain top
indefinitely. that the last men will not rest until all mountain dwellers and other
solitaries have been exterminated: "The good have to crucify him he who devises
his own virtue! That is the truth!"43 Of course. in exterminating the creators, the
last men ensure that the future itself is sacrificed (to themselves). This is
precisely what the man who died means when he argues that unless the lesser day
is set within the context of the greater day and ruled over by the men of the
latter, all ends in disaster. If he himself is to avoid being murdered once more
(and innumerable times more) at the hands of the majority, then he has to accept
the responsibility of power and the obligation of rule. In order to guarantee both
his own life and the 'whole human future'. the man who died realizes he must
accept his duty to rise not only as man-alive, but as a power-lord.
In The Escaped Cock. the hint is given that the man who died is transformed via
his contact with the priestess into more than a man who will simply make a good
lover, or husband and father; i.e., will also become a solar-aristocrat or man of
divine fire and affirmative will: "A new sun was coming up in him ... 'Now I am
not myself - I am something new ... It, (EC, p. 595). This IS developed by
Lawrence in an essay which effectively forms an outline for a third part to the
tale of the man who died, entitled The Risen Lord. In this work, the man who
died acknowledges his intention to engage with the world and resist those forces
which would block the flow of solar energy and negate all warmth of heart. That
is, those forces which Lawrence identifies as belonging to 'Mammon' (his term for
the Crucified). Lawrence writes that if Jesus rose as a man on earth then his
greatest test would be to find a way in which to continue the struggle against "the
mechanical anti-life convention of Jewish priests, Roman despotism, and universal
money-lust", as well as his own "self-absorption. self-consciousness, self-
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importance" .44
Crucially, the latter struggle against egoism relates closely to the former. For the
man who died realizes that if he is to be successful in the fight against the
conventional powers that be, he must learn to form relations with others.
Nietzsche says: "It is not possible to be a philosopher completely for oneself. For
as a human being a person is related to other human beings, and if he is a
philosopher, he must be a philosopher in this relationship. "45 But this is true also
for the non-philosopher; true for all men in whatever capacity they act. No one
can ever really lead an entirely isolated 'inner life' or ask in good faith of another
'what have I to do with thee?'
Acknowledging the bond between himself and all other men and women, the man
who died rises to form a wide variety of relationships - sexual, social, and
political - some based on love, others based on enmity (but all formed within
desire and sealed by Dionysian passion). The man who died rises not only to
discover family life, but also the world of work, for example. In The Risen Lord
Lawrence suggests that if he remembered his first life then probably he would
assume once again not his role as a preacher, but as a carpenter "with joy, among
the shavings. "46 But in The Escaped Cock, as we have seen, the man who died
decides to become a healer-physician, realizing as he does that he can only
achieve his own healing via a 'revolutionary' healing of mankind; that his
resurrection does not take place in isolation. It is not that life itself is a sickness
(as decadents like Socrates and those who posit death as a 'cure' would have it);
but human life has been made sick by the forms of subjectivity and civilization
man has devised for himself. As cultural physician, the man who died is also a
'schizoanalyst' - and who knows better than he of breakdowns, breakthroughs
and becomings? But the nature of the schizoanalytic project is not merely
therapeutic, or strictly clinical: it is also formative of a new type of critique. As
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Mark Seem writes: "Once we forget about our egos a non-neurotic type of
politics becomes possible, where singularity and collectivity are no longer at odds
with each other't+": what we have called in this work a politics of desire. This
form of 'molecular' politics allows for new collective expressions of desire and
seeks to destroy "the oedipalized and neuroticized individual dependencies" formed
by a totalitarian system of moral and rational norms, via "the forging of a
collective sensibility". 48
As we said earlier, this means that the man who died as risen lord must continue
his fight with the reactive forces who have today granted themselves authority:
"But this time it would no longer be the fight of self-sacrifice that would end in
crucifixion. "49 Rather, this time it would be the fight of "a freed man fighting to
shelter the rose of life from being trampled on by the pigs. "50 That is to say, this
time the man who died will be strategically and tactically more astute, politically
less naive. There can be no doubt, however, that the man who died intends to
carryon the struggle. Declaring his intention at the end of the tale, when about
to flee from the authorities who would capture and put him to death once more,
to continue to pit his wits against theirs, one is reminded of Lawrence's own
remark in a letter when asked of his plans following a period of relative silence
and enforced withdrawal from public life due to illness: "1 shall go into the world
again, to kick it and stub my toe. It is no good my thinking of retreat. I rise up,
and feel I don't want to. My business is a fight, and I've got to keep it up. "51
Arguably, in all those who have attempted to rise up and live as lords (i.e.,
sovereign individuals), the fight against convention and slave morality has become
second nature (i.e., a mixture of instinct and need).
In pledging himself to protect the 'rose of life' from being trampled on by the
'pigs', the man who died pledges to defend intelligence, sensitivity, love, laughter,
and beauty from all forms of grossness and vulgarity. In other words, he is
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declaring his intent to defend culture from the forces of civilization (the latter
being a euphemism for mechanical barbarism). Above all, as risen lord the man
who died wants to take the power and the riches of the world out of the hands of
the mediocre and the greedy. In his first life Jesus "thought that purity and
poverty were one. It was a fatal mistake. "52 Now he knows that the riches and
powers of the world must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the base and
resentful. Power and wealth do not corrupt the pure in spirit ("it would thus not
seem to be a necessity for a Caesar to become bad"53); but the impure in spirit
and the impotent use these things corruptly. The man who died as risen lord is
determined that the earth shall not belong to the slaves of the lesser day, that it
shall, rather, be governed by those who have had the courage to die out from
their old lives and resurrect into the new flesh. Such men have not, after all,
"died and risen again for nothing." 54
It must be stressed, however, that the above do not lust for riches and worldly
power in order to disguise their own poverty of spirit, or their own weakness.
Both Nietzsche and Lawrence are keen to make this point clear. The former
writes that true aristocrats are not merely ambitious slaves eager to expand their
own egoism and authority, but those who "want power merely because it would
otherwise fall into other hands upon whom they do not want to be dependent. "55
And the latter has the risen lord tell Mammon that riches and power and glory
ultimately mean very little to him as a man who, having died, has lost his self-
importance: "'That's why I am going to take them all from you Mammon, because
I care nothing for them. I am going to destroy all your values, Mammon: all your
money-values and conceit values. I am going to destroy them all. "'56 In daring to
destroy the old values, the man who died as risen lord marks himself out as a
true creator; his joy comes from the thought of destroying whatever mutilates or
prevents the flow of life and contact with life.
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In some ways, the risen lord is the Jesus hinted at on occasion In the New
Testament, but never fully developed: Jesus the power-lord who comes bearing
arms with which to smite his enemies. Certainly the man who died as risen lord is
not the gentle shepherd and saviour who preaches love and forgiveness and thinks
he can abandon any concern with power and politics (the sword). This was the
fatal error made by Jesus in his first life and one made much of by Lawrence in
Apocalypse, where he argues that whilst "Jesus gave the ideal for the Christian
individual . . . rhe] . " deliberately avoided giving an ideal for the State or
Nation. "57 This, Lawrence claims, was naive and irresponsible; for Jesus
effectively left it to others to give such and thereby to fashion and operate such.
Thus, in away, Jesus handed us all into the power of the systematizers and the
bullies: "Jesus made it inevitable, when he said that money belonged to Caesar.
Money means bread, and the bread of men belongs to no man. Money also means
power, and it is monstrous to give power to the virtual enemy". 58
Christ's error here resulted in the universal crucifixion of man; not just his own
death. For his refusal to accept the responsibility of power and provide rule, gave
the opportunity to the base and mediocre to fashion a religion in his name
founded upon self-glorification of the weak and the undermining and persecution
of the strong and healthy (i.e., it allowed the slave revolt in morals). Incredibly,
some readers of Lawrence and Nietzsche still fail to grasp this point and its
significance. Michel Haar, for example, insists that the future 'masters of the
earth' called for and imagined by Nietzsche "will possess neither political power,
nor wealth, nor any effective governing force". 59 Hopefully, the folly and
dangerously utopian nature of this remark is now self-evident. The 'voiceless
voice' who whispers into the ear of Zarathustra during the 'stillest hour' is right
to tell him that it is unpardonable to have power and then to refuse to rule.6o It
is not enough merely to perform miracles, one must also be able to command
great things. Ultimately, Jesus not only let down Judas, but he betrayed us all by
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leaving himself at the mercy of slaves and opening the way for the 'reign of
saints'. But the man who died accepts the 'horizontal division of mankind' as the
"eternal division between the base and the beautiful'<! and he affirms the
necessity of cultivating a pathos of distance between them and of establishing the
rule of the few over the ego-bound masses, or 'robot-hoardes'.
To conclude, I would like to refer to the series of points that Lawrence closes
Apocalypse with. Deleuze notes that these points, crucial to an understanding of
Lawrence's late political thinking, form "a kind of rnamfesto'<! and he relates
them to the Litany of Exhortations found in Fantasia. And, certainly, they do
essentially argue something similar to that found in the above; namely, leave off
ideal-loving in the abstract and start to form real connections. But this is not
what they say in full, and Deleuze is careful not to mention the nature of the
connections Lawrence advocates: active power-relations formed within and
productive of aristocratic political relations (i.e., relations contrary to Deleuze's
own quasi-anarchic political project, but very much in line with Nietzsche's
philosophy and Lawrence's own earlier work: see chapters II and III).
With his dying breath, Lawrence seeks to defend and to affirm a political creed
that many of his commentators remain keen to overlook, or pretend he abandoned
decisively post- Plumed Serpent. But although Lawrence does flood his late work
with a greater level of radical desire and does begin to evolve a different political
vocabulary of favoured terms, still he insists on the vital importance of political
and social power relations. It remains his belief that the most fundamental truth
is that: "No man is pure individual ... men live and move and think and feel
collectively ... It has always been so, and will always be so. "63
For Lawrence, then, man is a unit of worldly power. And as such he is a
collective being who "has his fulfilment in the gratification of his power-sense. "64
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Therefore, as point six of Lawrence's 'manifesto' in Apocalypse concludes: "To
have an ideal for the individual which regards only his individual self and ignores
his collective self is in the long-run fatal. "65 Either the collective self has its
being in a power relationship, or it is doomed to live a reactive life "trying to
destroy power, and destroy itself. "66 As risen lord, the man who died is ready to
accept the validity of this argument; ready to acknowledge his own duty to
provide in himself the living embodiment of power: the hero or leader whom
Judas sought in vain. To become an aristocrat means more than being able to
display great tenderness; one must also be able to give expression to the "sense
of divinity informing humanity" (i.e., become one who can "interfuse the earthly
and the spiritual for the enrichment of the community")."?
The risen lord is a power-lord, or solar aristocrat; a king-god who transmits
vividness and the actual potency of the cosmos. To a greater or lesser degree, it
is the need of all men to feel themselves such in their own way: "The primal need,
the old-Adamic need in a man's soul is to be, in his own sphere and as far as he
can attain it, master, lord, and a splendid one. "68 But this can only be achieved
via submission within a hierarchy of arranged power and by giving reverence and
allegiance to the power-soul in other men; by conceding that fulfiment is
something that can only be achieved collectively.
Part IV: Closing Remarks.
IV.i. Nietzsche and Lawrence as Posthumous Thinkers.
"The philosopher", says Deleuze, "is someone who believes he has returned from
the dead".! Someone, that is to say, who believes he must live in the world as a
risen lord; that this is the necessary pre-condition for living a full and vital life
of wonder and connection. Nietzsche calls such types 'posthumous' individuals and
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includes himself amongst their number; "it is only after death that we shall enter
our life and become alive, oh, very much alive, we posthumous people!"?
There can be no doubt that Lawrence too is another posthumous thinker. And
perhaps it is the case that our hope today lies precisely with such people; i.e.,
with those who give us in their writings and their lives a new understanding of
life and death and provide also what fewer than a handful of poets and
philosophers have ever given us - a completely new vision of what man is and
may yet become. Works such as Nietzsche's Zarathustra and Lawrence's The
Escaped Cock which have been central to our study in this chapter, express a
becoming-other to that which we are and that which is produced, perpetuated,
and insisted upon as the ideal form by the dominant socius of this today. They
allow us to glimpse, if only briefly and somewhat hazily, the "deeper blue of that
greater day"3 which is the unborn day that lies beyond the ruins. Nietzsche's
aphorisms and Lawrence's poems, at their best, tear open the grey skies of the
present and form openings to the outside which is also the future, obliging and
encouraging us as readers to "plunge into chaos, before returning as if from the
land of the dead. "4
IV.ii. Towards a Final Conclusion.
I have attempted here in this chapter to offer an understanding of Nietzsche as he
would have us understand him; in terms of Dionysus versus the Crucified, which
is to say as one who has 'unmasked' Christian morality. It is this, he claims,
which sets him apart from the rest of rnankind.f It certainly sets him apart from
Lawrence, who has a somewhat different (though clearly related) project; namely,
to put Jesus back in touch with the wider religious context from which he
emerged and to "put God and the Bible back into the enormous historical
setting. "6
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For Lawrence and Nietzsche, the Judea-Christian insistence upon an absolute and
detached monotheism has been disastrous, and they wish to reactivate the
pluralism and interconnectedness of the earlier pagan religions. Of course, it is
certainly the case that: "A paganism haunted by Christianity is something
inevitably different from a paganism that has never known it. "7 Nietzsche and
Lawrence would readily admit this (just as they would concede that a post-moral
ethic beyond good and evil, is something other than a pre-moral ethic before
good and evil). Zarathustra and the man who died attempt to show us possible
ways forward; there can be no going back. And yet we might ask is the
becoming-Osiris of the latter really an advance or in any way more significant
than Ramon's becoming-QuetzaIcoatl, or Cipiano's becoming-Huitzilpotchli in The
Plumed Serpent (see chapter 1II)? One would argue that it is: For one thing, it is
achieved via a process of phallic tenderness and an experience of desire; not
political murder. The man who died fucks himself into a new life and thus his
becoming resembles more closely the becoming of Oliver Mellors, than Ramon or
Cipriano. The latter, for example, attempts to achieve divine status and breach the
limits of his humanity by stabbing prisoners. The man who died, however, having
himself been a political prisoner and himself been judged, condemned, and
executed by the authorities, has had more than enough of such cruelty and state-
stupidity.
This is an important point: Quetzalcoatl drinks human blood; Dionysus is a god
of the grape. Whereas Jesus too once advocated the drinking of his blood and the
eating of his flesh, this is now explicitly repudiated as a teaching by the man who
died. There is in The Escaped Cock a counter-transubstantiation of blood back
into wine to parallel the counter-transcendence back into the flesh of the body.
The man who died no longer says drink blood like one of the undead, or feast like
a zombie on corpses; but, rather, sip the wine of Dionysus and let it make you
merry and gay so that you will want to dance and sing, not lust for revenge and
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for death.
Whilst Lawrence retains notions of active power and radical aristocratism post-
Plumed Serpent, he does move significantly beyond the politics of evil and cruelty
as discussed in chapters II and III of this thesis. Lawrence ultimately condemns
the literature of transgression as being both romantic and decadent; a
pornographic mixture of the sentimental and the sensational. If in The Plumed
Serpent and other writings from his 'American period' he plays out his own
murderous fantasies, he eventually comes to question those writers and thinkers
who remain trapped at the level of crime and disintegration. In a letter to Aldous
Huxley he asks: "if you can only palpitate to murder, suicide, and rape, in their
various degrees ... however are we going to live ... it becomes a phantasmal
boredom and produces ultimately inertia, inertia, inertia and final atrophy of
feelings. "8
Such negative limit expenences may help us 'escape' from our 'imprisonment'
within moral-rational consciousness, but if they fail to help us get beyond the
sensation produced by the experiences themselves then they are not very effective
escapes (mere masturbatory fantasies); we remain ego-bound. In wishing to
follow a line of flight that will transport us from bad conscience to new
innocence, we do not wish to end in a black hole of inertia and the atrophy of all
feeling (i.e., nihilism). In seeking to become hard, we do not wish to become
brutal and insensate. Lawrence, more than any other novelist of the last century,
helps us to move beyond good and evil without succumbing to the above
dangers. Of course, even his work takes place within the perspective of nihilism
and is thus far from free of reactive forces; but he, like Nietzsche before him,
comes closest to stuttering the first terms of a genuine revaluation of all values.
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Outside the Gate: A Conclusion.
In this thesis I have made a critical and clinical examination of Nietzsche's project
of revaluation as 'mediated' via the work of D.H. Lawrence and in relation to
other bodies of post-Nietzschean thought. Primarily, I have been interested in the
political and ethical aspects of this project, as well as its cultural and social
implications; that is to say, I have been keen to argue Nietzsche and Lawrence at
a public level, countering the reduction of their work's significance to a wholly
private individual level (i.e., an essentially abstract and apolitical level). I have
suggested that whilst it may be difficult and at times disturbing to modern
sensibilities to imagine a culture dominated by active forces and noble values, or a
model of the self 'beyond good and evil', this should not constitute an argument
against attempting to do so.
By placing Nietzsche's project within the fictional enviroment provided by
Lawrence's novels, I have hoped to stress that it achieves its main success as a
provocative thought-experiment, best played by those readers and critics
prepared to live dangerously and do their thinking outside the gate (i.e., outside
of the usual moral-rational conventions); searching for a vocabulary of
'elementary' words with which to build a nest of flames in which old models of
thought, self, and society can be destroyed, and new models created. I will say
more on this idea at the close of this conclusion, indicating an important implicit
concern of this thesis (the theme of language).
Firstly, however, I wish to formally bring together in a clearly summarized
manner a number of the main conclusions that have emerged during the course of
the preceding study. The following were reached in the context of and are relative
to the individual chapters and I have roughly arranged them here according to
this structural division of the thesis and not on the basis of merit or validity.
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Fuller accounts of the points summarized can often be found In the closing
sections of the chapters they are drawn from.
Our primary conclusion must be - contrary to our own initial expectations and
prejudices - that nihilism, far from being the great danger and problematic of
modern European culture to be solved at all costs, or the very limit of thought
and experience to be moved beyond via a transcendent leap, is actually something
to be affirmed. For nihilism, as indicated by all the talk of crisis that surrounds
it, is a crucial moment of transition; a phenomenon which provides the
opportunity to revalue values and effect an overcoming of ourselves. It does not
merely mark the collapse of all values and the disintegration of agency. Those
who understand it in exclusively negative terms have only partly understood it.
Modern man, as Nietzsche shows, is born of 'original' nihilism; its unfolding
constitutes our essential history. And, in all likelihood, we may conclude,
postmodern man (the transhuman human being) will be born of modern European
nihilism; the latter marking the end of one history and the beginning of a future
narrative and new revealing. In one form or another, nihilism is coextensive with
our being and becoming and provides both the tomb and womb of man and
overman. Even the decadence which is asociated with it (as cause and symptom) is
necessary to us; vital for growth and the flourishing of culture. If strength and
health are needed to preserve life, then sickness and corruption (deviation)
advances it. Thus nihilism is an ambiguous state of affairs; one that ultimately
demands and requires perfecting.
Secondly, and following on directly from the above point, those things which
nihilism has most clearly and successfully manifested itself via - humanity, science
and technology, capitalism - cannot simply be abolished. Nor can the above or
their effects be reversed or undone; only overcome. And if there is an inherently
negative will expressed in the above and a predominantly reactive accumulation of
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forces; if they do form limits upon thought and experience and in some base
manner cripple us by inhibiting our becoming, then so too from out of the above
do some of our best hopes escape. Ultimately, they are not things to be opposed,
so much as forms to be reconfigured, processes to be accelerated, and forces to
be redirected. What needs to be done is to decodify and deterritorialize the self
still further (man must be overcome, not 'saved'); science must become gay and
technology questioned (not rejected in favour of a simple-minded and
technophobic 'New Ageism'); capitalism must be taken to its absolute limit, which,
as shown in chapter I, is a schizophrenic limit, and there transformed (not
countered by socialist idealism or hindered by state regulations and a series of
internal axiomatics). Nihilism, to reiterate the above conclusion, must be
consummated (not left incomplete and imperfect). Besides, as Nietzsche rightly
points out; 'no one is free to be a crab'. Thus nihilism cannot be side-stepped, or
reversed. But whilst we should resist the temptation to reactively deny it, so too
should we avoid falling into the trap of passive resignation a la the last man. The
four R's: reform, revolution, reaction, and resignation must all be met and
countered by a fifth: rejection. Affirmation alone is the key to the sixth and final
R-term: revaluation.
And the revaluation, we may conclude, will involve in an important sense the
becoming-minoritarian, or becoming-woman of politics, of the subject, of
knowledge forms, and of culture. Nietzsche refers to this process both positively
and with approval as the giving of style, or the making gay of the above; and
negatively in terms of decadence (although as noted above this is often only a
nasty word for something which provides tomorrow's health). It is a process
characterized by a return to, or, more precisely, a resurrection of the body (as
something without organs) and a transfiguration of the Word back into the Flesh.
Such thinking, which has been at the heart of this thesis, has often best been
developed within contemporary feminist theory and we can conclude that whilst
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the project of revaluation is not explicitly presented by Nietzsche as a 'feminist'
one per se (any more than the problem of the subject is openly portrayed as a
crisis of adult-white-male-heterosexual male authority in particular), it can
legitimately be read as such and there are clearly aspects of Lawrence's and
Deleuze's work, as well as Nietzsche's own, which encourage and open the way
for such a reading. In fact, this has been one way in which the writings of the
above have had an important public role to play; i.e., by providing minority
groups with the opportunity to develop a new style of nomadic thought and
evolve a counter-discourse that is appropriate to the voicing of their concerns.
If Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean philosophy allows for the development of a
radical politics as suggested above, then so too does it encourage the forming of
a closely related new ethos and aesthetic; art providing a new practice of self as
well as a counter-nihilistic force par excellence at the level of culture and society.
'Style' is a central term in the Nietzschean vocabulary. And yet because style
involves above all else strict discipline and the formation of a singular taste, few
will ever attain it. However, it remains crucial, Nietzsche argues, that every man
and woman have some notion of style, if they are to achieve satisfaction (i.e., a
feeling of pride in their strength and fulfilment as creatures able to command and
obey themselves). Those individuals lacking in satisfaction will succumb to the
poison of ressentiment and cast an evil eye on those others who do know joy and
do possess a degree of style. These are the 'slaves' who make up the herd
majority of mankind that Nietzsche speaks of; those unable to create laws of their
own by which to live and who therefore subscribe to and seek to impose a
universal morality; those who, unable to give birth to a culture and become a
people, erect a civilization and form themselves into a state. Lacking the character
and the strength to shape the chaos of themselves, they suppress and deny the
latter by an act of will; shutting out all but the small handful of base forces they
can organize a purely personal identity upon. One of the crucial tasks of
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revaluation is, we may conclude, the liberating of daimonic and impersonal selves
from the subjectivities and ego-bound selves we have been given and become all
too familiar with. How man achieves this self-overcoming is vital. But, let us
recall, it has been an important finding that this too is a fundamentally social and
cultural task; it is not and cannot be something achieved in isolation. The care,
creation, and enhancement of the self (as well as its overcoming) is a politics as
well as an ethics, because our being is always a being with and for others and our
becoming always a becoming-other.
Having mentioned the process by which the overman is produced, I would like to
offer a few additional remarks in conclusion with specific reference to this
important notion. In chapter II, I examined how as the move was made from the
love-mode of moral idealism to the power-mode of libidinal materialism, the
human subject (and political agent) is dramatically reconceived and reconfigured at
both the level of forces and form; the ideal concept of the human being displaced
by possibilities suggested by the greater reality of man as a being of will to
power: inhuman and overhuman possibilities. Nietzsche and Lawrence both stress
the immoral and non-rational nature of man and demonstrate how the daimonic
forces of the Old Adam could come together with external forces - social,
political, economic, and technological forces for example - to produce a new type
of subject. But whilst their anti-humanism is far-reaching and thorough-going, it
is not simply a reactive misanthropy; anymore than their wishing to make of man
more than a logical machine is a flight into an absurd and romantic irrationalism.
If, on the one hand, both authors do at times appear to invite misinterpretation
on such points as these, so, on the other hand, do they demand and deserve the
most careful and intelligent of readings.
The key question is: can man in his present form acquire a new sensibility (i.e., a
new way of thinking and feeling); or must his present human status be abolished?
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Nietzsche. rightly I would conclude, argues that man must be overcome.
However, he remains at pains to emphasize that even in his present form man,
for all his slave attributes (free-will, memory, accountability etc.), remains a
creature worthy of hope and full of tremendous potential and is not simply to be
aborted. Man himself must form the bridge to the future; or, more precisely,
dormant forces within man. The overcoming of man is essentially a self-
overcoming and will proceed via a deepening and furthering of what man is, as
well as a connection with new forces external to him. The becoming -Ubermensch
does not involve transcendence and is not achieved via ecstasy. Of course, this is
not to imply that Nietzsche is merely seeking a new turning for man based upon a
development of the moral-rational subject. If he is not advocating an ideal leap
over man, nevertheless he does wish in some manner to punctuate historical and
evolutionary equilibrium and continuity via the development of a radical trans-
human future. The overman may not be the absolute other that some critics have,
mistakenly, suggested; but 'he' is certainly more than the superhuman.
Ultimately, this question of the overman is central to the project of revaluation
because Nietzsche and Lawrence are interested in how, via a number of strange
becomings and transmutations, they can make the present order explode. If this is
a 'revolutionary' project, it is so on a primarily molecular level and in a manner
most significantly developed by Deleuze and Foucault. Molar political revolution is
something that Lawrence expressly rejects in two separate novels as vieux jeu.
For the latter promises nothing more than a continuous repetition of the same;
i.e.. more men of slave-like and human, all too human status and their grouping
into herd formations. Nietzsche and Lawrence are undoubtedly at their most
interesting and most important when, realizing this, they begin to imagine and
promote the possibility of a new kind of politics.
But if the revaluation involves the forming of a radical new style of politics, then
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it has to be admitted that Nietzsche and Lawrence did not get very far in
developing such themselves; they merely hinted at it and opened the way for
others. Further, there are elements in the writings of both which seem at odds
with the radicalism of their work. In part due to his theory of culture -
arborescent rather than rhizomatic - Nietzsche, for example, finds himself obliged
to affirm a socio-political model that is strikingly similar at times to a
conservative tradition within philosophy that reaches back to Plato and his
Republic. When Lawrence attempts to reterritorialize his thinking upon such lines
in The Plumed Serpent (see chapter III), the result is a disturbing and quasi-
fascistic fantasy in which the underlying sensibility doesn't fit into the political
form given it. This novel serves best, it can perhaps be concluded, as an
instructive failure.
However, if there are reactionary and authoritarian elements in Nietzsche's and
Lawrence's political writings (and clearly they were neither liberals nor democrats
in the usual sense of this term), it is important to be able to conclude that it is in
no way valid or meaningful to describe their work as 'fascist'. On the contrary,
with its emphasis on cracks, ruptures, disjunctions, difference, and becoming (in
fact a whole 'gargoyle aesthetic' and radically active notion of power), it is
feasible to argue that their work is inherently anti-fascist. If the political thinking
of Nietzsche and Lawrence is sometimes limited and sometimes regrettably
distorted by the semi-rigid forms they attempt to impose rather awkwardly onto
their more fluid philosophy of power, never does either of the above betray Geist
to Reich or to any party-political MachtpoJitik. Whatever else they were, neither
Nietzsche or Lawrence was a state-idolater and both were, in fact, prescient in
recognizing and warning against the danger of the totalitarian modern state. Being
artists, both were instinctively aware that there is no Absolute and that wholeness
and completion, or purity (be it of races or genres) can only rest upon illusion
and the exclusion of a vast field of otherness. A field which they wished to
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explore and conduct their thought-experiments within, bringing out the temporal,
contingent, and discordant elements within all certainties (to find value in that
which the fascist mind fears most).
By abandoning fantasies of violent transgression and takeover we are perhaps all
rescued from the black hole of fascism and the dangerously utopian longing for a
New Jerusalem. As indicated, a grand revolutionary response to nihilism at the
molar political level is simply inappropriate and demands to be decisively rejected;
the revaluation is hindered rather than furthered by such means. It is important
to be able to conclude, as Lawrence concludes, that the desire for bloody
revolution and all sorts of horror and atrocity is both romantic and reactionary; a
form of love-idealism on the recoil. Just as the challenge to rationalism does not
mean the promotion of a mindless irrationalism, as said above, nor does an active
immoralism and affirmation of nihilism require or justify a brutal and base
inhumanity. The thrill of the negative limit-experience and of crime, belongs to
the masturbatory variety that leaves one just as ego-bound afterwards as before,
never really transforming the subject, despite the intensity of sensation. If the
new innocence that Nietzsche and Lawrence seek lies 'beyond good and evil', it
does not lie beyond good and bad: the immoralist is not unethical; becoming hard
does not mean becoming insensate and falling into a state of emotional atrophy in
which all finer feeling is denied (it means become honest and acknowledge the
tragic nature of existence, affirming its eternal return); live dangerously does not
mean abandoning all self-discipline and restraint, or refusing to exercise any
degree of caution (it means, rather, avoid positing as far as possible any fixed
ideals and beware of turning processes into goals). The key, then, to revaluation
and self-overcoming is in the exorcising of the twin spirits of gravity and
revenge; spirits which weigh us down with ascetic self-seriousness and self-
righteousness and poison the blood with ressentiment.
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But if transgression is rejected as a strategy and theoretical terrorism abandoned,
it is nevertheless important to note in conclusion that, for Nietzsche, it remains
vital that the great man or sovereign individual be allowed the opportunity to
show that he can, ultimately, after having demonstrated an ability to both suffer
and inflict cruelty, resist the desire to do so and thereby affect his own self-
overcoming (become 'good' in the noble and generous sense). As we heard
Zarathustra declare: '''I desire beauty from no one as much as I desire it from
you, you man of power: may your goodness be your ultimate self-ovecoming. I
believe you are capable of any evil; therefore I desire of you the good. '" I To be
able to show compassion - even a revalued form of pity - is undoubtedly an
important test of greatness and central to Nietzsche's project. In The Plumed
Serpent, Lawrence gives Ram6n and Cipriano the chance to undertake this test.
Whether or not they pass it by holding out the 'green leaf of Malintzi' (see
chapter III once more). is debatable; and Lawrence soon after the end of this
novel is ready to confess his loss of faith in the great man or hero. It may be,
sadly, that in the present circumstances, even the greatest of men would fail to
achieve the goodness desired by Zarathustra; and that we therefore need the
'quarantine' arrangements of democracy and the old morality for a long time yet.
However, one needs to be careful in drawing too many conclusions of this kind
from Lawrence's publically confessed loss of faith in the hero. For if it signals a
move away in his late writings from inflated political posturing and the ascetic
militancy associated with it, towards a new politics of phallic tenderness and
touch, it is vital to note that this represents a change of tactics and approach -
and not a change of goal or core philosophical beliefs; the revaluation of values is
still the great desideratum. Certainly Lawrence is not beating a retreat to the old
ideals of liberal humanism. as some critics seem overly keen to suggest. Thus if
the Lady Chatterley writings and those related to them allow for an opening up
and critical reexamination of his own thinking in the power trilogy of novels,
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Lawrence does not effect a complete break with the above. Rather, he seeks to
make his position clearly distinct from those who would vulgarize and brutalize
his thinking with their own inherent baseness and fascism. If Lawrence
reconsiders his own philosophy of power, he does so, we can conclude, because
he stays committed to it. And he moves away from an inappropriate politics of
modernist ambition in which power is invariably conceived in negative and
metaphysical terms (as something lacking but lusted after; something to be
possessed and worked from the will in order to outlaw, prohibit, oppress etc.), in
order to safeguard his positive notion of power. There is thus a greater
continuity and subtle coherence in Lawrence's work (as, indeed, there is in
Nietzsche's), than is sometimes recognized.
In rejecting grand politics and great events, Lawrence does not, however,
withdraw into the private or the petty; i.e., make the solipsistic retreat into the
politics of the soul as advocated by those such as Rorty (see the Introduction part
II). The micro-politics of desire which became the concern of this thesis in
chapters IV and V, remains very much a concern with the forces and flows that
underlie, form, reform. pass through, over, and around the individual and
society. A schizoanalysis is always a political analysis; the soul is never a private
affair. And yet this is not to suggest that Nietzsche and Lawrence naively confuse
the personal with the political due to a false equation between the organization of
the soul with that of the state, thereby making invalid and illegitimate judgements
to do with the latter on the basis of their insights into the former. Rather,
Nietzsche and Lawrence radically anticipate the conclusion reached by later
theorists that there is no longer a clear public/private dichotomy or distinction to
be made. The modern state has entered the soul in a previously unheard of and
unimaginable manner. Thus, as Marcuse rightly claims: "The traditional border
lines between psychology and political and social philosophy ... have been made
obsolete by the condition of man in the present era. "2 It is because Nietzsche and
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Lawrence grasped this - not because they held on to classical models of thinking
that understood society as man writ large - that they successfully flitted back and
forth from remarks on the body and consciousness, to remarks on society and
culture, shattering the traditional language games of political and social science in
the process.
If there are many different aspects to the project of revaluation, the erotic
element is by no means the least important among them; particularly when linked
to ethico-aesthetic and socio-political thinking. A theory of sexuality - and, in a
much wider and more profound sense, desire - is vital to an understanding of
Nietzsche's project. This is not surprising when one recalls that his central
problematic, nihilism, is conceived of as a physical crisis of feelings, as well as
one of values and beliefs, and that he identifies his own philosophy as 'Dionysian'
in nature. For Lawrence too sex is central; understanding it as he does as our
deepest form of awareness, and basing his thinking on touch and tenderness on
this understanding. These two terms - touch and tenderness - we can conclude,
are as crucial to the project of revaluation as Lawrence conceives of it, as they
are to his politics of desire. The former, for Lawrence, means coming back into
connection with one another, with other creatures, and with inanimate things of
the physical universe. Nietzsche calls this desire for touch an 'urge to living
unison'; but what he does not mean by this is a desire to negate difference or
close distances (which is of course how nihilism operates, reducing all things to
an essential sameness and valuelessness). Desire is that which brings into relation,
joining together at least two terms, two flows, two forces; but without collapsing
them into One Identity as within the ideal-love tradition that longs for merger.
Nietzsche and Lawrence differ from Deleuze and Guattari on the political
implications of desire, however, as we indicated in chapter IV. Whilst the latter
seem to believe that all relations and structures of servitude and hierarchy can
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and have to be compromised and dissolved by desire, the former (maintaining the
'aristocratic' element of their own earlier thinking), argue that these are in fact
the very things formed by desire and which we should value (and socially
inscribe). Thus a libidinal culture of touch is not without distinctions and whilst,
admittedly, desire may not recognize class differentials based on money, it
accentuates power differentials. A democracy of touch therefore, whilst on the
one hand enabling men to meet 'naked and light' along the Open Road, would, on
the other hand, allow power differentials to become manifestly self-evident and
for souls to be ranked accordingly, based on the degree of power they were. Of
course, the way in which an individual styles the degree of power he is will also
playa part in determining his rank within such a democracy, and, it should be
stressed, power is a dynamic flow between individuals who are constantly
becoming-other; it is not a fixed essence that determines being once and for all.
Thus the above order is mobile and susceptible to continual change; one's rank
indefinite.
We need, in conclusion, to offer a few further remarks on Lawrence's notion of a
democracy of touch. It is, apparently, a libidinal arrangement within desire that is
'fucked' into being via the creative exchange between man and woman conceived
of not simply as distinct 'sexes', in the manner common to thought based upon
molar identities, but as two flows of energy vibrating at a different speed or
pitch; or two streams of differently charged blood. It is certainly not something
that can be established by non-molecular revolution; the raised fist punching the
air of the party-political militant have been replaced by the holding of hands
between lovers. Lawrence does not promote or even accept the possibility of
liberation from social relations into an ideal individualism, nor the equally ideal
notions of solidarity proposed by those such as Rorty. On the contrary, he seeks
an escape from such liberal fantasy and an end to isolation via the establishment
of physical relations on the basis of active power and affirmative desire.
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But is Lawrence's notion of a democracy of touch compatible with Nietzschean
philosophy? I conclude that it is; in fact, very much so - particularly with the
mid-period works beginning with Human, All Too Human. When one reads these
works, one understands how even the use of the word 'democracy' by Lawrence
is not so peculiar. For whilst, admittedly, he, like Nietzsche, is an enemy of
democracy as it is presently understood (by slave moralists), ultimately Lawrence,
like Nietzsche, wants to see the overcoming of such a reactive conception of
democracy (resting on fear, weakness, and envy), and the building of a 'true'
democracy of exuberance and strength which will "create and guarantee as much
independence as possible; independence of opinion, of mode of life and of
employment'l.:' This, for Nietzsche quoted here, is the democracy of the future
and what Lawrence calls the democracy of touch. As an arrangement of a people
still to come, it involves rather more than just socio-economic and political
change (important as these things undoubtedly are). It will demand great cultural
transformation in addition, and, beyond this, a reckoning with the great saviours
and teachers of the past; i.e., those grand idealists such as Plato and Christ. Or,
as Nietzsche summarizes this reckoning: Dionysus versus the Crucified!
This brings us back to a claim we made in the Introduction and which we sought
to demonstrate in the main text; namely, that Nietzsche and Lawrence are, in a
sense, great religious writers, as much (if not more) than they are political
thinkers: I would like to re-affirm this view here in conclusion. Although they
are not mystics, or theologians, they understand the need to substantiate mystery
and that the revaluation is an inherently anti-Christian struggle first and
foremost; an attempt to overthrow moral idealism via a reactivated paganism. If
they attempt to express their philosophical and religious insights in socio-political
terms, so too do they frequently work in reverse and attempt to find the
'Dionysian' poetry in which to express those values they find impossible to
contain within conventional language games. Lawrence achieves this perhaps most
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beautifully in The Escaped Cock, his final major work of fiction which formed the
focus of chapter V, having arguably failed to do so in The Plumed Serpent.
Nietzsche does it with mixed success in Thus Spoke Zarathustra; a book which,
if not quite mankind's greatest gift, remains nevertheless one of the most valuable
works of revaluation.
Dionysus versus the Crucified is rightly given by Nietzsche as the formula to
understand him and his project. But his thinking is post-Christian as much as
anti-Christian (in the same way that it is post- and not merely anti-modern). And
Lawrence rightly recognizes that only a resurrected Jesus can play the role of
anti-Christ to perfection (better even than Dionysus), and he suggests that via a
revaluation of Christ's story it can be made to actively serve and enhance the life
of the present.
There are, finally, just a few additional points that deserve to be emphasized in
conclusion. Perhaps above all it should be said that Nietzsche's concern is with
the question of culture and the cultural production of greatness; the revaluation
can legitimately be read as a sustained call for cultural renaissance. The
philosopher, Nietzsche informs us, in his guise as cultural physician, can diagnose
the condition of culture, can help preserve it, or can assist in its destruction,
thereby providing the space and the conditions for a new culture. But he cannot
himself create this new culture; not unless, that is, he becomes an artist himself.
For only as an artist is the philosopher able to create new models and practices,
invent new ways of thinking and speaking, and, ultimately, revalue values.
Combined, these new models and practices allow for a different ethos to be
developed and a different revealing for man; one that makes possible a Dionysian
celebration of life lived on earth, in the flesh, and in time; life as something
mortal and yet valuable and worthy of affirmation precisely because of this.
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In returning us to the flesh and to time, Nietzsche and Lawrence essentially
return us to the real; the revaluation marks a counter-transcendence away from
the Ideal and the imaginary and asserts that human and cultural greatness is not
achieved via a denial of the thingness of things, nor an attempt to transcend the
earth, the body, or the temporal conditions of existence, but by affirming the
above and forming a multiplicity of direct connections with the real. Immanence,
not transcendence, is one of the central words belonging to the vocabulary of
revaluation. Man, as Lawrence puts it, must learn how to climb down Pisgah,
which means, as Heidegger puts it, "climbing back down into the nearness of the
nearest. "4 This descent may well be arduous and perhaps even more dangerous
than the ascent into abstraction, but if man is to come into fulfilment and
blossoming as man-alive (and not dead-man-in-life), there is no alternative but to
attempt a passage into the sacred moment which is here and now. As we
concluded earlier, it is perhaps our poets and artists like Nietzsche and Lawrence
themselves who are best able to guide us towards this fourth dimensional realm
of the Greater Day; having retained their sense of wonder, of reverence, and of
gratitude. The question is whether we will accept the gifts they offer and dare to
follow the pathways beyond good and evil which they reveal; pathways planted
with purple delights and, as Nietzsche says, with good sentences.
The revaluation of all values is a complex and multifaceted process that will not
and cannot be achieved overnight: it will involve change culturally, socially,
politically, and onto logically . The politics of style, of evil, of cruelty, and of
desire which we have introduced here as possible responses to modern European
nihilism, mayor may not offer clues as to how these changes can be made. The
crucial point to conclude is that Nietzsche's philosophical investigations cannot be
divorced from his public and social thinking. If, as indicated, there are serious
concerns with the above, it is our task to wrestle with these - not funk them.
And if Nietzsche and Lawrence do not achieve a revaluation of all values between
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them, they succeed nevertheless in constructing a powerful reckoning with slave
morality and in exposing the vocabulary of the above as something full of hate
and ressentiment; something destructive to man's well being and which infects not
just his soul, but his political and social forms. Nietzsche and Lawrence succeed
also in offering us the first stammered terms of a counter-vocabulary of
innocence and becoming for which we should be grateful; a vocabulary of
'elementary' words which will enable us to tear up the foundations of our souls,
reawakening feeble and dormant forces within us and liberating us from the old
ideal words of moral-rationalism. Undoubtedly, there will still be many who wish
to remain captives and servants of received conceptual schemes and moral-
linguistic conventions; souls enchanted by the spell and promise of metaphysical
language, enthralled by good grammar and comfortable with cliche. But these
persons will never create new ways of thinking, never enjoy new ways of
experiencing, never discover new worlds to inhabit. There remains no smooth
road into the future; we still have many obstacles to go round or scramble over if
we want to live. But surely, no matter how many skies have fallen, we do want to
live and live with a certain nobility. For whilst God is dead, we are not and, as
Lawrence concludes, this should be cause for rejoicing.
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